On the Theological Origins and Character of Secular International Politics:Towards Post-Secular Dialogue by Gelot, Ludwig
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the Theological Origins 
and Character of Secular 
International Politics  
 
Towards Post-Secular Dialogue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ludwig Gelot 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of PhD 
 
Department of International Politics 
Aberystwyth University 
 
 
16 April 2009 
 
 
  
 - 2 - 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
At the turn of the 21
st
 century, the global resurgence of religion is posing a direct 
challenge to a Westphalian international system which upholds secular politics as the 
most peaceful, stable, and universal foundation for international relations. The aim of 
this thesis is thus to interrogate the secular dimension of the contemporary political 
foundation as well as the beliefs and assumptions that shape IR‘s historical foresight 
so that international dialogue may be facilitated. Through the reconsideration of the 
secularisation process, I demonstrate that the Westphalian secular order emerged 
through the usurpation, translation, and appropriation of important religious resources 
found within Christianity. Far from being universal or neutral, the current foundation 
of international politics has theological origins and a religious character to which it is 
oblivious. In turn, this implies that secularism‘s overconfidence in its own neutrality 
and objectivity may be a threat to the preservation of peace and security. In the name 
of value pluralism, IR must distance itself from its secularist history. Therefore, what 
is required is to reconsider the way IR relates to religion with a view to strengthening 
political independence and international freedom and to forestalling value conflicts. If 
IR is to facilitate genuine global cooperation, it must reconsider its secular foundation 
and exchange it for a post-secular project in which secularism and religion are 
considered on an equal footing. In the interest of peace and security pluralism should 
rethink its assumptions concerning the inevitability of secularisation and exchange its 
secularism for the establishment of a ‗post-secular‘ dialogue with religion.  
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It has been reserved…for our epoch to vindicate…the human ownership of treasures 
formerly squandered on heaven; but what age will have the strength to validate this 
right in practice and make itself their possessor? 
 
 Georg Hegel  
 
 
 
What is divine escapes men‘s notice because of their incredulity. 
 
Heraclitus 
 
  
 
Neither give heed to fables and endless genealogies, which minister questions,  
rather than godly edifying which is in faith: so do. 
 
Timothy I:4 
 
 
 
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
 
 
The world today…is as furiously  
religious as it ever was, and in 
some places more so than ever 
 
Peter Berger 
 
 
Against all predictions, the late 20
th
 century witnessed a worldwide resurgence 
of the religious factor on the international stage with profound consequences for the 
conduct of international politics.
1
 Starting in the late 19
th
 century with the rise of 
Protestant fundamentalism in the United States and taking a completely unexpected 
turn with the ousting of the US-backed government of the Shah during the 1979 
Iranian Revolution, this revival came as a great surprise to most scholars. At the turn 
of the 21
st
 century, the importance of the phenomenon as well as its global and radical 
dimensions found their most terrifying expression in the 9/11 attacks.
 2
 The fact that a 
religious movement could defy not only local governments, but also the world‘s only 
superpower on its own territory posed a major challenge to the West‘s secular vision 
of the international order.  
 This return of religion is most paradoxical as it flies in the face of a world that 
prides itself with its modernity and secularism. The paradox is twofold. First, this 
global revival came as a shock because of the widespread acceptance of the 
secularisation and modernisation theses. In all sub-disciplines of the Social Sciences, 
the demise of religion had been foretold and the advent of a modern and rational 
                                                 
1
 Jeffrey Hadden, "Desacralizing Secularization Theory," in Secularization and Fundamentalism 
Reconsidered, ed. Jeffrey K. Hadden and Anson D. Shupe (New York: Paragon House, 1989), p.22. 
Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (London: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: 
The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
2
 Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder 
(London: University of California Press, 1998), p.20, 32. Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?: 
Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); 
Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion; Jeffrey K. Hadden and 
Anson D. Shupe, Secularization and Fundamentalism Reconsidered (New York: Paragon House, 1989); 
Gilles Kepel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern 
World (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994). 
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society was believed to be well under way. In such a context, the return of religion 
from exile could not have been predicted.
3
  
And second, the revival of religion directly challenges the common wisdom 
according to which secular politics is uniquely able to provide a peaceful, stable, and 
universal foundation for national and international relations. In Europe, the horror of 
the Wars of Religion convinced many that religion, and more specifically Christianity, 
had to be excluded from the conduct of politics and that the secularisation of politics 
was the sole solution to avoid the barbarism and cruelty of religious warfare.
4
 Up to 
this day, this normative assumption has remained foundational to International 
Relations (IR) and in The Global Covenant, Robert Jackson  still defends his pluralist 
version of secular politics as  
the one political-legal framework that can transcend all the manifold 
differences between the countries of the world, can accommodate 
their various belief systems and domestic ways of life, and can serve 
as a normative basis for their coexistence and co-operation.
5
 
 
Jackson‘s statement is of great significance to the extent that it is an explicit, 
emblematic, and most representative outline of the secularist tenets that are taken for 
granted in the field of IR. However, with the return of religion, a growing number of 
voices are denouncing the limits or invalidity of secular politics. And in opposition to 
IR‘s assumption, they denounce secularism as a cultural achievement rooted in 
Christianity and its imposition on the non-Western world as ―an explicitly religious 
action as narrowly sectarian as anything attempted by its nonsecular opponents.‖6 
                                                 
3
 Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
4
 Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? 
5
 Robert H. Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p.366. It is an inherently secular project founded on a set of pluralist 
assumptions that have their roots in the Westphalian attempt to prevent conflicts over religion. ―The 
historical project of the global covenant…is to forestall hostilities and collisions between different 
political groups over issues of values. The societas of states is arranged in such a way as to reduce 
unnecessary political confrontation based on value conflict…Religious values have been assigned to 
that category since 1648. Westphalia represents the taming and domestication of religion…Political 
religion and political ideology…have no place in international society…That would thus exclude from 
international relations the Western political ideology of democracy…the Muslim religious belief 
system of jihad …communism or fascism or imperialism, as well as any other religious or political 
belief system that repudiates the societas of states.‖ p.182. 
6
 Douglas Johnston, "Religion and Culture: Human Dimensions of Globalization," in The Global 
Century: Globalization and National Security, ed. Richard Kugler and Ellen Frost (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 2001), p.669. Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact 
and Middle Eastern Response (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.116. Roxanne Leslie Euben, 
Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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Knowing that ―the global resurgence of religion confronts IR theory with a 
theoretical challenge comparable to that raised by the end of the Cold War or the 
emergence of globalization,‖ it is important and urgent to deal with these two 
paradoxes.
 7
 On the one hand, it is essential to reassess the secular and modernist 
dogmas that are inscribed ―in the genetic code of the discipline‖ so that IR may 
emancipate itself from its ‗own theoretical captivities.‘ 8  And on the other, it is 
necessary to question the validity of secularism‘s claims to universalism, stability, and 
superiority so that we may achieve genuine global coexistence or cooperation.
9
  
The aim of this thesis is thus to interrogate the contemporary secular 
foundation of international politics and the avowed secularism of the field.
10
 It is 
about reconsidering, in light of the return of religion, the beliefs and assumptions that 
shape IR‘s historical foresight so that international dialogue may be facilitated. To 
paraphrase Stephen Toulmin, it is about ―reconstructing an account of the 
circumstances in which [secular politics] was conceived, the philosophical, scientific, 
social, and historical assumptions on which it rested, and the subsequent sequence of 
episodes that has led to our present quandary‖ so that more adequate ‗horizons of 
expectations‘ may be developed. 11  Such a reconstruction has the potential to 
fundamentally transform, not only IR theory, but also the very foundation of secular 
politics.
12
 
This project of reconstruction is undertaken by answering the following two 
questions: (1) What has been the impact of the secularisation process on the 
foundation of international politics? (2) Is the contemporary foundation sustainable in 
the 21
st
 century? Answering the first question will help us to tackle the first paradox 
and will allow us to assess whether the type of secularism adopted within the field of 
International Politics is truly universal or is essentially Christian and Eurocentric in 
nature. We will look at the origins of secularisation as well as the ideas, beliefs, and 
                                                 
7
 Petito and Hatzopoulos, Religion in International Relations, p.3. 
8
 Ibid., p.1, 3. 
9
 Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Oxford: Polity, 2003), p.103. 
10
 The term ‗foundation‘ refers to the principles and norms that frame and inform interaction at the 
international level. The different elements of this foundation are discussed in chapter three. The term 
‗international politics‘ neither refers to the concrete affairs of international politics nor to the theoretical 
discussions of the field of IR. Rather, it corresponds to those intellectual assumptions taken for granted 
by a socio-cultural group at a certain period in time and that influence both these theoretical reflections 
and practical implementations. 
11
 Stephen Edelston Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), p.3. 
12
 Petito and Hatzopoulos, Religion in International Relations, p.3. 
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assumptions that have lain at the foundation of the secular project. The answer to the 
second question will help us to appreciate the characteristics required by any 
foundation of politics to tackle the current resurgence of religion. Besides, it will help 
us to sketch an alternative to IR‘s secularism. 
 
* * * * * 
 
The field of International Relations has only recently awakened to the 
importance of the religious resurgence. In the wake of 9/11, ―[d]espite Samuel 
Huntington‘s Clash of Civilization and Juergensmeyer‘s The New Cold War, the 
discipline of international relations was not ready for the inclusion of the religious 
variable into the contending paradigms.‖13 And it is only afterwards that scholars 
began to address the burning issue in a sustained manner. But almost a decade later, 
the field still has to develop the theoretical resources necessary to an in-depth 
understanding of religion.
14
 Thus, in order to answer the questions raised above, it is 
necessary to draw on the academic discipline most concerned with the study of 
secularisation, namely, the Social Sciences. Despite the ‗frontier police‘ patrolling the 
borders between scholarly disciplines, the interdisciplinary nature of my project is 
justified by the inability of the field of IR to deal, on its own, with religion in all its 
dimensions.
15
  
In the last two decades, the field of Sociology has been home to a lively debate 
concerning the validity of the modernisation and secularisation theses. Effectively, the 
return of religion in the late 20
th
 century has led many sociologists to reassess long-
                                                 
13
 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, p.1.  
14
 Eva Bellin, "Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics," World Politics 60, 
no. January (2008). 
15
 Peter Burke, What Is Cultural History? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p.11. It is extremely 
difficult to define the term ‗religion‘ without including or excluding too much. The term has been 
defined in substantive and functional terms. Substantive definitions are concerned with the essence and 
the content of religion (belief in God, Scriptures, etc.) Functionalists define the term according to the 
functions it performs in a society (social cement, morality, etc.). I do not intend to enter this debate in 
this thesis. Instead, I use the term as defined by Scott Appleby: ―Religion is the human response to a 
reality perceived as sacred…religion, as interpreter of the sacred, discloses and celebrates the 
transcendent source and significance of human existence…religion embraces a creed, a cult, a code of 
conduct, and a confessional community…Thus religion constitutes an integral culture, capable of 
forming personal and social identity and influencing subsequent experience and behaviour in profound 
ways.‖ R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation 
(Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp.8-9. Of course, this definition has its drawbacks and may 
seem overly euro-centric. Nevertheless, it remains adequate to carry out the task set in this thesis. The 
meaning of the term 'religion‘ has evolved over centuries, adding even more confusion to an already 
complex subject. Scott Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global 
Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Society," Millennium 29, no. 3 (2000): 
pp.820-21. 
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held assumptions and well-established dogmas inherited from the Enlightenment. As a 
result of this process, many scholars reached the conclusion ―that a whole body of 
literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled ‗secularization theory‘ is 
essentially mistaken.‖16 Once a systematic theory, secularisation revealed to be ―a 
hodgepodge of loosely employed ideas‖ that neither fitted the data nor the historical 
record.
17
 Accordingly, sociologists redefined secularisation and dispelled the many 
myths that surrounded the issue of the future of religion.  
Thus, the second chapter of this thesis – the introduction being the first chapter 
– attempts to differentiate those dimensions of secularisation theory that are 
‗essentially mistaken‘ from those that provide an adequate account of the process. 
Because the ‗mistaken‘ body of literature has been implicitly taken for granted and 
uncritically accepted in International Relations, I will channel a more up-to-date 
reading of the process from Sociology back to IR. I conclude that secularisation 
corresponded to a long-term and systemic process of cultural change that resulted in a 
shift in sources of legitimacy and forms of authority across Europe.  
The study of this civilisational process is a very large endeavour, the 
undertaking of which is fraught with difficulties. As Kenneth Waltz argues in Theory 
of International Politics, ―[i]n reality, everything is related to everything else, and one 
domain cannot be separated from others.‖18 Likewise, Ernest Gellner notes that reality 
is so ‗rich and diverse‘ that any unselective description of the changes that took place 
in Europe and the Western world over the last few centuries could not ―even be begun, 
let alone completed.‖19 In such circumstances, Gellner advises that ―one chooses the 
crucial and elementary factors operative in human history, selected to the best of 
one‘s judgement, and then works out their joint implications.‖ 20  Thus, the third 
chapter is devoted to this process of selection through the development of an 
appropriate theoretical framework and adequate analytical tools. 
In the first part of the chapter, I look at three complementary ways of studying 
the socio-cultural processes of change that led to the secularisation of Europe. I begin 
with Max Weber‘s study of rationalisation and I then move on to Benjamin Nelson‘s 
                                                 
16
 Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World (Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy 
Center, 1999), p.2.  
17
 Hadden, "Desacralizing Secularization Theory," p.13. 
18
 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (London: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p.8. 
19
 Ernest Gellner, Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History (London: Collins Harvill, 
1988), p.13. 
20
 Ibid.  
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notion of structures of consciousness and Charles Taylor‘s concept of moral sources. 
In the second part of the chapter, I look at the different approaches developed in the 
field of IR to address the impact of these civilisational processes on international 
orders. I connect these systemic changes to transformations in forms of legitimacy and 
authority at the international level. In this chapter, Sociology merges with 
International Politics and I demonstrate that the work of Christian Reus-Smit, Ian 
Clark, and Daniel Philpott are central to the study of the secularisation process. 
Because my project attempts to understand the nature and workings of fundamental 
cultural structures and systemic processes of change, the perspective taken is that of 
Historical Sociology.
21
 It is only once the theoretical framework is outlined that I 
begin to address the secularisation of international politics per se and that I tackle the 
issue of the adequacy of the contemporary foundation of international politics. 
In chapters four, five, and six, I explore the formation of the secular 
foundation of international politics from the Middle Ages until the American and 
French Revolutions. I look at the secularising influence of the structures of 
consciousness, moral sources, and principles of legitimacy that emerged during 
Europe‘s decisive periods of spiritual turmoil and socio-cultural crises. I devote 
particular attention to the ‗seminal ages‘ of the 12th century Renaissance, of the 
Protestant Reformation, and of the Enlightenment as well as to the role played by 
important cultural intermediaries in the development, organisation, and transmission 
of more secular cultural rationales.
22
 
The ‗Eurocentric‘ character of these chapters is not methodological but results 
from the importance of Europe in the shaping of the contemporary secular foundation 
of international politics. This focus on Europe is justified for two reasons. First of all, 
as Hedley Bull and Adam Watson argue, the creation of the contemporary 
international society resulted from ―Europe‘s impact on the rest of the world over the 
last five centuries.‖23 In The Expansion of International Society, the two scholars 
                                                 
21
 Stephen Hobden argues that historical sociology ―is distinct from ‗traditional‘ Sociology because of 
its prime concern with change and historical context. It is distinct from ‗traditional‘ History because of 
its concern with social structures rather than recounting the stories of individuals and describing 
events.‖  Stephen Hobden, International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down 
Boundaries (London: Routledge, 1998), p.3. As such, my project is historical but does not correspond 
to a history of Europe‘s changes over the last centuries. 
22
 Geoffrey Barraclough, History in a Changing World (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), p.12. This 
notion of cultural intermediaries is further developed in chapter two. 
23
 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: 
Clarendon,1984), p.1. 
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demonstrate that the international system of states that emerged in early modern time 
―was exclusively European until the time of the American Revolution and remained 
predominantly so until the Second World War.‖24 In a similar fashion, Daniel Philpott 
justifies his focus on the West because its ―history tells of the changes that brought the 
globe to its present condition…It is the origins of our order in which I am 
interested.‖25 
Secondly, in Formations of the Secular, Talal Asad argues that West European 
history ―has had profound consequences for the ways that the doctrine of secularism 
has been conceived and implemented in the rest of the modernizing world.‖ 26 
According to him, it is thus legitimate to draw one‘s material almost entirely from 
Europe‘s history. Overall, the development of the secular foundation of international 
politics essentially arose as a result of the West‘s supremacy in ‗the management of 
the world system.‘ 27 Therefore, in light of the above, I believe that the Eurocentric 
character of this thesis is justified by the importance of Europe in the development of 
the current secular international order.  
Amongst the many themes touched upon in these three chapters, an important 
thread that runs through all of them is that secularisation was characterised by the 
‗transfer‘ of religious power, property, and functions from within the Church to 
secular elites. In fact, far from developing as an independent, universal, and objective 
sphere distinct from religion, as is commonly believed, the ‗secular‘ was carved out 
and emerged from the sacred core of Christianity. Thus, through the study of the 
changes in structures of consciousness, moral sources, and forms of legitimacy, I trace 
this development that questions and contradicts secularism‘s self-proclaimed 
neutrality, superiority, and objectivity. This process took place in three successive 
steps. 
 The first step was the theological legitimisation of the ‗secular‘ through a 
slow process of doctrinal rationalisation. With the separation of the realm of the 
                                                 
24
 Ibid. The European roots of the current states-system have been acknowledged by countless scholars. 
In particular, this view has been developed and upheld by proponents of the English School. Martin 
Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), pp.118-19. 
25
 Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations 
(Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.29. 
26
 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), p.25.  
27
 Derek R. Peterson and Darren R. Walhof, "Rethinking Religion," in The Invention of Religion: 
Rethinking Belief in Politics and History, ed. Derek R. Peterson and Darren R. Walhof (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), p.13. 
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natural from the supernatural, the secular gained autonomy while retaining its sacred 
character and its role in God‘s plan. Building on Greek philosophy, but also on 
Europe‘s Roman heritage, kings and princes began to claim access to the power and 
resources of their divinely-ordained counterparts. With the Protestant Reformation, 
their demands were accepted and secular rulers were finally granted divine legitimacy 
by Christian prelates. These processes of appropriation and usurpation were direct 
consequences of the theological legitimisation of the secular (Chapter 4).
28
  
Second, building on the newly-consecrated realm of the natural, secular 
polities were modelled on the Church and theological dogmas were slowly translated 
into secular terms to constitute political theories.
29
 For example, the doctrine of the 
king‘s two bodies was developed as a secular image of the Chalcedonian creed of 
Christ‘s two natures.30 After having usurped the Church‘s ‗halo of sanctity,‘ the state 
excommunicated it and took its place. Religion was redefined and emasculated to give 
the secular sphere unquestionable supremacy in all spheres of life. In this regard, the 
case of Thomas Hobbes‘ political philosophy is most telling and largely representative 
of the secularisation process that was unfolding at the time. The creation of a 
Leviathan as a secular replica of the papal Juggernaut provides a perfect illustration of 
the case in point (Chapter 5).
31
 As Eric Voeglin argued, Hobbes took the decisive step 
of decapitating God ―as the ultimate condition and the origin of its own existence‖ 
and replacing him with the state.
32
 
Third, once religion had lost its sanctity and authority, philosophers began to 
sacralise the world on immanent and secular grounds. From the 17
th
 century till the 
Enlightenment, a new secular eschatology was applied to the material world. Through 
the use of reason and the experimental method, justification could be attained, 
redemption achieved, and heaven created in this world (Chapter 6). Under the aegis of 
civilisation, mankind would emancipate itself from the bonds of nature and establish 
peace and security here on earth. Ultimately, these processes of usurpation, modelling, 
                                                 
28
 Roger Mehl, The Sociology of Protestantism (London: SCM Press, 1970), p.61. In this context, the 
word usurpation is defined as ―The action of taking into use or making use of a thing; acceptance or 
agreement in the use of anything; usage, employment.‖ In the Oxford English Dictionary Online 
Edition s.v. ‗usurpation.‘ 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957). 
31
 Michael Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: The Papal Monarchy with 
Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963). 
32
 Eric Voegelin, Modernity without Restraint, the Collected Works of Eric Voegelin ; V. 5, ed. Manfred 
Henningsen (London: University of Missouri Press, 2000), pp.28-29, 64. 
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translation, and secular sacralisation turned the emerging secularism into a 
―theological discourse in its own right.‖ 33  And today, the contemporary secular 
political foundation remains very much influenced by these eschatological hopes 
inherited from the Middle Ages.  
During the 20
th
 century, the crisis of modernity and the rejection of the 
Western colonial order marked a major shift in legitimacy and opened up a space for 
the reconsideration of the secularisation process. Marking a ‗climacteric‘ comparable 
to that of the Enlightenment, the last century was characterised by growing 
disillusionment with secularism and by the return of the old gods whose death had 
been all too quickly proclaimed. The de-secularisation process that seems to be under 
way, though limited in its scope, ultimately calls forth the reconsideration of the form 
of secularism accepted in International Relations (Chapter 7).  
In such a context, because of the theological roots and characteristics of 
contemporary politics and because of the renewed influence of religion in world 
politics, the secular foundation of international relations cannot be sustained in its 
present form. Since secularism is neither objective nor neutral but a source of 
conflicts and tensions, its remaining presence at the heart of the pluralist order is no 
longer warranted in the 21
st
 century. In any case, secularism is not fundamental to the 
pluralist architecture. Instead, if International Politics is to account for the continued 
existence of religion within modernity, it must exchange its secularism for a ‗post-
secular‘ horizon of expectation (Chapter 8). Indeed, the preservation and defence of 
the status quo is no longer justifiable since it unduly restricts dialogue to the confines 
of the secular and thus erects a major obstacle to genuine coexistence and 
international independence. For the sake of pluralism, International Relations must 
reconsider its secularism and open itself to a post-secular dialogue with religion. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Many ideas that inform this thesis are well-known and have been established 
in the Social Sciences and Humanities for decades. The originality of the argument 
developed lies in the organisation of the different ideas, in the connections drawn 
between them across academic boundaries, and in their extension to deal with the 
situation of the early 21
st
 century. Ultimately, the contribution of this thesis to current 
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debates is threefold. First, by working within an interdisciplinary perspective, I 
expand the boundaries of the field of International Politics and offer a picture of the 
current trends and events that is not constrained by secularist, state-centric, and 
positivist biases. This interdisciplinary approach also encourages reflexivity in the 
field since Historical Sociology acts as a mirror in which International Politics can see 
its own limits and blind spots. Besides, such an approach is better adapted to the 
socio-cultural changes that are taking place globally.
34
  
As Barry Buzan and Richard Little have demonstrated, International Relations 
has failed as an intellectual project because of its acceptance of the ‗Westphalian 
straightjacket.‘35 Sectoral narrowness, a-historicism, and theoretical fragmentation are 
the sources of this underachievement and could be rectified by returning to a grand 
theoretical vision. And as a matter of fact the tradition of Historical Sociology, like 
World History, is most suitable to the task since it provides a thicker and more holistic 
historical framework.
36
 By drawing on Historical Sociology, this thesis strips 
International Relations of its Westphalian straightjacket and, reinstates it in ―its proper 
role as a meta-discipline.‖ 37  In particular, by rejecting the ‗presentism,‘ 
‗chronofetishism,‘ and ‗tempocentrism‘ associated with IR, Historical Sociology 
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reintroduces a sense of historicity and reveals the unique historical origins and 
constitutive features of the present order.
38
 
Second, by developing an alternative account of the nature of secularism, I 
provide a thorough critique of the beliefs and assumptions that shape IR‘s approach to 
the resurgence of religion. By questioning one of the field‘s most fundamental 
assumptions, secularism, I open the door to the development of a better understanding 
of the challenge posed by the religious revival and of its potential implications for the 
conduct of politics in the 21
st
 century. I broaden the field of possibilities for inter-
civilisational encounters to include non-secularist alternatives. Far from being the 
only way to accommodate religion within modern societies, secularism should give 
way to a ‗post-secular‘ worldview. Secular politics should transcend its aversion 
towards religion and acknowledge the latter‘s wisdom and resources. Ultimately, 
religion has the potential to contribute powerfully to international relations and its 
dismissal is no longer justified. 
Finally, by highlighting the theological nature of secular politics, this thesis is 
an expression of the growing awareness of the sacred that characterises the current 
resurgence of religion.
39
 This thesis is part of the contemporary trend that attempts 
more or less consciously, after centuries of rationalisation, to re-enchant modernity 
and to restore wonder to the world. Over the last millennium, reality has increasingly 
been depicted in rational, mechanistic, and materialist ways. But in the 20
th
 century, 
the theological nature of this very worldview has been recovered, thereby reinstating 
context, meaning, and substance to a process that was thought to have none. 
Accordingly, the disenchanted world of modernity is now being questioned and a 
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space is opening up for its re-enchantment and the recovery of the lost ‗sensory 
receptivity to the marvellous.‘ 40  
Some scholars have implicitly worked towards the re-enchantment of 
modernity by recovering its ‗religious‘ character. For example, Elizabeth Shakman 
Hurd, Michael Gillespie, and Stephen Toulmin have reinterpreted the advent of 
secular modernity as the development of a more or less theological project.
41
 Such a 
reading of history is markedly different from the one that was commonly accepted 
until the late 20
th
 century. Also, some authors have explicitly called for the re-
enchantment of the world on the ground that its disenchantment was a flawed political 
project that was bound to fail. Thus, William Cavanaugh, Jane Bennett, David Griffin, 
and John Milbank have developed powerful arguments in favour of both theological 
and materialist forms of re-enchantment.
42
  
By reconstructing an account of the emergence of secular politics, this thesis 
retrieves secularism‘s hidden theology. But more importantly, by highlighting the 
limits of secularism and by calling forth the development of a post-secular perspective 
on the world, this thesis challenges the limits imposed by secular presuppositions and 
summons up the re-enchantment of the world. Effectively, the partiality of secularism 
fundamentally questions the historical exclusion of religion from the conduct of 
politics. While, religion had historically been barred from international relations in the 
name of order and political independence, the theological roots and character of 
secularism mean that its remaining exclusion in a religiously and culturally diverse 
world is no longer warranted. It is in such a context that the establishment of a deeper 
and post-secular form of pluralism transcends the narrow confines of the secular and 
opens up a greater space for genuine coexistence, international independence, and 
religious expression.  
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2. Defining Secularisation 
 
 
 
 
 
In the 20
th
 century, religion‘s return from exile was met with great surprise 
because of the widely-shared belief in the weakening of the influence of religion on 
politics and in its eventual disappearance from the public and private domains. 
Whether in the field of International Politics or in the Political Sciences, the work of 
the Founding Fathers of Sociology had influenced academia in profound ways. 
Expressing the common wisdom of his time, the once president of the American 
Anthropological Association Anthony Wallace firmly declared in 1966 that in modern 
societies, ―the evolutionary future of religion is extinction.‖43  
This great discrepancy between the predictions of classical sociologists and 
the reality of the late 20
th
 century led many to question traditional accounts of the 
process of secularisation. The secularisation thesis began to be decried and denounced 
as an ideological and doctrinal project with little scientific moorings, i.e., a religion.
44
 
Because of its roots in a utopian metaphysics, David Martin concluded that 
―secularization is less a scientific concept than a tool of counter-religious 
ideologies.‖45 As a result, scholars began a process of selection and separation of the 
mistaken facets of the process from those that fit the historical record and that could 
account for current trends and events.  
 In this chapter, my aim is to provide a broad overview of the late-20
th
 century 
debate in the Social Sciences concerning secularisation and to redefine the process in 
light of the current comeback of religious fervour. In the first part, I define the terms 
‗secular‘ and ‗secularisation‘ and I outline the common wisdom concerning religion 
and its likely future. I argue that the widely believed predictions of the disappearance 
of religion emerged from the modernist mood of Enlightenment philosophers and are 
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based on a set of unfounded assumptions. Then, I explain how this common wisdom 
influenced students of International Politics by showing that most, if not all, traditions 
endorse secularist prejudices that exclude religion from international relations. 
In the second part of this chapter, I focus on the development of the 
secularisation thesis in the Social Sciences. The aim is to give a brief overview of the 
different approaches developed in the field and to explain how they slowly evolved 
and came to form a relatively well-integrated theoretical view. First, I look at the 
classical accounts of the secularisation thesis developed by Max Weber and Emile 
Durkheim. Then, I look at the development of neo-secularisation as an attempt to 
rescue the thesis from its detractors. Finally, I bring back the insights of neo-
secularisation into the field of IR and I show the limits of the approach to religion and 
secularisation traditionally accepted in the field. I argue that mirroring the anti-clerical 
prejudices that informed the thinking of Enlightenment philosophers, IR is founded on 
‗Westphalian presumptions‘ that are equally biased.46 I finally conclude the chapter 
by redefining secularisation in line with the historical record. 
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A.  The Common Wisdom: the End of Religion 
 
 
 
1) ‗Secular‘ and ‗Secularisation‘ Defined 
 
 The term ‗secular‘ comes from the Latin saeculum, which referred, in the 
Bible, either to a great span of time or to the nature of the human condition after the 
Fall, i.e., ‗this world.‘47 The term remained virtually unused until the late 13th century 
when it came to lose its negative undertone and acquired a more neutral connotation 
to refer to that which belongs to ‗the world‘ as distinguished from the Church (first 
entry in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1290). In particular, it was used to 
differentiate the members of the clergy living in ‗this world‘ (i.e., secular clergy) from 
those living in monastic seclusion (i.e., the religious clergy). Interestingly enough, the 
term ‗secular‘ was understood as being a realm integral to religion and the Christian 
cosmology.
48
 
The term ‗secularisation‘ spread soon after the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 
to denote the – often forced – removal of territory and property from the control of the 
Church.
49
 The process referred to the ―passage, transfer, or relocation of persons, 
things, function, meanings, and so forth, from their traditional location in the religious 
sphere to the secular spheres.‖50 In the heated atmosphere of the Wars of Religion 
through to the Enlightenment, the term became charged with normative connotations 
and came to be associated with godlessness and the profane.  
In the 18
th
 century, the term secularisation came to refer, within liberal circles, 
to the rejection of clerical guidance and to the refusal to submit one‘s judgment to 
erroneous superstitions. The historical process of secularisation came to be equated 
with a radical political project pushing for the privatisation if not the eradication of 
religion, namely, secularism. Finally, during the 20
th
 century, in light of the 
multiplicity and heterogeneity of the definitions of the process of ‗secularisation‘ and 
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because of the conflation of secularisation and secularism, some scholars suggested 
that the term be dropped altogether.
 
 
The large number of scholarly work on the process of secularisation and the 
great diversity of approaches running from the Enlightenment up to the 21
st
 century 
make an exhaustive study of the process unworkable if not impossible. As such, this 
thesis being a contribution to the field of International Relations, my take on the 
secularisation of Europe will be limited to the most important approaches to the 
subject and will not be guided by the current research agenda of sociologists of 
religion. 
Broadly speaking, four successive moments or waves in the development of 
the secularisation thesis can be distinguished. The first wave corresponds to the strong 
versions of secularisation developed by 18
th
 century thinkers such as Voltaire and 
David Hume. The anti-religious, anticlerical, and secularist assumptions that 
characterised their versions of the process have long been dismissed by sociologists of 
religion. Yet, they remain implicitly accepted by scholars in the field of IR.
51
 The 
second wave corresponds to the work of the classical sociologists (Auguste Comte, 
Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, etc). While their take on the subject is far more 
balanced than that of their forefathers, the much criticised Enlightenment and 
modernist assumptions remain deeply anchored. The third wave of interest in the 
secularisation thesis saw scholars such as Peter Berger, Steve Bruce, Bryan Wilson, 
Karel Dobbelaere, David Martin, and many others develop a broad array of 
approaches loosely connected to one another.  
The renewed interest in the subject during the last decades of the 20
th
 century 
was marked by the mounting number of ‗anomalies‘ and evidence disproving the 
predicted decline of religion. Many scholars voiced their concern as to the viability 
and reliability of the thesis and some came to argue that the term ‗secularisation‘ 
should be dropped altogether or ―erased from the sociological dictionary.‖52 But in 
opposition to the challenge mounted by the detractors of the thesis, a group of 
sociologists attempted to rescue some of its invaluable insights. By retaining the bare 
essentials of the classical accounts, scholars of a fourth wave developed the neo-
secularisation thesis.  
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While the work of proponents of the neo-secularisation thesis is hardly 
different from that developed by sociologists of the third wave, their explicit attempt 
to distance themselves from the mistaken Enlightenment and modernist assumptions 
of classical sociologists makes them stand out. Even though the distinction between 
third-wave secularisation and neo-secularisation may not be all that significant or 
relevant in the field of Sociology, because the field of IR relies on assumptions from 
the first wave to understand religion, it is essential to mark a clear-cut boundary.
53
 
 
 
2) The Enlightenment and Religion 
 
The most influential thinkers of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries were fervent 
proponents of the idea that Christianity would gradually disappear from Western 
societies under the advent of modernity and industrialisation. Writing in the early 
1700s, Frederick the Great and Voltaire criticised the English writer Thomas 
Woolston for his pessimistic prediction of the disappearance of Christianity by 1900 
and instead predicted it a century earlier.
54
 As ‗agents of the Enlightenment,‘ most, if 
not all, famous philosophers and sociologists predicted the death of the Church and 
Christianity.
 55
 The belief in the withering away of religion became an implicit 
assumption.  
The great intellectual movement of the Enlightenment was centrally concerned 
with the celebration of reason and the omnicompetence of criticism.
56
 In An Answer to 
the Question: “What is Enlightenment?” published in 1794, Immanuel Kant defined 
the movement as ―man‟s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity.‖57 He argued 
that in this Age of Enlightenment, man was called to throw off the shackles of alien 
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guidance as these were detrimental to his ―progress toward improvement‖ and away 
from barbarism. In particular, Kant noted that enlightenment called for the private use 
of reason to question the legitimacy of religious and traditional forms of authority.
58
  
The end of the 18
th
 century and the great socio-political transformations that 
accompanied the advancement of modernity constituted the cradle for the emergence 
of Sociology. Building on the Enlightenment concepts of progress and reason, 
classical sociologists argued that Western societies were emerging from the religious 
dogmas and superstitions of the ‗Dark Ages‘ and moving into the modern world in 
which commerce, sciences, and technology would liberate humans from the 
oppression of religion.  
The French thinker Claude Saint-Simon argued that the ‗feudal-theological 
system‘ was gradually being replaced by a modernised social order based on 
industrialisation and positivist sciences. For Auguste Comte, the founder of Sociology, 
the Law of Three Stages meant that every branch of knowledge would successively 
pass through theological, metaphysical, and positive stages of development. As a 
consequence, Comte argued that all societies would follow a similar pattern of 
transition away from the fictions of religion to finally culminate in a modern society 
―governed by industrial administrators and scientific moral guides.‖59 Mankind would 
come to outgrow the infantile illusion of religion.
60
 From their onset the Social 
Sciences were ―committed to the positivist view that religion in the modern world is 
merely a survival from man‘s primitive past, and doomed to disappear in an era of 
science and general enlightenment.‖ 61  Industrialisation, education, urbanisation, 
bureaucratisation, economic development, science, and technology were believed to 
lead to the universal spread of a modern society inherently secular.  
 Anthony Wallace argued that as a result of the irresistible diffusion of true 
and objective knowledge that accompanied the scientific revolution of the 17
th
 century, 
beliefs in supernatural forces were ultimately ―doomed to die out, all over the 
world…the process is inevitable.‖ 62  Marxists saw a similar process taking place. 
According to Karl Marx, religion was meant to become extinct as the workers became 
more conscious and aware of their exploitation and alienation. As Engels put it, 
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―necessity will force the working men to abandon the remnants of a belief which, as 
they will more and more clearly perceive, serves only to make them weak and 
resigned to their fate, obedient and faithful to the vampire property holding class.‖63 
Within this mindset, the establishment of a secular order was morally appealing.  
However, as the Enlightenment and the discipline of Sociology swept away 
clerical obscurantism and dogmatism, they ―imposed [their] own restrictive prejudice 
on the scope and content of scholarship as on literature and the arts.‖ 64  In fact, 
because ―from the positivist standpoint, religion is, basically, institutionalized 
ignorance and superstition,‖ the study of secularisation became thoroughly 
impregnated with these prejudices.
65
 In turn, these biases produced ―more cruel 
illusions and blacker veils than the religious naïveté and fanaticism it was designed to 
replace.‖66 The Social Sciences originated and participated in the very rejection of 
religion as an explanation of the world by accepting the widespread modernist and 
Enlightenment assumptions of the time.
67
  
Within this intellectual climate inherited from the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries and 
out of excitement in prophesising Europe‘s ushering in a new era of peace, progress, 
and prosperity, thinkers allowed their beliefs and hopes rather than evidence to guide 
their research. As Grace Davie puts it, the ‗fit‘ between theory and reality ―became 
axiomatic, theoretically necessary rather than empirically founded…as the world 
modernized, it would automatically secularize.‖68 Any deviation from the thesis was 
classified as a localised anomaly or branded as ‗not yet modern.‘  
 
 
3)  The Limits of Common Wisdom 
 
It is against this all-pervasive attitude and set of beliefs that Jeffrey Hadden 
argued, in his 1986 presidential address to the Southern Sociological Society, that the 
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secularisation thesis corresponds to a ‗doctrine,‘ an ‗ideology,‟ a ‗sacralised‘ belief 
system accepted ‗on faith‘ and taken-for-granted.69 As a product of a specific social 
and cultural milieu in which modernisation was bound to lead to the vanishing of 
religion, the thesis developed more as an ideological preference inherent to this 
modernising program than as a systematic theory. In opposition to the widely 
accepted belief in the slow decline of religion, Hadden demonstrated the weak logical 
structure of the thesis, the lack of empirical evidence, and highlighted the growing 
political importance of religion around the world. As a result, he concluded that 
religion is likely to remain alive and globally visible in the 21
st
 century and that the 
secularisation thesis should be ―radically revised or relegated to the category of a 
marginally useful heuristic pedagogical device.‖70 
Following Hadden‘s critical re-appraisal of secularisation, the statistics that 
were once used to back up the secularisation thesis were revealed to be inadequate or 
irrelevant.
 71
 Sociologists realised that the different processes of religious 
transformations and ‗unchurching‘ of populations meant that ―religion in the modern 
world [had become] diffused throughout the culture and [was] no longer contained by 
formal institutions.‖72 Glasner argued that because statistics were based on reified 
definitions of religion as being an activity that takes place on Sundays, within the 
confines of a church, what was in fact a transformation in religion was equated with 
outright decline if not disappearance.
73
 As a result of this reconsideration of statistical 
approaches, leading sociologists concluded that ―there has been no demonstrable 
long-term decline in European religious participation.‖74 As Swatos and Christiano 
argue, ―[t]he secularization theory as does exist is unsupported by data after more than 
twenty years of research.‖75  
Also, besides their critique of the dithering and indecisive nature of 
quantitative approaches, sociologists began to criticise some of their long-held 
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assumptions. For example, the Comtean belief that individuals become less religious 
when confronted to scientific knowledge began to unravel in the face of the high 
levels of subjective religiousness in ‗advanced‘ countries.76 Effectively, the taken-for-
granted incompatibility between science and religion is mostly the product of 
positivist imagination and ―largely a red herring.‖77 As Steve Bruce argues, ―[t]he 
history of the human ability to believe very strongly in things that turn out not to be 
true suggests that whether something is true and whether it becomes widely accepted 
are two very different questions.‖78 Finally, Joe Barnhart traced back this assumption 
to the postmillennialist belief according to which the spread of the Christian message 
across continents would ‗enlighten the heathen‘ and draw them to ‗the manifest truth 
of Christ.‘79  
Another assumption that was promptly attacked was that in the past, before the 
rise of modernity, people were extremely religious and devoted Christians, attended 
Church on Sundays, and above all, feared God. The pre-modern era was an integrated 
Age of Faith marked by great solidarity and filled with the sacred. However, this story 
of the type ‗once upon a time the world was religious‘ contrasts sharply with the 
conclusions drawn by most historical studies.
80
  
Contrary to what most people believe, in the Middle Ages, ―none of the 
common people attended‖ church.81 When one considers the facts that masses were in 
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Latin, that there were no benches for the laity to sit on, that worshippers were illiterate, 
that churches were not heated, and that in any case there was a very limited number of 
places of worship proportionally to the total population, one has good reasons to 
believe that few people attended Church. Furthermore, most parishes had no clergy, 
and even when they did, it was not certain that the priest would be present or be able 
to conduct the mass.
82
 Ignorance of the most basic Christian principles was general 
and the central concerns of the Church were far from being purely spiritual.  
Besides ignorance and a clear lack of interests, the respect for the sacredness 
of the Church was little valued. In effect, churches were used as marketplaces, to store 
grain and crops, and to shelter livestock. Furthermore, within churches men and 
women would dance and sing, ―[m]embers of the population jostled for pews, nudged 
their neighbours, hawked and spat, knitted, made coarse remarks, told jokes, fell 
asleep, and even let off guns.‖83 Also, ignorance and ‗irreligious‘ behaviour to our 
modern standards were accompanied by widespread paganism. 
Finally, the degree of compulsion was very high. When the Church was the 
only form of administrative structure to record birth, baptism, marriages, and death, 
one was ‗forced‘ to be a Christian. Besides, when social gatherings or markets were 
organised at the Church, one had good reasons to claim membership. According to 
Jose Casanova, in the Middle Ages,  
because the official structure of society guaranteed that everybody 
was leading Christian lives, it was not so necessary to stress 
personal devotion. It was the structure itself that was religious, that 
is, Christian, not necessarily the personal lives that people lived in 
it.
84
 
 
 In the words of Delumeau and Le Bras, ―the ‗golden age‘ of Christianity is a legend‖ 
since ―a society must be Christianized before it can be de-Christianized.‖85 
The tremendous gap between what is commonly taken for granted regarding 
religiosity in the Middle Ages and reality finds its roots in the ‗counter-religious 
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ideological‘ project of early sociologists. 86  The creation of an Age of Faith was 
developed from within modernity to legitimise the onset and development of the Age 
of Reason.
87
 Effectively, classical sociologists considered themselves to be at the 
heart of a grand project towards true knowledge and liberation. As Glasner 
demonstrated, the rationale underlying the development of the secularisation thesis 
stemmed mostly from the values of classical Western sociologists, at the heart of 
which stood the general ideology of progress and the faith that accompanied it.
88
 By 
making religion the domain of the irrational, of the authoritarian, the traditional, and 
the violent, sociologists had legitimated the superiority of reason and of the modern 
project and had hoped to displace and exorcise their own violence and irrationality. 
The questioning of the secularisation thesis ended in a profound critique of 
modernity and its Enlightenment heritage. Sociologists realised that the anti-clerical 
quest for truth had induced major blind spots
89
 and that for decades Sociology had 
operated ―unaware of the contingency of its assumptions and the consequences of its 
universalising tendencies.‖90  For centuries ‗the secular‘ had defined ―itself as the 
starting point in relation to which the ‗religious‘ is constructed,‖ a starting point that 
was above all neutral, rational, and democratic.
91
 However, at the turn of the 21
st
 
century sociologists realised that by asserting the foundational character of ‗the 
secular,‘ proponents of secular politics were enacting ―a particular, though certainly 
distinct, theological discourse in its own right.‖92  
 
 
4) Secularisation in International Relations Theory 
 
In Western academia, the influence of the Enlightenment inscribed strong 
secularist prejudices not only within the heart of the Social Sciences, but also ―in the 
genetic code of the discipline of International Relations.‖93 Already in the late 70s, 
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many US analysts were unable to study, let alone understand, the nature of the Iranian 
revolution. The proposition to study the religious dimension of the pre-1979 
upheavals was vetoed at the CIA despite the central role imams were playing at the 
time. As Edward Luttwak reports, this decision was motivated ―on the grounds that it 
would amount to mere ‗sociology,‘ a term used in intelligence circles to mean the 
time-wasting study of factors deemed politically irrelevant.‖94 
In this context, even though the 20
th
 century witnessed the global resurgence 
of religion, scholars within the field of International Politics were far from prepared to 
face the challenge mounted by the September, 11 attacks. As Jonathan Fox and 
Shmuel Sandler noted,  
Should policy makers have turned to the relevant academic 
disciplines, the situation was not much better…the discipline of 
international relations was not ready for the inclusion of the 
religious variable into the contending paradigms in the discipline.
95
  
 
This lack of preparation, Scott Thomas demonstrated, was directly related to the 
Enlightenment roots of the Social Sciences, but more importantly, to the Westphalian 
foundation of the field of IR.
96
  
For students of International Relations, the Treaty of Westphalia is a major 
historical landmark.
97
 By putting an end to the most destructive war since the Roman 
era, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), the Treaty enshrined the fragmentation of 
Christian Europe and gave birth to the central principles of our modern international 
order.
98
 Christendom, and more generally religion, came out of the so-called ‗Wars of 
Religion‘ discredited. What were purported to be religious atrocities were so appalling 
that local princes did their best to marginalise and distance themselves from religion. 
While this was done out of interest in the acquirement of the Church‘s power and 
riches, it was also the result of the development of a widespread liberal and Protestant 
presumption that peace and religious pluralism could only exist if religion was 
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disciplined by a state.
 99
 The medieval cosmology of a united Christian community 
was undermined and religion was privatised, marginalised, and nationalised.
100
  
The religious discredit resulted in the need to rethink the foundation of the 
international order. The Treaty of Westphalia required all parties to recognize the 
Peace of Augsburg of 1555 by which each prince had acquired the right to determine 
the religion of his own state, i.e., the principle of ‗cuius regio, eius religio‟ translated 
as ‗whose realm, his religion.‘ It was agreed that the citizenries would be subjected 
first and foremost to the laws of their respective government rather than to those of 
neighbouring powers or to the transnational authority of the Catholic Church. The 
unification of politics and religion ―within the framework of the state‖ was established 
with the explicit aim of putting an end to the devastation caused by religion.
101
 In the 
words of Jeffrey Stout,  
liberal principles were the right ones to adopt when competing 
religious beliefs and divergent conceptions of the good embroiled 
Europe in the religious wars…Our early modern ancestors were 
right to secularize public discourse in the interest of minimizing the 
ill effects of religious disagreement.
102
 
 
As a result, the newborn international system found its roots in the very dismissal of 
religion as an ordering principle for Europe.  
Nowadays, this prejudice is still very much present in Western academia. For 
example, in Ordinary Vices, Harvard professor Judith Shklar argues,  
liberalism was born out of the cruelties of the religious civil wars, 
which forever rendered the claims of Christian charity a rebuke to 
all religious institutions and parties. The alternative then set, and 
still before us, is not one between classical virtue and liberal self-
indulgence, but between cruel military and moral repression and 
violence [i.e., religion] and a self-restraining tolerance that fences in 
the powerful to protect the freedom and safety of every citizen [i.e., 
the liberal and secular state].
103
 
 
This Westphalian aversion towards religion is further strengthened by the fact that IR 
is integral to the Social Sciences, a field that emerged as ―an empirical, man-centered, 
this-worldly, matter-of-fact explanation of human organization and development.‖104 
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And as Bryan Wilson demonstrated, Sociology ―began as a contradiction of 
theology.‖105  
Besides mainstream Liberalism, most approaches to international politics 
share more or less explicitly the same anti-religious prejudice. Of course, exceptions 
exist in all traditions but as a general rule, secularism is dominant.
106
 The Realist 
tradition develops an approach centred on the relations between sovereign ―states 
pursuing interests defined in terms of power.‖ 107  Realism‘s emphasis on state 
sovereignty is undoubtedly rooted in the Westphalian conception of the international 
order and is accompanied by the ‗Westphalian presumption‘ that religion is no longer 
supposed to play a role in international relations.
108
 States are independent and 
autonomous units that know no higher authority. The transnational authority of the 
Church having withered away during the Reformation and the Enlightenment, states 
are said to live under anarchy and to be pursuing materialist interests devoid of sacred 
significance. As a result of the process, religion has been reduced to an aspect of state 
power, a useful set of superstitions states could use to strengthen national morale, 
maintain order, and gain legitimacy.
109
 While religion was a powerful source of 
inspiration for many Classical Realists and is not overtly criticised, the Realist 
framework makes it superfluous and unnecessary to understand international relations. 
Besides the Westphalian rejection of religion, many traditions within IR are 
―wedded to a post-Enlightenment epistemology defined by the commitment to reading 
the political world as understandable, explicable, and knowable by way of human 
reason and methods.‖ 110 Because, ―such an epistemology at once determines how we 
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come to know the world and constitutes the range of what is knowable,‖ its positivist, 
materialist, and behaviouralist facets tend to veil the importance of religion.
111
 
For example, the mutual and exclusive commitment to secular ‗rationalism‘ of 
neo-Realism and neo-Liberalism or the economic monism and historical materialist 
foundations of Marxism have mostly led religion to be treated as nothing more than a 
dangerous pathological irrationality or as the opiate of the masses.
112
 In the case of 
Wallerstein‘s world-system theory, the tradition is ―heavily informed by Marxist and 
neo-Marxist economic deterministic assumptions. Thus, it also adopts the ‗strong 
version‘ of the secularization hypothesis.‖ 113  Likewise, Anson Shupe notes that 
―globalization theory has ignored religion.‖114 
A similar case can be made against constructivism since, as Fox and Sandler 
argue, ―for an approach that sees the Westphelian [sic] international system as the 
creation of man, the divine is in trouble.‖115 Effectively, by arguing that ―[r]eality is 
not God-given or Nature-given, but human imposed,‖ 116  constructivism explicitly 
rejects religion through the development of a kind of ‗hyper-secularism.‘117 Finally, in 
the case of postmodernism, Swatos and Christiano argue that the tradition ―is nothing 
more than the disenchantment of that sacrality the Enlightenment gave to reason. It is 
the secularization of secularism.‖118 Ultimately, the role of God is further degraded 
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when reality is only in one‘s mind and dependent on one‘s subjectivity. However, this 
brief glance at the rejection of religion should not blind us to the growing attention 
paid to religion in the main traditions of IR. 
Now that the partiality of the predictions concerning the future of religion has 
been outlined, and now that the acceptance of virulent secularist assumptions within 
IR has been flagged up, we can turn to the development of a more adequate definition 
of secularisation. In the second part of this chapter, I look in more detail at attempts 
by sociologists to develop a less biased approach to the process. First, I outline the 
classical accounts developed at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Then, I look at the 
attempt to rescue the thesis from its detractors and to deal with its failures through the 
development of neo-secularisation. Finally, I bring the insights of neo-secularisation 
back into IR and I show the limits of the approach to religion and secularisation 
traditionally accepted in the field. I conclude the chapter by redefining the 
secularisation process in light of the argument developed throughout this chapter.  
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B.  Redefining the Secularisation Process 
 
 
 
In the field of Sociology, ‗secularisation‘ became ―the master model of 
sociological inquiry‖ under the influence of Max Weber and his associate Ernst 
Troeltsch.
119
 In fact, the first sociological study of the secularisation process is found 
in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in which Weber explored the 
process of the rationalisation of action that was spreading throughout all spheres of 
life during the Protestant Reformation and the Industrial Revolution.
120
 The study of 
secularisation was subsequently developed through the use of functionalist approaches 
by Emile Durkheim and others. Even though the term did not appear extensively until 
the 50s, by the early 70s, it had acquired some sort of ‗mystical immunity‘ and had 
become ―the reigning dogma in the field.‖121 
 
 
 
1) The Weberian and Functionalist Traditions 
 
Because he was primarily concerned with the rationalisation processes that 
paved the way for the social transformation at the heart of Western modernity, Max 
Weber (1864-1920) only scarcely employed the term ‗secularisation.‘ Effectively, 
through the study of the rise of ‗the spirit of capitalism,‘ the German sociologist tried 
to understand how the broader spread of ‗Occidental rationalism‘ came to dominate 
all spheres of life from the 16
th
 century onward. Instead, alongside his concern with 
rationalisation, it was the idea of ‗disenchantment‘ that he favoured, an idea used to 
refer to centuries of religious rationalisation which resulted in the elimination of 
magic as a means of salvation.  
Weber located the deepest roots of this all-pervading ‗rationalising force‘ in 
Ancient Judaism, and thus made the Judeo-Christian tradition the carrier of the seeds 
of its own secularisation.
122
 Christianity was thus ―the religion for departing from 
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religion,‖123 or as Berger puts it, ―Christianity has been its own gravedigger.‖124 The 
Judaic non-cosmological conception of God as a transcendental entity standing 
outside the cosmos led to the affirmation of the existence of a ‗disenchanted‘ world in 
which man was the historical actor. Berger demonstrated that such an affirmation 
paved the way for processes of transcendentalisation, historisation, and the 
rationalisation of ethics, the very processes at the heart of modernisation and 
secularisation. In fact, this is connected to the rationalisation of the whole of modern 
life and to the development of individualism, capitalism, liberalism, industrialisation, 
bureaucratisation, and the secularisation of European societies through the flourishing 
of religious pluralism.
125
  
This process of rationalisation led individuals to look for the explanations of 
events within ‗this world‘ through the use of reason and based on scientific standards 
of proof. In turn, religious or ‗other-worldly‘ explanations became superfluous if not 
outright dangerous. The rejection of the mysterium tremendum and the withering 
away of traditional beliefs led to the disenchantment of the world. The ‗mysterious‘ 
came to be conceived as something to be conquered and mastered through the 
development of scientific knowledge and technology. Weber used the terms 
‗intellectualisation‘ and secularisation almost interchangeably.126 In the 60s, Bryan 
Wilson summarised the situation as follows: 
As social processes are increasingly subjected to rational planning 
and organization… [m]en may have become more rational, and their 
thinking may have become more matter-of-fact… but perhaps even 
more important is their sustained involvement in rational 
organizations…which impose rational behaviour upon them. The 
Churches with their dominant function as the institutionalization of 
emotional gratification necessarily stand in sharp and increasingly 
disadvantageous contrast.
127
  
 
Nowadays, it is widely accepted that the process of secularisation ―is a result, a 
consequence, in a way a finishing point, a logical conclusion of the historical-
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religious process of disenchantment of the world.‖128 For Swatos and Christiano, it is 
this rationalisation/disenchantment process that constitutes the core of 
secularisation.
129
  
Contrary to Max Weber who never explicitly defined religion but implicitly 
considered it to be no more than a system of beliefs and ideas, Emile Durkheim 
provided one of the most comprehensive definitions. The French sociologist put 
particular emphasis on the function that rituals, symbolic ceremonies, and seasonal 
celebrations play for society as a whole, and thus defined religion as ―a unified system 
of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and 
forbidden -- beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called 
a Church, all those who adhere to them.‖130 What is most interesting in Durkheim‘s 
definition is his conception of religion as being a ‗social thing‘ per se. In fact, 
religious beliefs, rituals, and practices were thought to act as the cement of society‘s 
moral unity since their object was society itself. Finding its origins in the collective 
unconscious, religion came to be loosely equated with the worship of the community.  
Durkheim‘s functionalist conception of secularisation pictured the process as 
being a direct consequence of the social differentiation that characterised the spread of 
industrialisation in most Western societies. Effectively, industrialisation was thought 
to lead to functional rationalisation and differentiation, de-traditionalisation, and 
individualisation, the cumulative effects of which had a direct impact on the decline in 
church involvement. In Steve Bruce‘s words,  
[i]ndustrialization brought with it a series of social changes – the 
fragmentation of the life-world, the decline of community, the rise 
of bureaucracy, technological consciousness – that together made 
religion less arresting and less plausible than it had been in pre-
modern societies. This is the conclusion of most social scientists, 
historians, and church leaders in the Western world.
131
 
 
The Weberian and functionalist accounts of the process of secularisation depicted 
processes of rationalisation and differentiation that unfolded with the advent of 
modernity and that were logically to lead to the disappearance of religion. With the 
extensive rationalisation, atomisation, and differentiation of social life, sociologists 
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could not have predicted anything but the death of religion. In The Elementary Forms 
of Religious Life, Durkheim concluded that ―the old gods are growing old or already 
dead…‖132 
The variety of approaches to secularisation developed in the 20
th
 century is 
daunting and an exhaustive outline is simply unfeasible. Because this thesis is a 
contribution to the field of International Politics, such an undertaking is neither 
needed nor warranted.
133
 Instead, I rely on the typology of the secularisation process 
developed by Karel Dobbelaere. The Belgian sociologist most comprehensively 
classified the different accounts of secularisation in three distinct categories according 
to three levels of analysis. First, there is a macro or societal process of secularisation 
(i.e., institutional differentiation, rationalisation, disenchantment, subjectivisation, the 
‗Great Disembedding,‘ etc.). Second there is a meso or organisational process of 
secularisation (i.e., relativisation, this-worldliness, privatisation, etc.). And finally, 
there is a micro or individual process of secularisation (i.e., individualisation, 
bricolage, unchurching, unbelief, etc.).
134
 While most theories deal with all three 
dimensions of secularisation, sociologists generally agree that the macro process is 
primary and that there is no necessary causal relationship between the different 
levels.
135
 According to Oliver Tschannen, the three fundamental pillars of 
secularisation are rationalisation, differentiation, and disenchantment/ this-
worldliness.
136
  
 
 
2) ‗Something Must Have Changed!‘ 
 
In the last decades of the 20
th
 century, a complete reworking of the 
secularisation theory took place. Following Jeffrey Hadden‘s attack on the thesis, 
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many sociologists developed similar arguments and questioned its fundamentals. 
Rodney Stark concluded that ―[a]fter nearly three centuries of utterly failed prophesies 
and misrepresentations of both present and past, it [was finally] time to carry the 
secularization doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories, and there to whisper 
‗requiescat in pace.‘‖ 137  However, suggestions to drop the concept altogether 
remained unheeded since unlikely, unsatisfactory, and ultimately unproductive.
 138
 
Rather, sociologists attempted to save it.  
Even though proponents of the secularisation thesis were over-ambitious and 
relied too heavily on Enlightenment and modernist assumptions, the phenomenon they 
were studying was not a chimera. While the secularisation thesis may have had 
mythical overtones, one cannot deny that as societies modernised and changed, 
religious institutions and practices also underwent deep processes of transformation. 
As Peter Berger noted, however inadequate the secularisation theory may be, we 
cannot deny that historically something has happened, ‗something must have 
changed!‘ 
Contrary to Stark, Hadden, and others, scholars such as Jose Casanova, David 
Yamane, and Mark Chaves refused ―to throw out the baby with the bathwater‖ and 
explicitly redefined the secularisation thesis instead of dropping it altogether.
139
 They 
took on board the strong criticisms but retained the core of the thesis. As Casanova 
puts it: 
In any case, the old theory of secularization can no longer be 
maintained. There are only two options left: either, as seems the 
present inclination of most sociologists of religion, to discard the 
theory altogether once it is revealed to be an unscientific, 
mythological account of the modern world, or to revise the theory in 
such a way that it can answer both its critics and the questions which 
reality itself has posed.
140
 
 
In a similar vein, Steve Bruce noted that ―[i]f we can abandon simplistic evolutionary 
perspectives and keep our minds focused on the complexity of the historical record, 
we need not…reject secularization as a social myth.‖ 141  Therefore, numerous 
proponents of the secularisation thesis decided to redefine and systematise their 
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theoretical conceptions in accordance with the new evidence of a religious revival. In 
the end, the most important result to come out of this reconsideration was the 
emergence of neo-secularisation. 
 
 
3) Neo-Secularisation 
 
The neo-secularisation thesis corresponds to a lighter and simplified 
reformulation of the work of scholars from the third wave, especially the work of 
Bryan Wilson. Taking on board most criticisms mounted against the traditional thesis, 
it puts great emphasis on the societal dimension of the process and thus gives a new 
impetus to the secularisation thesis. Neo-secularisation is based on an explicit attempt 
to distance itself from the modernist and secularist predictions of the disappearance of 
religion and is compatible with the current revival. The main exponents of the neo-
secularisation thesis are Chaves and Yamane and their starting point is Bryan 
Wilson‘s definition of secularisation as being ―the process whereby religious thinking, 
practice and institutions lose social significance.‖142  
Neo-secularisation‘s central move is to shift the locus of the secularisation 
process from the decline of religion in all spheres of life to the sole decline of the 
scope of religious authority. This shift in focus leads Chaves to define secularisation 
as being ―the declining influence of social structures whose legitimation rests on 
reference to the supernatural.‖143 In opposition to the earlier theories that predicted 
the disappearance of religion, the neo-secularisation thesis ―maintains no more than 
that religion ceases to be significant in the working of the social system‖ because it 
―has lost its presidency over institutions.‖144  
For Wilson, secularisation means that human consciousness changes as a 
result of rationalisation processes and that people ―learn to regulate their behavior to 
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conform to the rational premises built into the social order.‖145 Even though he may 
continue to ‗resort to the supernatural‘ privately, in public, the ―irrational 
man…contributes to the increasingly rational character of external order in an 
environment that is increasingly man-made.‖146 As such, for the British sociologist, 
the secularisation model does not  
predicate the disappearance of religiosity, nor even of organized 
religion; it merely indicates the decline in the significance of 
religion in the operation of the social system, its diminished 
significance in social consciousness, and its reduced command over 
the resources…of mankind.147 
 
Effectively, organisational and individual secularisations do not necessarily 
accompany the societal decline in the influence of religious structures.
148
The 
separation of Church and state is said to free individuals from the compulsion of being 
a member of the local congregation. But far from turning individuals into atheists, 
religiosity becomes individualised and independent from the authority of the Church. 
In effect, when secularisation takes place, ―there is no necessary, determinate 
shrinkage in the character and extent of beliefs.‖ 149  Likewise, organisational 
secularisation is either challenged or reinterpreted as a process of religious change 
from church-centred forms of worship to diffuse forms of religions – ‗invisible 
religion‘ for Luckmann, civil religion for Bellah, political religion for Gentile, ‗new 
Gods‘ for Crippen, private religions for Casanova, spirituality…150 The new concept 
of secularisation means that one should talk of ―a shift in the institutional location of 
religion…rather than secularization.‖151 
Such a redefinition of the secularisation thesis strips it of its evolutionary and 
universalistic twists and from the taken-for-granted incompatibility between religion 
and scientific reason. By moving away from a predictive approach to a descriptive 
one, neo-secularisation distances itself from the ‗myth of the Enlightenment‘ and 
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accounts for the current resurgence of religion by arguing that it was only the ‗system‟ 
that had become secularised.
152
 In other words, the high levels of religiosity do not 
disprove the secularisation process since it is not because ―there is religion‖ that there 
is ―effective religious authority.‖153 As Dobbelaere argues, ―individual piety may still 
persist, however, if it develops independently of religious authorities, then it is an 
indication of individual secularization.‖ 154  Finally, no mythical Age of Faith is 
assumed. While neo-secularisation recognises the importance of the legitimacy of 
religious authority in the Middle Ages, it refuses to infer the existence of societies 
filled with the sacred.
155
 In the end, because one can be secular and religious at the 
same time, the traditional religious/secular dichotomy becomes obsolete.  
 
 
4) Bringing Neo-Secularisation into IR 
 
The field of International Politics, through its specific emphasis on Westphalia 
as a founding moment, accepted a strong version of the secularisation thesis and took 
for granted the secularist aversion towards religion. However, because this approach 
towards religion is essentially prejudiced, the insights provided by neo-secularisation 
must be brought into the field. While traditional definitions of the process of 
secularisation had a central sociological dimension, neo-secularisation has a central 
political dimension. As Wilson notes, the focus on authority means that ―Political 
authority is…the most conspicuous arena in which‖ secularisation is taking place.156 
Indeed, secularisation is no longer the belief in the withering away of religion but 
should be taken as: 
a process of transfer of property, power, activities, and both 
manifest and latent functions, from institutions with a 
supernaturalist frame of reference to (often new) institutions 
operating according to empirical, rational, pragmatic criteria 
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In particular, the secularization model has been taken as referring to 
the shift in the location of decision making in human groups from 
elites claiming special access to supernatural ordinances to elites 
legitimating their authority by reference to other bases of power.
157
 
 
Thus, the dynamics of change are fundamentally political and secularisation 
corresponded to a ‗political settlement‘ between Christianity and the state. 158 
Simplified to the extreme, ―secularization may be said to refer to the process of the 
separation of state and church in Europe.‖159  
This redefinition has important consequences for the field of IR. In particular, 
it invites us to go beyond the Westphalian presumptions that religion does not and 
should not play a role in politics and to recognise the fact that religion is neither alien 
nor detrimental to the conduct of politics. IR‘s implicit conception of secularisation as 
being the death throes of religion can now be dropped in favour of neo-
secularisation‘s definition of the process in terms of the changes in the scope of 
religious authority and forms of legitimacy over time. 
 In effect, the global revival of religion not only disproves the ‗Enlightenment 
myth‘ but also calls for a reconsideration of its normative secularist assumption. As 
will become clearer in the following chapters, the shift in forms of authority and 
legitimacy distinctive to secularisation was accompanied by the development of a 
secularist discourse of a theological nature. In particular, this discourse was founded 
on ideological dogmas that were created to legitimise the rise of the state as the 
rightful bearer of the monopoly over the use of force (chapter 5). The redefinition of 
secularisation along ‗neo-secular‘ lines poses a profound challenge to this 
Westphalian discourse and requires IR scholars to go beyond two fundamental 
prejudices. 
First of all, besides the belief that religion has become extinct, it is widely 
believed that religion is inherently dangerous and violent and that secularisation 
brought peace and security to the world. It is common wisdom that ―[r]eligious people 
are particularly susceptible to offense and are very keen on responding to the 
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perceived harm with any means, be they legal or illegal.‖160 As Mark Juergensmeyer 
has remarked, ―religion seems to be connected with violence virtually everywhere.‖161 
While it is undeniable that the Christian Church and other religions have given 
legitimacy to horrendous acts such as the Inquisition, the Crusades, or more recently 
terrorism, such a secularist depiction must be balanced against the facts that religion 
was one of the most powerful forces for peace and social change in face of oppression 
(Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Mother Theresa, Liberation Theology, etc.). 
As Scott Appleby argues, the sacred is inherently ‗ambivalent.‘162 Besides, in the 20th 
century, secular politics has legitimised Russia‘s Gulags and Germany‘s Dachau. 
Secondly, from this perception of religion as being violent, thinkers deduced 
that were this violence to be avoided, politics should be secularised. Such a move was 
made during the run-up to Westphalia and remains widely accepted nowadays. Yet, 
when one carefully considers the historical facts, the Wars of Religion that ravaged 
Europe were also driven by the secular interests of political leaders and princes.
163
 
The biased depiction of these wars was guided by a political agenda which called for 
the legitimisation of the state as the only potential ‗saviour‘ from the barbarity of 
religion. Reflecting the climate of opinion of the 16
th
 century, Jean Bodin justified the 
absolute sovereignty of the state as the only ―acceptable alternative to religious civil 
war.‖ 164  However, such a representation of history is highly partial since, as 
Cavanaugh explains, ―the rise of the State was at the very root of the so-called 
‗religious‘ wars, directing with bloodied hands a new secular theatre of absolute 
power.‖165 In fact, Charles Tilly argues, the process of state formation corresponded to 
the largest example of organised crime. The very birth of the state was found in war-
making: ―War makes states.‖166  
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The current religious resurgence contradicts the belief that religion has 
disappeared from the realm of politics and also calls for a rethinking of the discourse 
that de-legitimised religion as a source of authority and established the secular state in 
its place. In particular, it invites us to go beyond the Westphalian exclusion of religion 
from politics. As I will argue in the rest of this thesis, these Westphalian presumptions 
are part of a political project whose prescriptive dimensions may well be as misguided 
as its predictions. In any case, while this project played a role during the 
secularisation of Europe, its validity and implications for the conduct of politics in the 
21
st
 century need to be questioned. To accept that religion does not necessarily have 
an adverse effect on the political process opens up a whole new realm of possibilities 
to confront the theoretical challenges mounted by the worldwide resurgence of 
religion. 
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Conclusion: 
 
 
 The aim of this chapter was to provide a broad overview of the late-20
th
 
century debate in the Social Sciences concerning secularisation and the likely future 
of religion. The central task was to redefine the secularisation process in the light of 
religion‘s return from exile. The first part of the chapter focused on the common 
wisdom surrounding religion and modernisation as well as its limits. The influences of 
the Treaty of Westphalia and the Enlightenment on the public imaginary were 
outlined. We saw that the predictions of the disappearance of religion emerged from 
the modernist and rationalist mood of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries.  The rejection of 
religion as an explanatory framework for the world was accompanied by the birth of 
Sociology and the scientific study of the impact of ‗modernisation‘ on European 
societies. In turn, this socio-historical context influenced the approach to international 
relations and the structuring of the field in the 20
th
 century. The deeply seated 
epistemological and ontological assumptions of modernity led to IR being overtly 
secular, positivist, and materialist, rejecting in turn the incorporation of religion as a 
potentially important factor in world affairs. 
 In the second part of the chapter, I turned to the Social Sciences. I looked at 
classical accounts of the secularisation theory and at the late 20
th
 century attempt to 
save it from its detractors. The modernist and Enlightenment assumptions on which 
the thesis relied were discarded by shifting the locus of the thesis from religion per se 
to the sole decline in the scope and legitimacy of religious authority. The 
secularisation process was finally redefined as a long-term and Europe-wide shift in 
authority and legitimacy, initiated by the rationalisation of human consciousness, and 
that resulted in a transfer of power and resources from the Church and to the state. 
Finally, I brought the insights gathered in the field of Sociology back into the field of 
International Politics and the reality of neo-secularisation was contrasted to the 
widespread belief in IR that religion has disappeared.  
 Now that the secularisation process has been defined, it is necessary to come 
back to the two research questions that motivate this enquiry, namely, (1) What has 
been the impact of the secularisation process on the foundation of international 
politics? (2) Is the contemporary foundation sustainable in the 21
st
 century? In light of 
this chapter, we can see that the impact of the secularisation process on the 
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international order has been a change in forms of legitimacy, a shift from institutions 
with a religious frame of reference to institutions sanctioned by other bases of power. 
This process of transfer took place between the Roman Church and the nascent 
dynastic state. The second question cannot be answered at this stage but it is clear that 
if the ‗Westphalian presumptions‘ and ‗Enlightenment myth‘ are central to the 
foundations of international politics, its sustainability and viability can rightly be 
questioned.  
Before moving on to the study of the shift in legitimacy that marked the 
secularisation of Europe, it is essential to develop a theoretical framework. Not only 
does the breadth and depth of the subject necessitate adequate theoretical tools to 
narrow down the focus of the enquiry, but more importantly, the re-appraisal of 
secularisation as a shift in authority and legitimacy calls for a specific type of 
theorising. For Chaves, such a redefinition of the process calls for the replacement of 
‗secularisation theory‘ by a general theory that could explain why different authority 
structures seem to be dominant at different times and in different places.
167
 Thus, what 
is needed is a sociology of cultural change to explain the rationalisation of 
consciousness and the shift away from supernaturalist forms of legitimacy. 
Interestingly enough, this brings us back to Weber‘s work on the rationalisation and 
institutionalisation of meaning and values. Effectively, the German sociologist wrote 
extensively on the emergence of Occidental rationalism in Europe as well as its 
impact on forms of authority and legitimacy. And despite his acceptance of 
Enlightenment assumptions concerning the future of religion, Weber‘s framework can 
be re-evaluated in accordance with neo-secularisation‘s insights.168 This will be the 
task of the following chapter and Weber‘s sociology will be our starting point.  
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3. Theorising Secularisation  
 
 
 
 
 
The secularisation of Western Europe corresponded to a long-term, systemic, 
and societal process of change driven by socio-cultural dynamics tending towards the 
rationalisation and differentiation of all spheres of life. Its outcome was the slow 
transfer of power, property, functions, etc, from the Roman Church to the dynastic 
state. More specifically, it resulted in the shift in authority from elites claiming special 
access to God to elites legitimating their rule by reference to other bases of power. 
From this definition arrived at in the previous chapter, it is possible to isolate three 
different components. First, there are socio-cultural dynamics tending towards 
rationalisation and differentiation. Second, there is a shift in forms of legitimacy and 
bases of power. And finally, there is the process of transfer from Christian to more 
secular elites. 
In this chapter, the central aim is to develop a theoretical framework that can 
provide us with the analytical tools and vocabulary necessary for the development of 
our understanding of secularisation. The starting point is the driving force and socio-
cultural dynamics that paved the way for the rationalisation and differentiation of 
societies. And from then onward, I look at the set of steps through which the process 
of rationalisation led to the changes in legitimacy and authority. I begin my enquiry 
from within the Social Sciences and I then move to the field of International Politics. 
Processes of rationalisation have barely been discussed theoretically within IR but 
have been the object of many studies within Sociology. However, when it comes to 
notions of legitimacy and authority, IR scholars surely have a lot to contribute.  
In the first part of the chapter, I connect the driving force behind the socio-
cultural dynamics to the changes in authority. Because of Max Weber‘s centrality and 
unique contribution to the study of rationalisation, I begin with his work. I then turn to 
Benjamin Nelson‘s notion of ‗structure of consciousness‘ and to Charles Taylor‘s 
concept of moral sources to sketch a framework of analysis. Finally, I connect all the 
different elements of the framework together by returning to Weber and his typology 
of authority. I argue that processes of rationalisation accompanied changes in 
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structures of consciousness and moral sources that were ultimately connected with 
changes in forms of legitimacy and authority. 
In the second part of the chapter, I look at the theoretical frameworks 
developed by scholars of International Relations and I draw connections between 
Sociology and IR, between structures of consciousness and forms of legitimacy. Then, 
after having dealt with a few methodological points, I bring the different elements of 
the theoretical framework together. Finally, I redefine secularisation in a manner that 
coheres with the analytical tools and the framework itself.  
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A.  Theoretical Framework, Analytical Tools 
 
 
 
1) The Driving Force: On Rationalisation 
 
Max Weber‘s fundamental interest is the study of the genesis and development 
of the patterns of social action that characterise Western modernity and that 
differentiate Occidental rationalism from India‘s greater commitment to faith 
traditions or China‘s cultural developments. Throughout his work, the German 
sociologist demonstrates that these patterns were established to order the world 
meaningfully through the media of different forms of rationality. Effectively, faced 
with the essentially fragmented and disconnected nature of reality, humans are pushed 
by their need for meaning to organise their perceptions and thoughts according to 
reason. In turn, this guides their worldview and life style.  
In The Social Psychology of World Religions, Weber discerns four such types 
of rationality: practical, theoretical, formal, and substantive.
169
 The development of 
patterns and regularities in social action under their impulse is what Weber refers to as 
rationalisation processes.
170
 These processes are not global in scope but ―take place at 
various sociocultural levels and in different life-spheres, both in those relating to the 
‗external organization of the world,‘ such as the realms of law, politics, 
economics…and in the ‗internal‘ spheres of religion and ethics.‖171 
Despite the ability of all types of rationality to establish meaningful 
regularities, the abstractness of theoretical rationality, the ritual nature of formal 
rationality, and the presentism and problem-solving character of practical rationality 
make them ill-suited for the introduction of patterns of behaviour. Weber 
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demonstrates that only the values or canons of values at the heart of substantive 
rationality have the power to institutionalise ‗normative regularities of action‘ within 
what he calls ‗methodical rational ways of life.‘172  By instilling a sense of ultimacy, 
such ‗canons‘ of values (i.e., feudalism, socialism, Lutheranism, etc.) are able to 
provide a ‗valid‘ direction to life and therefore to influence behaviour in characteristic 
ways.
173
  
What makes substantive rationality so different and so effective in instituting 
new patterns and regularities is its ability to orient action by putting psychological 
premiums upon values.
174
 Any action is deemed ‗rational‘ as long as it is consistent 
with this direction. By the same token, the irrational is that which is incompatible with 
the direction provided by the canon of values.
175
 This idea of premium led Weber to 
define the ‗ethical‘ as the belief in premiums which imposes a normative element 
upon actions which are therefore deemed morally good.
176
  
However, substantive rationality is most effective once values have been 
subjected to a prior process of theoretical rationalisation and turned into a 
comprehensive canon or ‗ethic of conviction.‘ This process is called ‗value 
rationalisation‘ and leads to the creation of a comprehensive religious or secular 
worldview, and to the methodical rationalisation of all spheres of life in accordance 
with this unified worldview – i.e., systematisation of knowledge, rigour, etc.177  
Weber‘s sociology is interesting because it provides a persuasive account of 
the driving process and propelling principle behind the secularisation of Europe. The 
rationalisation of all spheres of life led to the genesis of a new direction, to the spread 
of a new secular ethic of conviction, to new rational ways of life, and ultimately to the 
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rise of modernity. This change in worldview provided an impetus for the 
secularisation of worldviews and thus could be at the origins of the shift in forms of 
legitimacy and authority associated with secularisation. However, while Weber‘s 
approach to rationalisation provides us with invaluable insights, his frame of reference 
in time and his typology of rationality have been criticised for being too narrow and 
inadequate for the study of rationalisation in its ‗extraordinary many-sidedness.‘178 
Therefore, I now turn to the work of the American sociologist Benjamin Nelson and 
to the case he made for going beyond Weber‘s typologies and for studying regularities 
and patterns of action in terms of ‗structures of consciousness.‘  
 
 
2) Rationalisation and Structures of Consciousness 
 
Contrary to Weber who mainly studied the European processes of 
rationalisation in the context of the 16
th
 century, Benjamin Nelson (1911-1977), 
argued for the extension of Weber‘s frame of reference in time. In particular, the 
temporal boundaries were to be extended back to the 12
th
 century Renaissance and 
forward to the 20
th
 century.
179
 For Nelson, the Reformation came as a response to the 
Middle Ages, as ―direct assaults against the dominant cultural logics and spiritual 
technologies of the medieval world‖ and therefore needed to be studied in this 
context.
180
 The location of the starting point in the 12
th
 century is supported by 
scholars such as Randall Collins, Pitirim Sorokin, Marie-Dominique Chenu, or 
Quentin Skinner who consider the Protestant Reformation as a second takeoff or a 
single step in a process of change that can be traced back to Medieval Europe.
181
  
In addition, arguing that Weber‘s typologies of social action and rationality 
were rather narrow and inadequate for the study of rationalisation, Nelson made a 
case for going beyond them. The sociologist held that ―all behavior gets to be norm-
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dependent in one way or another, in the sense that all behavior, whether or not it 
originates in a value, has nonetheless to be referred to a value or defended by a value 
– i.e., made congruent with a rationale.‖182 Therefore, Nelson called for the study of 
rationalisation by focusing on these rationales, rationales of Conscience, structures of 
reason, structures of consciousness, or rationales of thought and action.  
Nelson defined these „cultural maps‟ and symbolic technologies on which 
social actions are contingent as the ―bodies of protocols which correlate all notions 
and evidential canons, associated with the proof or disproof, of arguments for or 
against any given declaration or claim whether the declaration be about what is or 
ought to be.‖ 183  Because these rationales of conscience establish the cultural 
requirements and expectations ―in respect to truth, virtue, legality, fittingness‖ they 
unavoidably stand behind all meaningful social regularities and
 
thus behind all forms 
of institutionalised authority.
184
 
Working within a civilisational framework, Nelson developed a typology of 
these ‗structures of consciousness.‘ He outlined three different types: (1) the sacro-
magical type of consciousness, (2) the faith-based type of consciousness, and (3) the 
reason-based type of consciousness. While the first type is not fully relevant to this 
study, the second and third structures are fundamental. Effectively, the transition from 
the second to the third structure corresponds to the shift of consciousness that led to 
the secularisation and the rise of modernity in Europe from the 12
th
-13
th
 centuries 
onwards. As a matter of fact, this shift in consciousness led to ―a complete 
overhauling of the structures of legitimation and theoretical rationales‖ of the 
Christian medieval world and threatened ―the very foundation upon which all vested 
authority rested.‖185 For the American sociologist, the study of the shifts in structures 
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of consciousness is central to our understanding of legitimacy and vice versa.
186
 And 
as we will see in later chapters, the shift from faith to reason-based cultural rationales 
was concomitant with the shift in authority and legitimacy away from Christian 
prelates to secular rulers in the 12
th
 century. 
Despite the fact that Nelson‘s concept of structure of consciousness is very 
abstract and has a limited analytical power, it provides us with an important analytical 
category for the study of rationalisation. Secularisation no longer takes place in a 
vacuum but results from the rationalisation of faith-structures of consciousness and 
from the genesis of reason-based cultural rationales from the 12
th
 century onwards. 
Also, it bears out the idea that we need to look within Christianity to find the sources 
of secularisation.  
 
 
3) From Structures of Consciousness to Moral Sources 
  
This brief contextualisation of secularisation has extended and broadened our 
perspective to consider long-term civilisational shifts in structures of consciousness. 
While this was essential to expand and deepen our understanding of secularisation, we 
now need to develop a parsimonious theoretical framework. Because of the sheer 
scale of the process, it is simply unthinkable to write what would amount to a ‗total 
history‘ of the changes in structures of consciousness that took place in Europe over 
the last millennium. Instead, if one is to study secularisation, it is necessary to narrow 
down the breadth of Nelson‘s analytical categories by focusing on what is core and 
central to the process, namely, the notions of authority and legitimacy.  
The way to narrow down our framework is alluded to in the work of Charles 
Taylor. In Sources of the Self, the Canadian philosopher develops a history of the 
development of modern identity by looking at the ‗immanentisation‘ of the sources of 
morality in Europe. While his study is not of direct relevance to our understanding of 
secularisation, it provides us with deep insights into the origins, development, 
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dynamics, and nature of the cultural processes that led to the creation of our modern 
and secular worldview.
187
  
The Canadian philosopher defines moral sources as the constitutive reality that 
empowers women and men to do and be good.
188
 In turn, he defines secularisation as 
the shift in the moral sources of European culture from theistic and supernatural ones 
to ―ones that don‘t necessarily suppose a God.‖189 And he argues that this ―cultural 
mutation by which alternative [moral] sources to the theistic became available‖ was 
fostered by the threefold immanentisation process that included (1) a renewed 
naturalism, (2) a new sense of inwardness, and (3) the affirmation of ‗ordinary life.‘190 
Knowing that these moral sources inform all notions of the good and the right, they 
necessarily inform ideas of legitimacy and thus stand behind all forms of established 
authorities.
191
 In turn, it is most likely that the shift in authority and legitimating 
principles that characterised the secularisation of Europe resulted from the 
immanentisation of Europe‘s moral sources. Indeed, as naturalist and materialist 
notions of the good superseded God as the source of inspiration in the Middle Ages, 
pope and priests lost their authority in favour of secular rulers. 
The correlation with Nelson‘s shift in structures of consciousness is gradually 
becoming apparent. Both approaches look at the socio-cultural processes whereby 
God disappeared as the central source of truth, legality, virtue, and fittingness and was 
replaced by an alternative source. But while Nelson deals with whole bodies of 
protocols and explores a variety of small-scale transformations in cultural symbolic 
(i.e., the rise of meditative practices, confession, personal responsibility for self-
regulation, etc.), Taylor focuses solely on the moral source at their core. Hence, they 
are both mapping the same process but at different levels of analysis. And because 
moral sources stand right behind all notions of legitimacy, it is possible to shift our 
attention away from broad structures of consciousness and to focus solely on the 
moral sources they embody.  
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However, it remains essential to refine further our theoretical framework and 
to connect the changes in moral sources to changes in forms of authority. The 
connection between Taylor‘s moral sources and forms of legitimacy is further 
clarified in the following sections and in the second part of this chapter. Also, changes 
in morality have so far been abstracted from the broader socio-economic context, the 
interconnection between moral sources and the material circumstances in which 
people lived is considered in the last part of the chapter. 
 
 
4) From Moral Sources to Changes in Authority 
 
In the Social Sciences, as well as in International Relations, the study of 
legitimacy and authority was pioneered and influenced by Max Weber. Weber is 
generally considered to be, if not ―the modern master of the study of authority,‖ at 
least one of its most influential theorists.
192
 Not only does Weber provide us with a 
comprehensive set of analytical tools for the study of secularisation, but more 
importantly, his typology of authority provides us with the connections between 
structures of consciousness, moral sources, and forms of legitimacy.  
In The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Weber defines power as 
―the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry 
out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability 
rests.‖193  However, the German sociologist is not so much interested in coercive 
power and force per se as in patterned and ordered forms of submission in which there 
is ―a certain minimum of voluntary submission‖ on the part of the agent.194 In other 
words, he is interested in the condition in which ―compliance is unproblematic and 
only occasional deviance needs to be policed.‖195 As was argued in the first part of 
this chapter, these broad patterns and regularities in social action can be traced back to 
the ability of substantive rationality to put ‗psychological premiums‘ on certain forms 
of behaviour and to institutionalise such ‗normative regularities of action‘ within 
‗methodical rational ways of life.‘  
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For Max Weber, this voluntary compliance is ensured by the very nature of 
legitimate authority. In Economy and Society, he argues that at ―the basis of every 
authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a 
belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige.‖196 In other 
words, submission and obedience to authority are commended and warranted by 
people‘s belief in the authoritative nature of the normative system and the absolute 
principles upheld by their society. Likewise, the normative system ―generates a 
constitutional structure of state in which all supreme political authority is held subject 
to [a] basic principle.‖197 As such, enduring and stable patterns of voluntary obedience 
to authority result from the orientation of behaviour towards a specific canon of 
values and once these have become institutionalised, they come to form what Weber 
calls a ‗legitimate order.‘198 
David Trubek defines these legitimate orders as ―[1] socially structured 
systems which contain [2] bodies of normative propositions that [3] to some degree 
are subjectively accepted by members of a social group as binding for their own sake 
without regard for purely utilitarian calculations.‖199 In turn, these orders have the 
specificity of orienting behaviours and actions into ‗methodical rational ways of life‘ 
since they embody a ―structured source of guidelines for right conduct.‖200 Besides, 
they do so without relying on force or self-interest for their normative nature makes 
non-compliance abhorrent to people‘s sense of duty.201 Finally, legitimate orders are 
upheld for two main reasons: (1) because of ―a rational belief in the absolute validity 
of the order as an expression of ultimate values,‖ or because of (2) ―the belief in the 
dependence of some condition of religious salvation on conformity with the order.‖202  
Weber‘s typology of authority provides us with the missing connections 
between moral sources and changing forms of legitimacy. Effectively, the belief on 
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which authority rests and the canon of values towards which action is oriented 
correspond to a very large extent to Taylor‘s notion of moral sources. Moreover, the 
institutionalisation of more secular principles into legitimate orders corresponds to the 
shift in structures of legitimacy at the heart of the secularisation process.
203
 At this 
point, one may venture to define secularisation as the decline of the authority of 
religious institutions under the impact of the broader cultural shift in the moral 
sources of European societies and of the rationalisation of its structures of 
consciousness. Or to put it differently, secularisation is the consequences of the shift 
in the moral sources of legitimacy in the sphere of religious and political authority.  
Finally, it should be noted that these concepts of structures of consciousness, 
moral sources, and legitimate orders correspond to ‗ideal types‘ that do not exist in 
their pure form but rather in different admixtures. In fact, ideal types are not true 
representations of the world and should be considered as abstractions designed to 
guide the researcher by specifying the elements and factors that are to be examined. 
They are nothing more than useful focusing devices ―to bring broad patterns of 
change into clearer delineation, admittedly at the cost of blurring details.‖204 
I have so far relied on the work of sociologists and philosophers to build my 
theoretical framework and it is now time to connect my findings to the field of 
International Politics. Not only does IR have an important role to play in the study of 
the less abstract manifestations of secularisation, but more importantly, systematic 
studies of the different elements outlined above exist in the field. However, traditional 
IR remains mostly oblivious to the intricacies of rationalisation processes and 
civilisational changes in cultural symbolic. Besides, its predominantly state-centric 
outlook makes it too narrow to study a civilisational process such as secularisation.
205
 
It was thus essential to begin with the field that offers the least constraining tools and 
approach, namely, Sociology. In this context, we can now turn to the work of scholars 
of International Relations and to their attempts to theorise changes in legitimacy. The 
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works of Daniel Philpott, Christian Reus-Smit, and Ian Clark will be drawn upon. We 
will see that secularisation could be studied as a ―crisis of legitimacy.‖206 
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B. IR’s Contribution, Methodological Issues 
 
 
 
Since the 1990s, the field of IR has witnessed a heightening of interest in 
subjects related to legitimacy, normative beliefs systems, and the role of ideational 
factors in international politics. In particular, under the impulse of constructivism in 
the United States, many themes that had been previously developed by the English 
School were revived and revised. At the heart of constructivism is a fundamental 
insight concerning the importance of ideas, rules, and norms in international affairs. 
The significance of ideational factors to any understanding of social reality was 
explained by Max Weber by the fact that rules and norms  
have a meaning in the minds of individual persons, partly as of 
something actually existing, partly as something with normative 
authority…Actors thus in part orient their action to them, and in this 
role such ideas have a powerful, often a decisive, causal influence on 
the course of action of real individuals. This is above all true where 
the ideas involve normative prescription or prohibition.
207
 
 
For many prominent European sociologists at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, ideas 
and beliefs were considered to be ‗social facts‘ that, ―like switchmen, determined the 
tracks along which action [was] pushed by the dynamic of interest.‖208 
In this second part of the chapter, I draw connections between Sociology and 
IR, and between the different elements of our framework. I deal with various 
approaches to these normative belief systems developed in the field of International 
Politics. In particular, based on the work of Christian Reus-Smit, I strengthen the 
connections between moral sources and forms of legitimacy. Finally, I deal with a few 
methodological issues and conclude the chapter by connecting all the different facets 
of the theoretical framework together. 
 
 
1) Constitutional Structures and Fundamental Institutions 
 
Building on this renewed interest in ideational systems and subjects related to 
legitimacy, IR scholars began to study the role that such norms and rules play in the 
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formation of the international system or international society.
 209
 They came to 
describe the existence of structures of authority and legitimacy at the international 
level. For example, Daniel Philpott pointed out the existence of ‗constitutions of 
international society‘ and Christian Reus-Smit mapped out ‗fundamental institutions.‘ 
One could also mention Mlada Bukovansky‘s idea of ‗political cultures‘ or Ian 
Clark‘s study of legitimacy in international society. Broadly speaking, these structures 
of legitimacy correspond to sets of implicit and explicit norms and rules shared by the 
major actors of a system and which define the holders of authority and outline 
expected modes of coexistence.
210
 These socially shared expectations, understandings, 
and standards of behaviour have both a constraining and an enabling effect on their 
adherents.
211
  
In Revolutions in Sovereignty, Daniel Philpott defines the international 
structure of legitimacy as ―a set of norms, mutually agreed by polities who are 
members of the society, that define the holders of authority and their prerogatives.‖212 
In a Weberian fashion, Philpott argues that constitutional norms do not imply 
compliance since they are not necessarily enforced: ―Indeed, constitutions can be 
violated, and can experience aberrations and exceptions, without losing their status as 
constitutions.‖213 When constitutions are contested, they are not necessarily replaced 
by new or more adequate ones (i.e., a ‗revolution in sovereignty‘) but the probability 
that actions will be oriented towards them simply decreases. The norms no longer 
elicit widespread endorsement or support. 
However, the concept of constitution of international society is limited by the 
fact that it tends to lump together ultimate principles of legitimacy and their 
institutionalisation into more basic norms and rules of collective conduct. Since 
secularisation primarily corresponds to changes in legitimate orders brought about by 
broader shifts in structures of consciousness and moral sources, it is essential to 
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proceed to the analytical differentiation of the two connected yet distinct dimensions 
of legitimacy. Because Reus-Smit has made the distinction clear and managed to 
differentiate ‗fundamental institutions,‘ from ‗constitutional structures‘ (legitimate 
orders), and from the ‗moral purpose of the state‘ (moral sources), I now turn to his 
work.  
In The Moral Purpose of the State, Christian Reus-Smit deals with what he 
calls ‗fundamental institutions,‘ those ―elementary rules of practice that states 
formulate to solve the coordination and collaboration problems associated with 
coexistence under anarchy‖ – international law, multilateralism, and so on. 214 
Through his attempt to develop a theory of the origins of these fundamental 
institutions, Reus-Smit comes to consider the role played by the ―deep constitutive 
metavalues that comprise the normative foundations of international society.‖ 215 
These ‗constitutional structures,‘ as he calls them, correspond to ―coherent ensembles 
of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and norms, that perform two functions in 
ordering international societies,‖ they define rightful membership and rightful 
conduct for the units of the system.
216
 Like legitimate orders, these deeper 
constitutional structures are very important since, as John Ruggie puts it, they ―have 
causal priority, and the structural levels closer to the surface of visible phenomena 
take effect only within a context that is already ‗prestructured‘ by the deeper 
levels.‖217 
Constitutional structures have three main components: (1) a hegemonic belief 
system about the moral purpose of the state, (2) an organising principle of sovereignty, 
and (3) a systemic norm of procedural justice. The ‗moral purpose of the state‘ 
represents the core of the normative structures and defines the ultimate notion of the 
‗good‘ served by the political arrangements. It is ‗hegemonic‘ in the sense that it 
constitutes the established and prevailing form of justification sanctioned by a 
society.
218
 Besides this moral purpose of the state, constitutional structures 
incorporate an ‗organising principle of sovereignty‘ and a ‗norm of procedural 
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justice.‘ These two elements are founded on the moral purpose of the state and are 
largely dependent on it. While the first component plays the most important role, the 
three of them form a coherent set of values and norms that legitimises institutional 
practices and international interaction and cooperation. 
The major strength of Reus-Smit‘s analytical framework is that, by looking at 
the norms and inter-subjective beliefs that shape fundamental institutions, it deals 
directly with the absolute principles at the heart of legitimate authority. In turn, this 
allows for a better understanding of the interconnections between changing absolute 
principles of legitimacy and the generation of the matching fundamental institutions in 
which all political authority is held subject to the new principles. While Reus-Smit 
does not directly deal with secularisation, we can see that his theoretical framework 
encompasses the shift in power and legitimacy at the heart of the process. Effectively, 
by developing a model that helps us to understand evolving patterns of moral 
inclusion and exclusion, Reus-Smit leads us to consider how the shift in location of 
decision-making and the decline in religious authority resulted from changes in 
constitutional structures and the moral purpose of the state at the international level. 
However, Reus-Smit‘s framework is ultimately geared towards the study of normative 
change through a state-centric lens and as expressed in changes in the principle of 
sovereignty. To this extent, he misses the complexity of the transfer of authority and 
legitimacy away from the transnational Church and to the absolutist states of the 17
th
 
century. 
The theoretical framework developed by Reus-Smit is important because it 
offers a systematic and comprehensive way to connect the different elements of our 
own framework. By arguing that the ―changes in the metavalues that comprise those 
structures [are] a primary determinant of systems change,‖ Reus-Smit links the long-
term systemic changes to the shifts in canon of values and to the evolving forms of 
legitimacy and authority.
219
 His notion of meta-values can largely be connected to 
Charles Taylor‘s moral sources. Indeed, they are both defined as major normative 
principles and beliefs that influence social and political structures as well as forms of 
legitimacy. Likewise, Reus-Smit‘s notion of constitutional structures is akin to 
Weber‘s notion of legitimate orders since they both correspond to institutionalised 
norms and practices that order societies and define notions of legitimacy. Finally, 
                                                 
219
 Ibid., p.164. 
Chapter 3: Theorising Secularisation 
 - 64 - 
Reus-Smit further connects changes in forms of legitimacy to changes in the norms 
and rules of the international order and hence to changes in forms of authority. As a 
result, if secularisation is to be better understood, we must primarily focus on the 
changes in the meta-values of the constitutional structures. 
 
 
2) Epochal Changes and Seminal Periods 
 
In The Moral Purpose of the State, Reus-Smit applies his theoretical 
framework to the cases of Ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, Absolutist Europe, and 
the Modern international system. He illustrates his argument through a comparative 
analysis of the changes in constitutional structures and fundamental institutions of 
four different societies of states. Other authors interested in the transformation of 
international normative structures have looked at periods of revolutions in sovereignty, 
or major epochal changes.
220
 This non-linear approach to the study of legitimacy is 
also thought to be the most adequate by Ian Clark. In Legitimacy and International 
Society, Clark solely focuses on peace settlements for the simple reason that it is after 
periods of strife and tension that major changes are best observed.
221
 As he notes in 
International Legitimacy and World Society,  
new principles of legitimacy tend to emerge most clearly in peace 
settlements at the end of major wars. Even if those wars were not 
always themselves the only or even the proximate causes of these 
shifts, they at least provided the opportunity for new ideas to take 
hold, and the political space for them to find their way onto the 
agenda….And so it would seem that the aftermath of wars become 
noteworthy focal points for tracing the origins of other kinds of 
norms as well.
222
 
 
However, to assume that new norms, principles, and beliefs necessarily ‗find their 
way onto the agenda‘ during peace settlements is debatable. Effectively, new 
legitimate orders result from prior changes in human consciousness and cultural 
symbolic and are therefore far broader and all-pervasive than what can be embodied 
in a peace treaty or in its organisation and unfolding. Why should one concentrate on 
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treaties when one can get a better grasp of these ideas by looking at them prior to their 
adoption and translation into political niceties?  
For example, the treaty of Westphalia is well-known for its establishment of 
the principle of cuius regio eius religio. However, were one to focus solely on the 
treaty itself, one would remain completely blind to the broader processes of 
naturalisation, rationalisation, individualisation, and immanentisation that were 
revolutionising European principles of legitimacy at the time. As a matter of fact, 
these fundamental socio-cultural dynamics have a profound impact on the formation 
of principles of legitimacy but remain untranslated during peace settlements. Scholars 
in the field of IR have a tendency to abstract specific facets of international relations 
from larger transformations in human societies and often fail to connect the former to 
the latter. In this context, it seems that Clark‘s approach is most adequate for the study 
of the practice of legitimacy but remains limited when applied to the study of moral 
sources and secularisation. In turn, the role of Historical Sociology as a tradition 
complementary to IR is further supported. 
While I recognise the great significance and importance of revolutions and 
social upheavals in the generation and spread of new legitimate orders, I believe that 
to focus on peace settlements is needlessly restrictive and too narrow. Instead, I prefer 
to trace the emergence of specific facets of international relations‘ secular foundation 
during Europe‘s decisive periods of spiritual turmoil and socio-cultural crises. 
Following the British historian Geoffrey Barraclough, I devote particular attention to 
the ‗seminal ages‘ of the 12th century Renaissance, of the Protestant Reformation, and 
of the Enlightenment and in the last chapter, I look at the extent to which the 20
th
 
century marked a comparable ‗climacteric.‘ 223  These seminal periods have been 
selected to the extent that ―there are certain affinities or similarities in circumstance, 
or in the questions with which men were coping, that make…their study particularly 
rewarding‖ for our understanding of secularisation.224 In particular, it is during these 
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three seminal periods that the changes in forms of legitimacy that underpinned the 
secularisation process took place.
225
 
 
 
3) Mediatorial Elites 
 
The issue we are now facing is that of the nature of the actors driving changes 
in legitimate orders. In National Collective Identity, Rodney Hall demonstrated that 
epochal changes are the result of micro-level shifts in the collective identity of the 
actors. But who are the actors concerned? States, nations, the working class, 
diplomats and negotiators at peace settlements? Throughout his work, Benjamin 
Nelson, drawing on Weber‘s concept of ‗status carriers,‘226 points to a specific group 
of individuals located in between the micro and macro levels of analysis and that 
plays an extremely important social role in the processes of development, organisation, 
and transmission of cultural rationales and legitimate orders, i.e., the mediatorial 
elite.
227
 Nelson argues that in every society one can discern a 
motley army of authorized and unauthorized groups and individuals 
who can collectively be described as the influential others – familial 
paradigms, extra-familial supervisors and cynosures, cultural 
paragons, mediatorial elites – The Grand Army of Officers and 
Aides…who have been trained with responsibility for…the defence 
of the interests of the governing powers. They are authorities in the 
interpretation of scripts and the establishment of the directive 
programs. At any given time these officers and aides have varying 
degrees of formal authority, indirect influence or effective power in 
respect to the operation of the mediation process.
228
 
 
Because of their role as prime actors in the structuring and development of cultural 
patterns and regularities, the work of the most prominent members of this mediatorial 
elite will be the focus of my thesis. In particular, I will look at the new principles or 
                                                 
225
 Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978), p.9. One could also mention Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity: Twelve Lectures, ed. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), p.17. 
226
 Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," p.287. 
227
 Ibid. See also Vovelle‘s idea of cultural intermediaries. Michel Vovelle, Ideologies and Mentalities 
(Cambridge: Polity in association with Basil Blackwell, 1990). Ch. 6. In the field of IR, the notion of 
‗norm entrepreneurs‘ is more commonly used. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International 
Norms and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998). 
228
 Benjamin Nelson, "Cultural Cues and Directive Systems," in On the Roads to Modernity: 
Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings, ed. Benjamin Nelson and Toby E. Huff 
(Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), pp.24-25. 
Chapter 3: Theorising Secularisation 
 - 67 - 
‗idées-forces‘ developed by leading ecclesiastical figures, philosophers, and political 
thinkers.
229
 As Guenther Roth argues,  
[h]istorically priests have been the most important legitimizers of 
political authority… [and that today] they are rivalled and 
frequently eclipsed by secular legitimizers, whether they be free-
lancing intellectuals or employed party ideologists. This competition 
has destroyed the clergy‘s one time monopoly.230 
 
As a result, it seems important to first look at the Christian mediatorial elite, and as 
secularisation advances, to progressively switch attention to more secular-minded 
status carriers; i.e., secular theologians and philosophers.
231
 
 More specifically, I will look into greater details at the work of Martin Luther, 
René Descartes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Besides their prominence and 
importance for the changes in structures of consciousness, moral sources, and 
legitimate orders, these thinkers are widely considered to be ―the begetters of…the 
modern conscience.‖232 Their role in the formulation and spread of immanence and 
rationalisation is central to our study of secularisation.
233
 I do not want to give the 
impression that secularisation ―spread outward from the formulations of epoch-
making philosophers.‖234 Of course, the collapse of Christianity did not result from 
the writings of Descartes or Locke. I believe that my focus on these influential 
thinkers is warranted by the fact that they articulated most powerfully ideas and 
cultural trends that were ‗already in train‘ and thus helped to shape and guide their 
‗future direction and form.‘235 Charles Taylor has explained that cultural movements 
are ―diffuse and ambiguous, hard to pick out and define.‖236 And in such a context, 
the philosophical formulations of these great thinkers deserve attention to the extent 
that they ―became normative for broad movements of thought.‖ 237  Through the 
systematisation and popularisation of new cultural rationales, these thinkers played an 
important role in the development of new forms of legitimacy.
238
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My choice of thinkers is justified on a case by case basis in each chapter and 
the criteria for deciding who to include or omit are open to criticism. But overall, I 
have selected Martin Luther, Thomas Hobbes, Rene Descartes, John Locke, and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau because their theological or philosophical formulations were most 
representative of the changes in consciousness that were taking place at the time. 
Luther‘s contribution to the emergence of modernity has been recognised by Weber, 
Nelson, Maritain, and countless others.
239
 The case of Thomas Hobbes is more 
complex, but for now it is enough to note that his philosophical contribution reflected 
the 17
th
 century shift in the European intellectual consciousness.
240
 The influence of 
Descartes and Locke has also been most significant in the onset of our modern and 
individualised form of consciousness.
241 
Finally, I look at Rousseau‘s oeuvre in great 
detail since he completed the rationalisation of Christianity initiated by Luther and 
fostered a major shift in legitimacy during the 18
th
 century.
 242
 As Henri Bergson 
remarked, Rousseau was ―the most powerful of the influences which the human mind 
has experienced since Descartes.‖ 243 Many of the philosophers I deal with have long 
been recognised as important for the formation of our modern form of consciousness. 
But overall, I believe that these thinkers, individually and as a group, have developed 
ideas and resources concerning the secularisation of Europe that have been used by 
their contemporaries and that remain powerfully available for us to draw on to make 
sense of our current condition.  
Some may argue that such an approach is biased and elitist and cannot provide 
an accurate depiction of the situation for it entirely ignores the more general social 
                                                 
239
 Benjamin Nelson, "Self-Images and Systems of Spiritual Direction," in On the Roads to Modernity: 
Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings, ed. Benjamin Nelson and Toby E. Huff 
(Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p.51. John Herman Randall, The Career of Philosophy: From 
the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment (London: Columbia University Press, 1962); Weber, The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
240
 Brian R. Nelson, Western Political Thought: From Socrates to the Age of Ideology (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p.128. Michael Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1975), p.58. Leo Strauss, "On the Spirit of Hobbes's Political Philosophy," in Hobbes 
Studies, ed. K. C. Brown (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965). 
241
 Taylor, Sources of the Self p.157. Carl Lotus Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century 
Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), pp.1-31. Peter Gay, The Enlightenment : An 
Interpretation, vol. 1, The Rise of Modern Paganism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p.37. 
Gerald R. Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century (1964), pp.5-6. ———, From 
Puritanism to the Age of Reason: A Study of Changes in Religious Thought within the Church of 
England 1660 to 1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p.77, 114. 
242
 Maritain, Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau, p.147. Randall, The Career of Philosophy, 
p.964. Joan McDonald, Rousseau and the French Revolution, 1762-1791 (London: University of 
London Athlone Press, 1965), p.164. Lord Acton, Lectures on the French Revolution, ed. John N. 
Figgis and Reginald V. Laurence (London: Macmillan, 1910), pp.15-16. 
243
 Henri Bergson, "La Philosophie Française," La Revue de Paris 15 Mai (1915): p.8.  
Chapter 3: Theorising Secularisation 
 - 69 - 
context or the intellectual matrix out of which the works of the mediatorial elite 
emerged.  As Skinner puts it, because ―political life itself sets the main problems for 
the political theorists ... [it is] essential to consider the intellectual context in which 
the major texts were conceived.‖244  However, I believe that my approach is not open 
to such criticisms since the narrative I am developing is broadly concordant with well-
known studies of this very intellectual matrix. More specifically, my narrative will be 
built upon the work of Walter Ullmann, Reinhard Bendix, and Jonathan Israel and 
will only be original insofar as it draws connections between elements that had 
previously remained unrelated.  
Nevertheless, to focus on status carriers is not without problems. Effectively, 
what is the connection between mediatorial elites, rationalisation, legitimate orders, 
and collective identities? To what extent do ideas influence actions and behaviours? 
To what extent can we argue that the ideas and beliefs of the status carriers trickle 
down and come to be widely shared and accepted throughout the population? The 
study of the mediatorial elite calls for the clarification of the relationship between 
ideational and material factors. 
 
 
4) Idealism and Materialism 
 
In Revolutions in Sovereignty, Daniel Philpott explores the role ideas played 
during the great socio-political transformations Europe experienced in the 17
th
 century. 
Through a study of the ideas of Protestant revolutionaries, he demonstrates how 
religious beliefs and ideas challenged the medieval constitution of international 
politics and paved the way for the rise of the modern constitution of sovereign states. 
Philpott demonstrates that this revolution was sustained by the work of a limited 
number of intellectuals or ‗entrepreneurs of ideas‘ whose concepts and principles 
came to be diffused by intellectual communities, activists networks, and other types of 
‗couriers.‘ 245 As a result, large social swaths came to be converted and the medieval 
constitution lost validity. Philpott concludes with the claim that ―[t]here must first be 
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an intellectual revolution for there to be a political revolution.‖246 This point has also 
been made by Jonathan Israel who argued, in the case of the Enlightenment, that the 
demolition of the monarchical world would have been ―impossible, or exceedingly 
implausible without a prior revolution in ideas – a revolution of the mind.‖247 
From my special interest in normative systems and legitimate orders, and from 
my focus on the ideas and beliefs of members of the mediatorial elite, some will 
conclude that I subscribe to some sort of idealism. However this is not the case. Far 
from rejecting materialistic approaches to systemic changes, I argue for the 
complementariness of the two perspectives. The significance of ideas does not rule 
out the importance of material factors and raw power. History shows that ideas of 
legitimacy are often shaped by, and in favour of, the most powerful actors anyway.
248
 
Nevertheless, material might is not enough for an actor to achieve its objectives or to 
establish a stable form of rule.
249
 As Reus-Smit explains, 
issues as fundamental as the nature and implications of sovereignty 
and the institutional architectures of international societies are 
inexplicable without reference to culture, identity and norms. 
Ideational factors such as these give meaning to material structures 
and processes and define actors‘ identities and interests.250 
 
Therefore, despite the importance of material factors, I will treat ‗only one side of the 
causal chain‘ and solely focus on legitimating principles.251 
Following Weber once again, I frame the relationship between values and 
material interests by using the concept of ‗elective affinities,‘ i.e., the ‗fit‘ between the 
values and ideas chosen by actors and their material interests. While ideas are 
powerless in and of themselves, social actors are equally powerless without a 
normative system through which to frame and carry out their interests. In fact, ideas 
are abandoned if they are not ‗elected‘ and have no ‗affinity‘ with the interests of the 
mediatorial elite.
252
 As such, this relationship is one of reciprocal causation in which 
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―material and ideal interests mutually reinforce one another to create especially 
powerful motivational forces capable of sustaining quite resilient patterns of 
conduct.‖253 This in turn further strengthens my position concerning the importance of 
the mediatorial elite in the study of secularisation for they are those who will elect and 
judge the ‗fittingness‘ of ideas. By acting as legislators of ideas, these cultural 
intermediaries are introducing or at least pressing for the adoption of new structures of 
consciousness and principles of legitimacy. 
Because issues of elective affinities and legitimacy are barely quantifiable, it is 
most compelling to develop some sort of interpretive explanation.
254
 As Clark and 
Reus-Smit explain, since  
the political salience of social recognition for an actor‘s or 
institution‘s power depends upon the institutional context and the 
degree to which social support maps on to the actor‘s or institution‘s 
intended realm of political action... our assessments of whether a 
subject is experiencing a legitimacy crisis are based on judgements 
about whether its level of social recognition has reached such low 
levels that it must either adapt (by re-establishing legitimacy, or 
exchanging material for social sources of power) or face 
disempowerment.
255
 
 
My aim will not be to provide a causal historical explanation of how secularisation 
came about or of the precipitating conditions that led to the cultural shift. Instead, 
following Taylor, I will give an account of the new normative systems and canons of 
values that replaced those of the Church. I will provide an interpretation of why 
people found the new worldview more convincing, meaningful, and inspiring and thus 
changed the justificatory framework that previously sanctioned political authority. 
This thesis is not idealist since it rejects the idea that an interpretive study of idées-
forces is sufficient to answer the secularisation question.
256
 It only assumes that 
ideational structures, far from being epiphenomenal, shape the development of 
material interests. 
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Conclusion: 
 
 
From the driving force behind the secularisation process, through to changes 
in forms of legitimacy, and down to the very transfer of property, functions, and 
power from Church to state, the essential elements of the theoretical framework have 
been outlined. It is now time to pull all the strings together and to summarise the 
findings. Drawing on the work of Max Weber, I explained that the secularisation of 
Europe was the outcome of rationalisation processes whereby reality was organised 
according to a meaningful and coherent worldview based on specific canons of values. 
I thus went on to sketch a theoretical foundation for the study of these processes by 
drawing on the work of Benjamin Nelson. I explained that rationalisation processes 
are best studied by focusing on the decay, transformation, and replacement of what 
Nelson calls the ‗structures of consciousness,‘ namely, those cultural rationales that 
establish the cultural standards in matters of truth, virtue, legality, etc. 
More specifically, I made a case for shifting attention from the broad cultural 
rationales to the sole normative principles and beliefs that they embody, that is, their 
moral sources. Indeed, more than the structures of consciousness, it is the moral 
sources at their core that inform notions of legitimacy and authority and that thus 
stand behind the secularisation process. As Weber rightly argued, all forms of 
authority are founded on normative patterns and regularities associated with specific 
canons of values. And it is the rationalisation of these values or moral sources and 
their institutionalisation within immanent legitimate orders that ultimately facilitated 
the transfer of authority from the Church to the state at the heart of the secularisation 
process. As such, if secularisation is to be studied, it is necessary to focus on the shifts 
in moral sources and legitimate orders as well as their interconnections. 
 In the second part of the chapter, I turned to the field of International Relations 
to find the appropriate analytical tools for the study of legitimacy and authority. 
Within IR, concepts similar to Weber‘s notion of legitimate order or Taylor‘s idea of 
moral sources have been developed and it is Reus-Smit who provides the most 
comprehensive equivalents. In particular, his notions of moral purpose (i.e., moral 
sources) and constitutional structures (i.e., legitimate orders) embody most perfectly 
Weber‘s emphasis on the power of values and ideals in the ordering of the world into 
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a meaningful unity.
257
 The connections that Reus-Smit drew between the two 
concepts helped us to further integrate the various elements of our analytical 
framework.  
Now that the different levels of the framework have been outlined and that 
their interconnections have been clarified, the concept of secularisation can be 
redefined as the founding of new legitimate orders under the impulse of broader 
changes in moral sources and shifts in structures of consciousness. The end product is 
the process of transfer of authority from the Church to the state outlined by Bryan 
Wilson.
258
 The different dimensions of my theoretical framework can be combined 
and represented as follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The 4 Levels of the Secularisation Process 
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Before moving on to the study of secularisation per se, I would like to come 
back to the two research questions that motivate this enquiry, namely, (1) What has 
been the impact of the secularisation process on the foundation of international 
politics? (2) Is the contemporary foundation sustainable in the early 21
st
 century? In 
light of our theoretical framework, we can see that the study of the secularisation 
process will be carried out by looking at the epochal changes in the meta-values that 
legitimise changing constitutions of international politics. This calls for an interpretive 
study of evolving forms of legitimacy and this will be the aim of the following four 
chapters. The second research question cannot be answered at this stage. However, it 
is clear that if the ‗Westphalian presumptions‘ and ‗Enlightenment myths‘ are coming 
under increasing challenge (Chapter 2), it could well be that a broader shift in 
legitimacy is taking place, calling for a shift in the contemporary foundation of 
international politics. 
  
4. Secularisation, Act I: 
Medieval Origins 
 
 
 
 
 
Here begins the interpretive study of the secularisation of Europe. Based on 
the definition of the process and on the theoretical framework developed in previous 
chapters, I look at the first two epochal changes connected to the secularisation of 
Western societies, the 12
th
 century Renaissance and the 16
th
 century Protestant 
Reformation. The importance of these two socio-cultural revolutions has been 
recognised by countless scholars and their foundational significance for the 
development of Western modernity has been established.
259
  
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the 12
th
 and 13
th
 centuries saw the 
onset of a gradual shift in Europe‘s structures of consciousness from faith to reason-
based rationales. Through inter-civilisational encounters between Western 
Christianity and Islam, Byzantine Christianity, the Mongols, China, Africa and the 
Jews, the cultural symbolic of Western Europe was radically transformed. The most 
important borrowing was that of the Hebrew and Arab translations of Aristotle and 
Plato‘s philosophical oeuvres.260 The new form of logic that emerged as a result of 
these cultural encounters marked ―the point of departure for the great searching of the 
Western spirit.‖261 For Benjamin Nelson, the 12th century Renaissance constituted the 
―prime seedbeds of the institutional and cultural developments of the Western world‖ 
and corresponded to ―a watershed in the international history of the world.‖262 
In Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters, Nelson argues 
that structures of consciousness rooted in faith (type-2) entailed ―that individuals 
committed to faith feel themselves to be part of the truth, a manifestation of the divine 
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in expression of the universal will or sovereign design. Existence in the faith is 
truth.‖263 Because it required the development of verifiable rationales to confirm the 
truth of the faith, this form of consciousness begged for the rationalisation of religion. 
This task was assumed by ―the appearance of a science called theology.‖264 Besides, 
the need for a comprehensive and methodical analysis of the relevant doctrines called 
for the emergence of religious virtuosi who could placate God on behalf of the less 
gifted masses. Ultimately, the rationalisation of faith structures through debate, 
theological refinement, and differentiation gave birth to the rational arrangements 
specific to consciousness-type 3. 
The emergence of reason-based rationales was marked by the growing 
acceptance of new moral sources based on the Libri naturales and on the notion of 
‗nature.‘ This new source of morality accessible in the ‗Book of Nature‘ challenged 
many established dogmas and social structures founded on the ‗Book of Creation.‘265 
―From the year 1210 to the year 1325 there occurred a complete overhauling of the 
structures of legitimation and theoretical rationales of Christian theology and natural 
philosophy.‖266 The ensuing development of a natural theology marked a ‗half-way 
house‘ between medieval theology and the emerging natural sciences characteristic of 
rationalised structures.
267
 These breakthroughs to a new logic and form of legitimacy 
prepared the way, step by step, for the modernisation and rationalisation processes 
distinctive to Europe.
268
 
This first epochal transformation was marked by a shift in structures of 
consciousness, the rise to prominence of new moral sources, and the creation of new 
principles of legitimacy behind authority. However, contrary to the other seminal 
periods I will be dealing with in the subsequent chapters, the 12
th
 century Renaissance 
essentially corresponded to an intellectual revolution. It is only a few centuries later, 
with the Protestant Reformation, that a complete reorganisation of societies took place. 
As Nelson argues, the theologies of Luther, Calvin, and others were essential to 
achieve the ―fundamental reorientation of the social and cultural patterns of the 
Western world‖ initiated in the 12th century.269  
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The Reformation by no means corresponded to the practical ‗implementation‘ 
of the intellectual changes that took place four centuries earlier. Rather, the 12
th
-
century recovery of Aristotle and the spread of naturalism brought up to the fore 
issues and questions that were answered in various and unexpected ways (i.e., the 
nature of God and man, the existence of universals, etc.). In particular, the re-
emergence of nominalism challenged the philosophical foundations of Scholasticism 
and led to the development of important themes which then came to influence 
Protestantism.
270
 However, it is mostly in the role they both played in facilitating the 
legitimisation and establishment of a secular political order that the 12
th
-century 
Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation converge.
271
  
Overall, Protestantism acted as a major force for secularisation by rejecting the 
mediatory role of the Church in the name of God‘s omnipotence. By proclaiming the 
independence of the political realm from within Christianity, Luther, Calvin, and 
others provided a theological justification for a perceptible shift in attitudes towards 
secular government. Their success was due to the fact that ―they did not deny the need 
for supernatural salvation, but found a mechanism for it outside the Church.‖ 272 
Indeed, they created a powerful moral project for ‗this world‘ which they defended 
with a potent ethic of conviction. The religious sanction of their vision was 
fundamental to secure their success over the papacy and to transform the European 
political arena.   
Nowadays, it is widely held that the Reformation unintentionally paved the 
way for the emergence of capitalism, liberalism, modern science, and secular 
government.
273
 Through their development of alternative theologies based on ideas of 
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individualism and progress, Protestants profoundly influenced philosophical thinking 
to such an extent ―that without their labors it is inconceivable that European culture 
could have pursued the course it did.‖ 274  The Christian reform movement that 
enflamed the European continent for over a century inaugurated a new ‗era.‘ 
 
The main thread running throughout this chapter is that the secularisation 
process was characterised by the transfer of power, functions, and resources from the 
Church to secular elites. Through the study of the changes in moral sources and forms 
of legitimacy, I trace this process of transfer that questions and contradicts 
secularism‘s neutrality and objectivity. Far from developing as an independent sphere 
distinct from religion, I demonstrate that the ‗secular‘ was carved out and emerged 
from the sacred core of Christianity. In this chapter, I argue that the first step of this 
process corresponded to the legitimisation and sanctification of the ‗secular‘ from 
within theology. In turn, this eventually resulted in the gradual appropriation and 
usurpation of religious resources by secular rulers as well as in the sacralisation of 
earthly authority. 
In the first part of the chapter, I focus on the 12
th
 century Renaissance and on 
the shift in moral sources from God to the notion of ‗nature.‘ I begin with an outline 
of the Christian source of morality and then explain how, as a result of intellectual 
effervescence, the legitimate orders that sustained the Church were challenged. 
Building on Greek philosophy, but also on Europe‘s Roman heritage, secular rulers 
began to systematically claim access to the power and resources of their divinely-
ordained counterparts and thus to threaten the papacy. Through theological 
rationalisation, the notion of ‗nature‘ gained autonomy while remaining infused with a 
sacred character and divine purpose. In turn, the realm of the natural began to elicit 
widespread support and its growing acceptance resulted in the increase in legitimacy 
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of secular forms of authority. This change was a key precondition to the major shift in 
legitimate orders that took place in the 16
th
 century.
275
 
In the second part of the chapter, I provide a narrative account of the Protestant 
Reformation. In particular, I explain how Luther proclaimed the independence of the 
political realm from the religious realm. With the Reformation, the demands of 
secular rulers for autonomy were accepted. Kings and princes were finally granted 
divine legitimacy from within Christianity. The theologies of Luther and Calvin 
proved challenging to the European order of the 16
th
 century and led to radical 
changes in the political organisation of societies. By legitimising the shift in authority 
away from the Church, their doctrines led to the shattering of the unity of 
Christendom and to the transfer of the sacredness of the Church to the state.
276
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A.  Moral Sources, from God to Nature 
 
 
 
During the Middle Ages the constitutional structure of government was based 
on the canon of values of Christianity and as Charles Taylor explains, ―God was in 
some way or other bound up with the only moral sources they could seriously 
envisage.‖277 Through the process of secularisation, this arrangement was challenged 
and criticised. The Church lost its politico-religious authority and slowly, kings and 
princes became more influential. To better understand this transformation whereby 
divine authority lost its supremacy and was supplanted, it is necessary to delve into 
the work of medieval historians and students of the papacy. In particular, it is 
important to introduce the typology of changing forms of principles of legitimacy 
developed by Walter Ullmann. Once the typology outlined, I trace the emergence of 
the new source of morality during the Middle Ages. I look at the rediscovery of 
Aristotelianism, the challenge posed by his naturalism, and its impact on the medieval 
legitimate order. I conclude that, however paradoxical it may be, these changes at the 
heart of the secularisation process were carried out by prelates from within 
Christianity. 
 
 
1) Walter Ullmann and the Two Themes of Government 
 
In his landmark Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 
Ullmann studies the changes in the sources and origins of law and of governmental 
power in Europe. The Cambridge Professor of Medieval History demonstrates that 
medieval political thinking was characterised by a shift between two ―conceptions of 
government and law diametrically opposed to each other.‖ 278 In the 12th century, the 
moral sources behind medieval forms of government shifted and led to the 
replacement of the Church‘s ‗descending theme‘ of government with an ‗ascending 
theme.‘  
                                                 
277
 Taylor, Sources of the Self pp.310-11. 
278
 Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen, 
1964), p.20. 
Chapter 4: Secularisation, Act I: Medieval Origins 
 - 81 - 
The descending thesis conceives of absolute power as resting with God. This 
divine power is entrusted onto a trustworthy mediator (i.e., the pope, the emperor, or 
the king) who can then distribute it downwards via a hierarchy of officials. As such, 
the power devolved from the top to the bottom of this imaginary hierarchical pyramid 
is never original but always ―derived from ‗above.‘‖279 In this scheme, the moral 
source is God and it informs all notions of legitimacy.
280
 As Maurice DeWulf argues, 
whether power is held by rulers, legalists, the papacy, or a representative republic, ―in 
any case, it always derives back to God as its source.‖281 
On the contrary, the ascending thesis designates a populist conception of 
government in which the source of power is located in the community: ―[w]hatever 
power is found in the organs of the government, whatever power they have in creating 
law, is in the last resort traceable to the people.‖282 As such, the power held by the 
representatives of the people at the top of the pyramid is always derived from below. 
The moral source is no longer God but ‗the people.‘  
Even though God was the supreme source of legitimacy up until the Middle 
Ages, some manifestations of the ascending theme of government remained present 
throughout the medieval period and provided ―a living bridge between the primitive 
European period and the new Europe.‖283 In fact, stressing continuity, Ullmann notes 
that ―after roughly a thousand years of dominance of the descending thesis the 
ascending came into its own again.‖284 Although the ascending theme of government 
became predominant from the 12
th
 century onward, it only reached full maturity in the 
18
th
 century. 
The descending thesis gained momentum in the 4
th
 century with the adoption 
of Christianity by the Roman Empire in 380. This acceptance of the ultimate authority 
of God took place shortly after the shift from consciousness type 1 to consciousness 
type 2. Likewise, the shift to the ascending theme of government in the 12
th
 century 
was concomitant with the shift from faith to reason-based cultural rationales. In the 
Middle Ages, the secularisation process corresponded to the shift in structures of 
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consciousness and to the passage from the descending to the ascending mode of 
government. 
The two theses correspond more to ideal types than to a true depiction of 
reality. In fact, Ullmann himself acknowledges the existence of anomalies and the 
discrepancy between theory and reality.
285
 While his theory might be too 
parsimonious for some medievalists, it provides us with a strong and adequate 
framework to study the civilisational changes in structures of consciousness and moral 
sources that were taking place at the time.
286
 Even though Ullmann‘s work may 
contain omissions, mistakes, and questionable interpretations of important texts and 
even though his emphasis on the importance of Aristotelianism is contested, his 
narrative seems to fit with the broader socio-cultural trends that marked the advent of 
modernity in Europe.
287
 Also, Ullmann‘s overall argument is supported by Reinhard 
Bendix‘s study of the long-term shift in authority from kings to the people.288 
Now that the typology has been outlined, we can look at the shift in moral 
sources. The following sections sketch the historical struggle for authority between 
the Church and secular powers that took place throughout medieval Europe. First, I 
look at the main characteristics of the descending order and then I sketch the return of 
the ascending thesis as a result of the emergence of a more attractive moral source. 
The recovery of the works of Greek philosophers in the 12
th
 century introduced a new 
source of morality that challenged the papal claims to spiritual and temporal 
supremacy and that led to the emergence of an autonomous natural and political realm.  
 
 
2) The Descending Theme in St Augustine and Gelasius I 
 
Before the 13
th
 century, even though religion and politics were integrated into 
the papacy and the differentiation of the political from the religious sphere did ―not 
make historical sense,‖ some sort of evolution in this direction can be traced back 
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from the early days of Christianity.
 289
 The incredible spread of the faith since its 
inception called for the indispensable development of a complex institutional structure 
to organise all Christians. In practice, this meant that even though it was ―pursuing 
religious ends, the leadership of the Church was compelled to adopt political ways of 
behavior and political modes of thought.‖290 As Sheldon Wolin argues,  
By the end of the second century, [Christianity] had ceased to be a 
loose association of believers, bound together by ties of doctrine and 
the vague primacy of the early apostles, and had become instead an 
institutionalized order...it was gradually realized that a believing 
society did not differ from any other kind of society in its need for 
leadership, governance, discipline, and settled procedures for 
conducting business.
291
 
 
From 380 onward, by an imperial decree, Christianity became the religion of the 
Roman Empire, and by the same token, ―the papacy…became focalized as a 
governmental institution.‖292  
Such an evolution in the nature of the Church marked a turning point which 
led to a profound questioning of the legitimacy and status of the authority of both 
pope and emperor. By the mid-5
th
 century, ―there was no basic difference between the 
concept of the monarchic function of the pope and that of the emperor.‖ 293  The 
Church had become a politico-religious complex and such a dualism of authority 
within Christianity needed to be justified and legitimised.
294
 How could the Church be 
intertwined with the Empire yet avoid becoming a political instrument? How was the 
brute military power of the Roman Empire to be reconciled with the message of 
Christ? Such a task was undertaken by St Augustine and for centuries, his answer 
prevailed. 
St Augustine (354-430) famously considered politics to be a necessary evil 
that was on the whole most regrettable but unavoidable. For the Bishop of Hippo, 
men‘s post-lapsarian condition called for the creation of some sort of coercive 
arrangement to tame their passions, greed, and selfishness. The subjection of man to 
man through some form of government was a divinely sanctioned solution to punish 
the sinners, test the faithful, and control man‘s destructive impulses. Before one could 
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hope to reach the blissful state of eternal life in heaven, one had to be a pilgrim in this 
world and endure the harshness of the present abode. Thus, the Augustinian ideal 
painted a picture of political communities as ―artificial and purely conventional 
institutions designed (albeit at the behest of divine inspiration)… to control the 
consequences of fallen human nature.‖295 
For St Augustine, politics was essentially limited in its ability to fulfil men‘s 
quest for eternal salvation. Since the most fundamental needs of men were those that 
no earthly society could ever satisfy, the form of government was of little significance. 
As St Augustine put it: ―As for this mortal life is concerned, which is spent and 
finished in a few days, what difference does it make under what rule a man lives who 
is soon to die, provided only that those who rule him do not compel him to do what is 
impious and wicked?‖296 Earthly life was ultimately fleeting and transient and as long 
as a political government – whether pagan or Christian - could secure peace, order, 
and allowed the faithful to pursue their religious quest for salvation unhindered by 
political concerns, it had fulfilled its function within the divine plan.  
In his De Civitate Dei, St Augustine outlined the existence of two ‗cities,‘ the 
earthly city or civitas terrena, and the city of God or civitas dei. Both cities are 
characterised by the direction in which the love that sustains them is directed, ―the 
earthly by love of self extending even to contempt of God, and the heavenly by love 
of God extending to contempt of self.‖297 Far from equating the city of God with the 
Church and the earthly city with Rome, St Augustine argued for the essential 
intermingling of the two.
298
 As a result of his teachings  
[an] intricate pattern of religion and politics, intersecting but not 
absorbing, was fashioned to teach that the political and the spiritual 
were distinctive, however complementary they might be at certain 
points; that while each ought to benefit the other, neither could 
achieve the other‘s salvation; and since it followed that the one 
ought not to be judged by the mission of the other, each had to be 
understood to an important degree in its own terms.
299
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Yet, ultimate allegiance was to the divine order.
300
 For the Bishop of Hippo, the 
wretchedness of earthly existence still required one to look beyond the present life and 
to the divine qualities of the city of God.  
Two generations after the death of St Augustine, the authorities of both 
Church and emperor were justified through papal pronouncements. Gelasius I (pope 
between 492 and 496) developed the doctrine of the Two Swords as a means to 
reaffirm the authority of the Church and the unity of Christian society. Gelasius 
argued that sacerdotium (the Church) and regnum (the emperor), though with separate 
powers, corresponded to the spiritual and the temporal arms of a united Christian 
society, a duality within Christ‘s body. As to the relationship between these two 
‗governments,‘ Gelasius I was quick to add that the emperor had the duty to assist the 
realisation of the divine plan in this world through the use of his sword ―for he is the 
minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.‖301  As a 
member of Christianity, the emperor was a son (filius) of the Church, remained under 
the pope‘s jurisdiction, and was denied any autonomy. By the end of the 5th century, it 
was agreed that papa a nemine iudicatur, i.e., ‗the pope is judged by no one.‘ Besides 
sacramental power (potestas ordinis), the pope came to enjoy some sort of 
jurisdictional power if not jurisdictional sovereignty (potestas jurisdictionis).
302
  
While these pronouncements by no means marked the separation of religious 
affairs from temporal ones, they laid down the foundation for a ‗division of labour‘ 
within Christianity. Indeed, in religious matters, the clergy remained in control, while 
in temporal matters the clergy obeyed imperial laws because of the divine source of 
the emperor‘s power. But both authorities were subject to the authority of God.303  
The descending themes of the Augustinian and Gelasian theological doctrines 
remained widely accepted until the 11
th
 and 12
th
 centuries. Political theories that 
called for the complete submission of earthly rulers to spiritual powers set ―the 
predominant tone of political debate in the Latin West down to the thirteenth century 
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and, in many respects, beyond.‖304 In fact, one has to wait for the inter-civilisational 
encounters of the 12
th
 century, the rediscovery of Aristotle, and the Thomist synthesis, 
to witness major challenges to the doctrines of the Two Swords and of the Two Cities. 
Combined with an increasing resistance of rulers to accept their role as ‗sons of the 
Church,‘ these theological challenges proved devastating to the Church‘s authority 
and marked an epochal shift in structures of consciousness, sources of morality, and 
forms of legitimacy. The self-defeating nature of the papacy‘s claim to supreme 
authority and the ‗discovery‘ of a new source of morality led to the establishment of a 
new political entity, the state. 
 
 
3) Nature as a Moral Source 
 
At the political level, the 12
th
 and 13
th
 centuries witnessed the emergence of 
proto-territorial states in England, the Norman kingdom of Sicily, and France.
305
 
However, the striving of territorial entities within the universal jurisdiction of the 
Church posed major political, theological, and legal issues.
306
 While the medieval 
view whereby temporal and spiritual powers coexisted within the Church had proved 
a viable alternative for centuries, the papacy and lay rulers began to question this 
arrangement in a fundamental manner. Both parties came to recognise the essential 
need for an ultimate authority. 
As was explained in the previous section, through a gradual process that took 
place over centuries, the Church had acquired  
many of the attributes of a state – for example, enduring institutions 
– and was developing others – for example, a theory of papal 
sovereignty. The fact that churchmen were deeply involved in 
secular politics, that no ruler could function without their advice and 
assistance meant that political theories and the administrative 
techniques of the Church had a direct impact on the lay 
government.
307
 
 
                                                 
304
 Dyson in the introduction to Thomas Aquinas, St Thomas Aquinas, Political Writings, ed. R. W. 
Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.xxiv-xxv. 
305
 Joseph Reese Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton Princeton University 
Press, 1970), p.10. 
306
 Canning, A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450, p.83. 
307
 Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, pp.15-16. 
Chapter 4: Secularisation, Act I: Medieval Origins 
 - 87 - 
With the Church becoming far more assertive and influential as an ―autonomous 
European-wide institution,‖ Pope Gregory VII (1025-1085) thought to increase the 
Church‘s independence from non-Christian elements through its centralisation under 
the pope‘s command.308 Out of the Investiture Contest that ensued, the Church came 
strengthened as a ―fully centralized and rationalized‖ ecclesiastical institution.309 In 
fact, through its victory over the Holy Roman Empire the Church was settled ―in its 
long-term direction as a body of power and coercion‖ and ―gained leadership, if not 
total control of European society.‖310 
Accordingly, the 12
th
 century introduced major innovations in the theory of 
papal monarchy.
311
 Numerous canonists and publicists began to challenge the dualist 
approach to authority and to develop hierocratic theories of power to assert the 
supremacy of the papacy. The pope took over the title of Vicar of Christ and began to 
claim ‗fullness of power‘ - plenitude potestatis. Along with his bishop‘s mitre, he 
came to acquire a crown - regnum.
312
 Claims to political supremacy found their 
utmost expression with Innocent III.
313
 Under his leadership, the medieval papacy 
reached its ‗apogee.‘314  
Arguing that the salvation of all was entrusted onto the pope, Innocent III 
(1161-1216) proclaimed his ability to govern in such a way as to halt and combat any 
hindrance that might be in the way to the salvation of the Christian society. Therefore, 
he not only claimed the right to universal jurisdiction, but arguing that sin was the 
main obstacle to salvation, maintained that whenever sin was implicated, the pope had 
a duty to act. Under ‗reason of sin‘ (ratione peccati), the papacy was given power to 
intervene in any situation.
315
 As Adda Bozeman explains  
Under Innocent III the church had become an international state. It 
had the power to set large armies in motion…to control the mighty 
and the meek, to raise funds by direct taxation, and to bring 
offenders to justice. It controlled education, propaganda, social 
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welfare, and the courts, and it wielded the awesome power of 
eternal life and death.
316
 
 
As a result of Gregory VII and Innocent III‘s challenges, the Church distanced and 
separated itself from secular political authorities. This separation strengthened the 
papacy but begged for the definition of the role secular rulers were now to play. 
Because their religious authority was no longer justified, kings and princes had to find 
another foundation on which to establish their power. As Joseph Strayer put it, ―the 
Gregorian concept of the Church almost demanded the invention of the concept of the 
State.‖317 Such a demand found an answer in three major intellectual transformations.  
The first transformation was the ―emerging rationalism of medieval 
jurisprudence‖ through the ―full-scale rationalization and systematization from 1050 
to 1300 under the influence of the universalizing rationales of Roman law.‖318 As a 
result of this process, ―an increasingly sophisticated mode of discourse for the 
elaboration of ideas relevant to political matters,‖ was created. 319  This first 
transformation led the Church to develop a ―centralized, bureaucratic and juridically 
oriented‖ outlook.320 While ―from 1073 to 1119 every pope was a monk,‖ during the 
12
th
 and 13
th
 centuries they were all lawyers.
321
 
The second transformation consisted in the rediscovery of Roman literature – 
especially of the work of Cicero. This transformation will be considered within the 
frame of the third and most important of the three transformations, namely, the 
recovery of the great works of Aristotle. As many medievalists have noted, the rapid 
introduction and circulation of many works of Aristotle ―entailed a rather radical re-
orientation in the realm of thought.‖ 322  So radical a re-orientation that, Ullmann 
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claims, ―[i]t would be hard to point to any historical phenomenon of doctrinal order 
which was to effect such far-reaching changes.‖323  
Cary Nederman has noted that even though ―Aristotle was perhaps the single 
most decisive classical figure in medieval moral and political philosophy,‖ the idea of 
a swift and ubiquitous ‗Aristotelian revolution‘ in the Middle Ages is essentially a 
‗scholarly chimera.‘324 While it is true that Ullmann exaggerated the importance of 
Aristotle‘s Politics as a catalyst in the shift from descending to ascending order, I 
believe that the impact of Aristotelianism must be studied to the extent that it reflected 
and articulated the profound transition in forms of consciousness that was taking place 
at the time.
325
 
The recovery of Nicomachean Ethics and Politics through Christianity‘s 
encounters with Islam allowed for the rediscovery of Aristotle‘s political thought 
during the late 13
th
 century. The introduction of ancient Greek philosophy in the 
context of the Middle Ages proved inspiring and provocative as it provided rulers 
with the tools they had until then lacked to dispute the ecclesiastical order and the 
theological foundation of its legitimacy.
326
 Aristotle‘s conception of man as a political 
animal by nature proved a direct challenge to Christian revelation. Because it implied 
that the realisation of men‘s nature could only be achieved within the perfect polis, it 
offered a way for people to realise their potential independently of the Church and 
without the mediation of the ecclesiastic hierarchy. Not only was the political 
dimension of mankind thought to be superior and to encompass all others, but more 
importantly, the origins of the political community and the authority of the rulers were 
no longer found in God but in nature.  
Aristotle‘s philosophy culminated in the view of the state as the supreme 
community of citizens and as the by-product of the proper functioning of the law of 
nature. The establishment of the ‗natural‘ realm cannot be underestimated. In effect, 
earlier challengers to the pope‘s theocracy, ―because they spoke the same language, 
used the same Bible and the same similes, and worked with the same patristic 
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equipment as their opponents did,‖ remained unsuccessful.327 But in the 13th century, 
as Ullmann argues, ―what generations of writers and governments had been seeking 
was now found in the simple application of the concept of nature. The State was in a 
word, a natural thing, and herewith the conceptual gulf between it and the Church was 
opened up.‖328 Ultimately, Aristotle allowed for the creation of a reality outside the 
wholly Christocentric intellectual framework of the papacy. Revelation was now 
confronted by the Aristotelian source of morality. Armed with the concept of nature, 
the ascending theme of government and law was recovered at the expense of the 
papacy, paving the way for the general differentiation of the religious and political 
spheres at the heart of the secularisation process.
329
 
 
 
4) The Political Implications of ‗Nature‘ 
 
Faced with the Aristotelian threat, Pope Gregory IX (1143-1241) had no 
choice but to forbid the study of his works until they had been ‗examined and 
purified.‘ Amongst others, Thomas Aquinas undertook this vast task of bringing 
Aristotle within the sphere of the Church and making it ‗compatible‘ with the revealed 
Word of God. The work of Aquinas provided the foundation to the appearance of a 
‗systematic theological science‘ and to the emergence of an ‗official doctrine‘ 
defended by a multitude of ‗experts‘ in law and theology.330 The resulting synthesis 
allowed for Aristotle‘s ideas to be introduced and included within the medieval 
intellectual milieu, and thus to serve as a catalyst for the shift from faith to reason-
based structures of consciousness.
331
 The birth of what Nelson called a ‗new theology‘ 
marked the advent of rationalised cultural symbolic.
332
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In the 13
th
 century, Aquinas (1225-1274) introduced political theory to 
medieval Europe and worked toward the development of a science of government 
based on natural human reason. The work of the Dominican monk was deeply 
influenced by his thorough study of Aristotle. In particular, the ideas of a teleological 
and self-sustaining nature and the definition of man as a social and political animal 
became important pillars of the Thomist philosophy. In an Aristotelian fashion, 
Aquinas held that man‘s natural instincts would ultimately bring about the 
development of an organised community, of which the pinnacle was the state. The 
state was a natural thing that emerged according to natural laws and through the use of 
natural reason.
 Knowing that nature was God‘s creation and possessed its own 
intrinsic laws it could now operate without the spiritual mediation of an ecclesiastical 
body.  
This reappraisal of the relationship between the Church and the state opened 
up a major conceptual gulf: ―[t]he State was a natural product; the Church a supra-
natural product.‖333 In fact, the natural origins of political government meant that the 
Church was no longer necessary for the proper conduct of political affairs as these 
were no longer divine in any sense, but natural. Conversely, because the state worked 
according to the divine laws as expressed in nature and accessed through reason, it 
could function independently from the Church.
 334
 Civil law was ―thus attributed an 
importance in spiritual terms that it had not heretofore enjoyed. Most importantly, this 
link between nature and spirit made politics, from a Christian perspective, an 
important and worthy endeavor.‖335 Earthly politics was no longer incompatible with 
the spiritual realm as St Augustine had upheld, but could now have a positive function 
of its own in facilitating ―man‘s attainment of the [supernatural] end for which he was 
created.‖336 Likewise, as the upshot of the workings of natural and rational laws, the 
political realm and secular rulers were given an autonomous role in God‘s plan.337  
The redrawing of the boundaries of the spheres of politics and religion led 
Aquinas to revive the theory of the Two Coordinate Powers according to which ―the 
temporal power was inherent, not derived, and that the secular state must be 
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recognized… as part of God‘s plan and as rooted in man‘s nature.‖338 In Scripta Super 
Libros Sententiarum, Aquinas judged that 
Spiritual and secular power are both derived from the Divine power, 
and so secular power is subject to spiritual power insofar as this is 
ordered by God: that is, in those things which pertain to the 
salvation of the soul. In such matters, then, the spiritual power is to 
be obeyed before the secular. But in those things which pertain to 
the civil good, the secular power should be obeyed before the 
spiritual, according to Matthew 22:21: ‗Render to Caesar the things 
that are Caesar‘s.‘ Unless perhaps the spiritual and secular powers 
are conjoined, as in the pope, who holds the summit of both 
powers.
339
 
 
For Aquinas, political institutions were thus ―justified on a purely human plane, 
independently of religious values, which do not alter the natural order of which the 
state is a necessary expression.‖340  
The recognition of the importance and autonomy of politics, though seriously 
qualified, marked the clear-cut separation of the two realms and allowed Aquinas to 
reconcile Aristotle with Christianity. Through his attempt to bring Aristotle within 
Medieval theology, St Thomas ultimately, though unintentionally, argued that the 
intelligibility of nature did not depend on revelation and led medieval political 
thought in a more naturalistic direction. 
Likewise, the philosophy of Aquinas marked a turning point in the acceptance 
of the descending thesis of government and law. The legitimisation of the existence of 
the state independently of the supernatural realm meant that the institutional 
foundation of Christianity and the corresponding monopoly of the papacy were now 
superfluous. Even though nature was God‘s creation, the creation of the natural 
provided an alternative source of legitimacy for the kings. Besides, it only took a 
generation for the link between God and nature to be severed and for the laws of 
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nature to draw their validity from their inherent reasonableness, a source of validity 
independent from the divine.
341
 Overall, what Aquinas achieved was to make 
―available the intellectual equipment by which his successors – notably Marsilius of 
Padua – were at last to begin to unravel the long established interweaving of secular 
and spiritual themes in European political discourse.‖342 
 
 
5) The Ascending Challenge to the Medieval Order 
 
The spread of Aristotelianism and the revival of natural philosophy meant that 
―man came to be repossessed and reinstated in his full powers, as a homo in the 
ethical sphere or as a civis in the political field.‖343 This resurrection of natural man 
was soon followed by the claim to the position and function that his fidelis counterpart 
had held for a millennium or so. As a matter of fact, the Thomist combination of the 
natural realm to the supernatural realm as part of a ‗double ordering of things,‘ paved 
the way for a dualism: the fidelis had now to share the socio-political space with the 
natural man, i.e., the citizen or civis. Also, it implied that one could be considered 
either from a political or a moral standpoint, thus facilitating ―the atomization of 
man‘s activities.‖344 
The Aristotelian and Thomist ideas deeply influenced the newborn study of 
the art of government. And by the end of the 14
th
 century major works had been 
written on the relation between the political and the supernatural; ―Nothing less than 
an intellectual revolution had progressively occurred.‖ 345As Jean Elshtain argues,  
―‗political theory‘ in the Middle Ages and early modern period was not the possession 
of a few articulate, self-possessed political theorists labouring away in their studies 
but, instead, was the making manifest of a whole climate of opinion that permeated 
the culture.‖346  
                                                 
341
 The full transition took place over centuries. For example, Hugo Grotius considered the divine to be 
fully intelligible in natural law. 
342
 R.W. Dyson in Aquinas, St Thomas Aquinas, Political Writings, p.xxxvi. 
343
 Ullmann, The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages, p.124. 
344
 ———, Medieval Political Thought, p.170. This separation of politics from morality or of Politics 
from Ethics may well be the cradle of the tenet held by Realist scholars in the field of IR, namely, that 
ethics and morality have nothing to do with politics and war. ———, The Individual and Society in the 
Middle Ages, p.119. 
345
 Canning, A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450, p.134. 
346
 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State, and Self (New York: Basic Books, 2008), p.67. 
Chapter 4: Secularisation, Act I: Medieval Origins 
 - 94 - 
Among the many thinkers to foster this climate of opinion, three of them are of 
particular importance to our subject: Dante Alighieri, John of Paris, and Marsiglio of 
Padua.
347
 These scholars dealt with important issues brought up to the fore by the 
recovery of Aristotelianism and the spread of naturalism. The themes and ideas they 
developed based on their more or less successful use of nominalism greatly influenced 
political thinking for centuries, especially that of the Reformers. In particular, 
Marsiglio developed a strong version of the ascending theory of government which he 
systematically supported with nominalist and naturalist arguments.
348
 In the remainder 
of this section, I outline the most important implications of the work of these three 
scholars for our understanding of the process of secularisation. 
In De Monarchia, Dante (1265-1321) attempted to tackle three broad issues 
pertaining to the necessity of monarchy, Roman history, and the divine source of 
monarchical authority. The third theme was meant as an address and contribution to 
the debate that was raging at the time on the relationship between the emperor and the 
papacy. Through a careful development of Thomist themes, Dante maintained that the 
pope‘s authority only extended over the supernatural realm, and thus, that the natural 
realm was left to the emperor and secular rulers. Arguing that ‗what comes from 
nature comes from God,’ Dante denied any papal right of supervision over political 
affairs.
349
 Instead, based on his acceptance of the Thomist idea that grace only 
perfects nature, the Italian poet argued: 
Temporal government does not receive its existence from the 
spiritual, nor the power which is its authority, nor even its operation 
as such; but it does receive help from the spiritual government to 
operate more powerfully by the light of grace with which the 
blessing of the supreme pontiff infuses it in heaven and on earth.
350
 
 
As a result of this separation, Dante maintained that the mediation of the clergy 
between God and man was supererogatory. Moreover, based on his beliefs in the 
divine origins of the emperor‘s authority and in the natural necessity of having a 
single sovereign, he established imperial supremacy in temporal affairs.  
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In conjunction with this re-working of the relation between the natural and the 
supernatural, Dante further developed the ascending thesis of government which 
Aquinas had begun to restore. While Aquinas had developed the themes of the ‗will of 
the people‘ and political representation, Dante went further and came to argue that 
‗the function of any right government is to see that men exist for their own sakes,‘ 
making in turn the government the servant of the people. These developments in 
political thought at the turn of the 14
th
 century marked the beginning of the modern 
concept of popular sovereignty and Dante‘s work was ―a prophecy of the modern 
State.‖351  
In a similar vein, John of Paris (1255-1306) challenged the papal claim to 
authority over both temporal and spiritual realms. Following Aquinas, he defined man 
as a political and social animal and located the origins of political authority in natural 
law. The position adopted by John of Paris differed from Aquinas‘ in that he starkly 
marked the difference between the Church as a purely mystical entity and the state as 
a purely natural one. By the same token, he allocated purely sacramental powers to 
the former and purely jurisdictional powers to the latter.  
 In his On Royal and Papal Power, John of Paris equated the spiritual Church 
with the supernatural, and the temporal political government with the natural.
352
 This 
clear-cut opposition of the two spheres was accompanied by the claim for the 
independence of the two realms from one another‘s jurisdiction. As such, in theory, 
any temporal object was relocated under the authority of the state, leaving only the 
spiritual lands to the Church. 
Following Aquinas and Dante, John of Paris argued that the power of the king 
was derived from the will of God as expressed through the will of the people. In the 
cases of both Church and political government, rulers and holders of offices drew 
their power from elections or the consent of the people. In fact there was a dual source 
of authority in the case of prelates; their power was ―not from God through the pope 
but immediately from God and from the people who elect or consent.‖353 However, 
like Aristotle, Aquinas, and Dante, John of Paris conceived of nature as being the 
creation of God, and as such there remained a major step to be taken before men could 
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become independent from the Father and His divine law. Such a step was taken by 
Marsiglio of Padua in The Defender of the Peace. 
Opposing natural reason to revelation, Marsiglio (1290-1342) argued that the 
relationship between nature and God was not factual but rather a matter of faith that 
could not be demonstrated through the use of natural reason. As a consequence of the 
unknowable nature of this relationship, the Italian medieval scholar affirmed the strict 
separation of the natural and supernatural realms. From this separation, there followed 
that the only object of study that could matter to a student of government and political 
science was the natural political entity devoid of any supernatural features. 
Contrasting with the idea of Thomas Aquinas that ‗grace does not do away 
with nature but perfects it,‘ Marsiglio broke the link between the two. Politically, this 
meant that secular communities became ends in themselves and could not be 
perfected by any supernatural element. Whether citizens were Christians or pagans 
mattered very little since the constitutive element of ―the only public body that lived 
on its own laws and on its own inner substance,‖ the state, ―was the citizen pure and 
simple.‖354 By the same token, the authority of the laws did not reside in its divine 
source but was derived from the universal body of citizens within the political 
community, i.e., the will of the people.
355
 Laws were no longer revealed but made and 
the ‗congregation of the faithful‘ gave way to the ‗congregation of citizens.‘  
Like Dante, Marsiglio maintained that the only domain reserved to the Church 
was the care of the souls. There followed that the Church‘s wealth or ‗coercive 
jurisdiction‘ were irrelevant if not damaging to the proper conduct of its tasks.356 He 
saw the papacy‘s ‗plenitude of power‘ as a major source of strife and disruption to the 
tranquillity that humans naturally seek. The Italian scholar criticised the juridical 
powers of the Church and argued that these had been unjustifiably seized from both 
Christ and princes, the sole judges in divine and human matters respectively. Far from 
holding any such juridical powers, coercive function, or ‗intrinsic dignity,‘ Marsiglio 
argued that the priesthood was of conventional origins and only held a voluntary 
position of ‗stewardship‘ as well as ―a power of ordering church ritual and of 
regulating persons in respect to the practice of divine worship in the temple or house 
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of God.‖357  Instead, Marsiglio claimed that the Roman emperor was the supreme 
holder of coercive authority. As the elected prince of the universal body of faithful 
citizens, the emperor was endowed with all powers over the priesthood. Indeed, 
Marsiglio thought that the restoration of the emperor to his rightful position was ―the 
only means of restoring the tranquillity that every realm must desire.‖358 
This redrawing of the roles and spheres of influence of both religion and 
politics marked the secularisation of the papal-hierocratic doctrine. As Michael Wilks 
argues, ―the Defensor Pacis is in many respects nothing more than an Aristotelianised 
version of the traditional medieval theory of the Christian Roman empire.‖359 Even 
though his ideal society remains Christian, an important shift in emphasis has taken 
place. As Wilks notes, Marsiglio‘s society no longer exists for a religious end, but 
instead, ―the Christian religion is permitted to flourish in the society for the purely 
secular end of internal security... The human society of Marsilius is a complete 
inversion of the papally-inspired Christian society, and in nearly every way is an exact 
parallel to it.‖360 
The Marsiglian shift in emphasis away from grace and towards nature placed 
an important stress on the natural realm as the new arena for human salvation. This 
process of ‗disenchantment‘ paved the way for what Weber called the shift towards 
inner-worldliness - i.e., participation within the world and the concentration of human 
behaviour on worldly activities as a means to salvation.
361
 For Donald Nielsen, it is 
this shift in orientations towards inner-worldliness that was linked with ―the rise of 
universities, the growth of towns, the emergence of new handicrafts and forms of 
intellectual and manual labor, and the rationalization of cultural life in general.‖362 
 
 
6) Conclusion 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I looked at the historical struggle for authority 
that took place throughout the Middle Ages between the Church, the Roman Empire, 
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and secular rulers. Having introduced Ullmann‘s framework for the study of the shift 
in principles of law and government, I first outlined the main characteristics of the 
papal descending theme of government. Then, I moved on to consider the shift in 
moral sources from God to the notion of ‗nature‘ under the impulse of the recovery of 
Aristotelian philosophy and the growing importance of natural reason. I explained 
how, as a result of intellectual changes, the constitutional structures legitimating the 
authority of the Church became challenged. The notion of ‗nature‘ became widely 
accepted and led to the increase in legitimacy of secular forms of authority based on 
the ascending theme of government. 
The assertion of the self-sufficiency of the political realm threatened the entire 
politico-theological structure of medieval Europe and defied the papal claim to 
universal sovereignty. Effectively, the origin of the authority of rulers could now be 
legitimated by means independent from the papacy. Instead, the workings of natural 
laws and processes – that could be accessed through the use of natural reason - were 
to culminate in the creation of natural political communities made up of citizens and 
independent from ecclesiastical institutions. And since nature was a divine creation, 
papal powers did not extend to the realm of the state - provided that the latter was in 
adequacy with natural reason. By the same token, the state came to be given an 
autonomous role in God‘s Design. The first step in the secularisation process (i.e., the 
theological legitimisation of the ‗secular‘) was well under way. 
The fact that medieval thinkers and theologians granted secular rulers a role to 
play in the divine plan by providing peace, security, and justice to their ‗citizens‘ 
begged for the establishment of adequate judicial and administrative institutions 
outside those of the papacy. As such, the rationalisation of theology and faith-
structures of consciousness paved the way for bureaucratic structures of government.  
Medieval thinkers such as Dante, John of Paris, and Marsiglio of Padua 
spearheaded a profound purge of all Christian and supernatural elements from the 
Augustinian doctrine of the Two Cities and the descending theme of government. 
While political studies started within a Christian framework, they slowly came to 
emancipate themselves from their own creator thanks to the creation of the realm of 
the natural. Politics came to be excised from its religious foundation, thus secularising 
an originally Christian science. Ultimately, the papal system was undermined ―by the 
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very men who believed that they were doing everything in their power to build it 
up.‖363 As Wolin argues in Politics and Vision: 
The irony, however, lies in the fact that the Church paid a price, one 
that was strictly exacted at the Reformation, of a loss in religious 
vitality… [T]he politicization of religious thought, which had all 
along accompanied the emerging of a purely religious identity of the 
Church into a politico-religious compound, opened the way for the 
development of an autonomous body of political theory which a 
compromised theology could not contain.
364
 
 
As part of this civilisational shift towards reason-based structures of consciousness, 
principles of legitimacy and authority slowly shifted away from God per se to the 
more immanent, natural, and rational principles embodied in His creation. The end 
result was the slow secularisation of European societies. 
However, this profound change was essentially intellectual and one has to wait 
until the end of the 15
th
 century and the Protestant Reformation to witness major 
practical changes and the application of the ascending theme.
 365
 In the words of John 
Figgis, it is only with Luther that ―the idea of the freedom of the lay powers to be 
found in Dante, in Marsiglio, in Wyclif, steps upon the stage of practical politics.‖366 
However, even though the writings of John of Paris and Marsiglio undoubtedly 
foreshadowed the secularisation of political thought in the 16
th
 century, their ideas 
only marked ―the origins of an intellectual tendency‖ of which the full impact two 
centuries later presented ―a quite different order of problems.‖ 367  This ‗time-lag‘ 
might well be due to the fact that the 12
th 
century rationalisation of theology solely 
corresponded to some sort of theoretical rationalisation which, as Weber argued, does 
not have any impact on practice since incapable of putting psychological premiums on 
actions. These ideas developed during the Middle Ages failed to be ‗elected‘ by 
members of the mediatorial elite and their impact on the organisation of societies 
remained limited. Therefore, it is in such a context that the Protestant Reformation 
deserves to be studied.  
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B. Legitimacy After the Protestant Reformation 
 
 
 
The advancement of rationalised structures of consciousness and the religio-
political upheavals that accompanied their spread and maturation took a radical turn 
on 31 October 1517 when Martin Luther nailed his list of complaints about the 
Church on the door of the cathedral of Wittenberg. This seemingly insignificant event 
was to become the symbol of the genesis of a profound and fundamental 
transformation of Europe.
368
 As a matter of fact, Luther‘s complaints were the 
reflection of deeper and widespread social changes that proved radically challenging 
to the order of the Catholic Church. The Protestant Reformation that subsequently 
enflamed Europe led to the Wars of Religion and the transformation of the 
international order.  
The second part of this chapter looks at the origins and nature of the Protestant 
Reformation, as well as its consequences for the socio-political and theological 
organisation of European societies in the late Middle Ages. Because the doctrinal 
disputes it fostered served as vehicles for the expression of wider socio-political 
grievances, the Reformation had a very profound and long-lasting impact. With the 
Reformation, kings and princes were finally granted autonomy and divine legitimacy 
from within Christianity. In fact, it is Luther, Calvin, and others who legitimised the 
shift in authority from the Church to ‗the people.‘ Their theologies proved challenging 
to the European order of the 16
th
 century and led to radical changes in the political 
sphere. As a result, the unity of Christendom was shattered and the sacredness of the 
Church was transferred to the secular realm.  
In this second part of the chapter, after brief descriptions of the ‗secularisation 
of the papacy,‘ the ‗politicisation of the Church,‘ and their origins in heated 
theological disputes, I outline Luther‘s doctrine of ‗justification by faith alone‘ as well 
as its socio-political consequences. While the Reformation started with Luther‘s 
attempt to depoliticise theology and to restore the repute of the message of Christ, it 
ended with Calvinism and the recovery of the political dimension of religion. I 
conclude that by enshrining the usurpation and appropriation of religious powers and 
resources by secular political forces, the advent of reformed theological doctrines 
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paved the way for the adoption of new legitimate orders and thus marked a major 
turning point in the secularisation of Europe. 
 
 
1) The Secularization and Politicisation of the Papacy 
 
The Reformation was primarily a religious endeavour concerned with 
theological issues as well as broader concerns over corruption, injustice, and 
misbehaviour.
369
 Among the many factors that made the Reformation possible, hardly 
any of them were new, not even the call for a profound reform of Christian 
institutions.
370
 But the impact of the charisma and doctrines of gifted men such as 
Martin Luther, John Calvin, or Huldrych Zwingli proved decisive. While critiques of 
the Church and papacy had been developed in previous centuries, what was truly 
revolutionary was the development of religious doctrines that led to practical changes. 
Contrary to their predecessors, Luther, Calvin, and others developed substantive 
rational doctrines that put direct psychological premiums on actions. The values or 
canons of values at the heart of these doctrines instilled a sense of ultimacy, gave a 
direction to life, and thus facilitated the institutionalisation of normative regularities 
and rational ways of life.
371
   
In a context of widespread discontent with the state of the Church these ‗ethics 
of conviction‘ encouraged all challenges to the monopolistic status of Christendom.372 
In particular, the papacy‘s systematic exploitation of all sources of income – annates, 
tithes, sales of dispensation, offices, indulgences, and absolutions – stirred up the 
jealousy of local princes and national monarchs. In this, they were largely supported 
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by a rising middle class antipathetic to the mediatory authority of the Church and 
interested in the latter‘s riches.373 Moreover,  
the steady dissolution of the feudal economy together with the 
effects of the widespread economic depression of the later middle 
ages resulted in the emancipation of the peasantry from their servile 
condition…They resented more than ever the domination and 
financial demands…of their ecclesiastical…overlord, the Church.374  
 
And on top of this, ―[w]hat was new was the extent of men‘s awareness of the 
defects in Church order and the possibility of remedy.‖375 The invention of printing 
allowed for the widespread availability of the Old and New Testaments, and by the 
same token, many found that the papacy had little support in the Holy Book. The 
accumulation of all these social factors provided an extremely fertile ground for the 
religious and political revolution that disintegrated ―the Christian Church-system and 
its supernatural foundation.‖ 376  Slowly, there ensued ―a gradual, though clearly 
perceptible decomposition of Europe as a single ecclesiastical unit, and the 
fragmentation of Europe into independent and autonomous entities which were soon 
to be called national monarchies or states.‖ 377  Ultimately, ―this fragmentation 
heralded the withering away of the papacy as a governing institution operating on a 
universal scale.‖378  
The unpopularity of the papacy reached its maximum height at the end of the 
15
th
 century. Besides the fact that a large number of priests were engaged in adultery 
and promiscuity, had children, were married, brawlsome, had no knowledge of Latin, 
or simply did not fulfil their basic function, one of the most serious problems was the 
‗secularization of the papacy.‘379 In fact, popes were chosen among Italian princes, 
and as such, in a context of power struggles among the different authorities, the Holy 
See began to narrow and ‗Italianize‘ itself in order to safeguard its independence.380 
Its interest in aggrandising its territory and developing an effective state in central 
Italy led the papacy to get involved in a rigorous form of taxation. In turn, popes had 
                                                 
373
 Robert Wuthnow, Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment, and European Socialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p.65. 
374
 Green, Renaissance and Reformation, p.116. 
375
 Chadwick, The Reformation, p.22. 
376
 Ernst Troeltsch and W. Montgomery, Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study of the 
Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World (London: Williams & Norgate, 1912), p.90. 
377
 Ullmann, A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages, p.270. 
378
 Ibid. 
379
 Stephen J. Lee, Aspects of European History 1494-1789 (London: Methuen, 1984), p.12.  Delumeau, 
Catholicism between Luther and Voltaire, pp.155-59. 
380
 Ullmann, A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages, p.314. 
Chapter 4: Secularisation, Act I: Medieval Origins 
 - 103 - 
to develop political relations with rulers and powerful families, leading Innocent VIII 
to marry his legitimised son to a daughter of the Medici family in the Vatican palace 
itself.
381
 As a consequence, ―in several respects the picture which the papacy presents 
in the last decades before the great revolution, was one of a leading Italian renaissance 
court. The pope was an Italian prince whose interests were local and purely 
egoistic.‖382 
At the local level, diocesan bishops tended to mirror this process by taking 
over the functions of feudal lords. This overlapping of ecclesiastical and secular 
functions may well have found its utmost expression in the case of Thomas Wolsey‘s 
accumulation of the titles of Lord Chancellor to Henry VIII, Archbishop of York, 
Bishop of Lincoln, Prince-Bishop of Durham, Cardinal, and Canon of Windsor; and in 
the case of Antoine du Prat, French diplomat, who was rewarded by the King with the 
archbishopric of Sens but only entered the cathedral for his funeral. 
Alongside the secularization of the papacy, a second reason behind the 
Reformation can be found in the increasing politicisation of the Church during the 
Middle Ages. As Sheldon Wolin notes,  
the remarkable spread of Christianity and the evolution of its 
complex institutional life were accompanied by a politicization of 
the Church…In pursuing religious ends, the leadership of the 
Church was compelled to adopt political ways of behavior and 
political modes of thought…merging [in turn] the purely religious 
identity of the Church into a politico-religious compound.
383
 
 
This evolution of the Church was accompanied by the realisation that a religious 
society, like any society, requires some sort of discipline, leadership, and judicial 
system. By the same token, the Church came to accept secular power as a legitimate 
instrument to advance its ends. 
 This overlap of ecclesiastical and political functions led to the development of 
the territorial conception of the church at the heart of the Protestant Reformation. And 
by 1500, the Church had already been compelled to delegate some of its control over 
the local ecclesiastical body and administration and the publication of papal briefs to 
the national monarchs.
384
 By the same token, rulers were indirectly in control of the 
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property of the Church, and therefore, had access to ecclesiastical revenues.
385
 
Ironically enough, while  
it was through the operation with the unadulterated monarchic role 
of the pope that the papacy became Europe‘s focal point in the 
Middle Ages…it was the operation with this self-same monarchic 
function which on the threshold of the modern period reduced the 
papacy to a power situated in central Italy.
386
 
 
Besides the politicisation of the papacy, the economic situation of the peasantry, and 
the grievances of a growing bourgeoisie were essential to the Reformation. While 
these factors were by no means new, they found a powerful mode of expression 
through the theological doctrines of charismatic and potent elites.  
 
 
2) Luther on Spiritual and Temporal Authorities 
 
This dissatisfaction with the secularisation of the papacy and the politicisation 
of the Church found its expression in Martin Luther‘s theological critique of Christian 
institutions. While material-practical interests proved essential to the Protestant 
revolution, only the development of a substantive critique of Christianity based on an 
alternative canon of values permitted the development of new forms of legitimacy, 
institutions, and ways of life.
 387
 
As a temporal state as well as a spiritual authority, the Holy See had built up 
an extensive political, judicial, and fiscal system so as to finance its grandiose projects. 
The enormous resources that were needed were partly gathered through the sale of 
indulgences (i.e., the remission of sins by a money payment to the Church). However, 
the theological foundation for this practice was deeply questionable and came under 
increasing criticism, especially with Pope Sixtus IV‘s extension of their scope to souls 
in purgatory. As Dickens put it, ―Luther‘s initial revolt was provoked by this spectacle 
of a salvation assurance company with branches in heaven, earth and purgatory.‖388  
In opposition to this mechanistic approach to man‘s salvation that proved a 
major source of income for the Church but a mockery of morality, Luther developed 
the doctrine of ‗justification by faith alone,‘ a doctrine that came to be foundational to 
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most of his socio-political and theological critiques of the papacy.
389
 The doctrine of 
justification was concerned with the actions one should undertake, as an individual, to 
be saved and absolved from one‘s sins. 390  Luther, breaking with the Church‘s 
materialistic assertion that ―the soul flies out of purgatory as soon as the money 
thrown into the chest rattles,‖ argued that justification could only be reached through 
the acceptance to put one‘s full trust in the promises of God and Christ.391 As a result, 
good works and the respect of the Christian law became secondary to, and a proof of, 
one‘s unswerving faith rather than the other way around.392 Such dispensation from 
‗material‘ duties came to be referred to as the ‗liberty of the Christian.‘  
Because individual faith was all that was needed for men‘s justification and 
because ―the Word of God was the start and the finish of his faith,‖ Luther called for 
the believer‘s total reliance on the Holy Scriptures.393 The role of the priesthood as the 
crucial intermediary between man and God was challenged. In turn, the Church was 
dispossessed from its divine legitimacy and priests lost both their exclusive right to 
preach and administer the Sacraments and their monopoly over scriptural 
interpretation. In accordance with this focus on faith alone, Martin Luther and John 
Calvin preached an orderly organisation in which one was only guided by one‘s own 
interpretation of the Book. This emphasis on ‗the priesthood of all believers‘ favoured 
individual ‗calling‘ at the expense of institutionalised piety, and hence worked 
towards the development of religious pluralism, individualism, and the atomisation of 
faith.
394
 Also, Jürgen Habermas argues, the Reformation was a key historical event in 
the establishment of the modern principle of subjectivity. 
With Luther, religious faith became reflective; the world of the 
divine was changed in the solitude of subjectivity into something 
posited by ourselves. Against faith in the authority of preaching and 
tradition, Protestantism asserted the authority of the subject relying 
upon his own insight.
395
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Through this subjective turn and transfer of religious legitimacy from the papacy to 
the individual believer, a complete overhauling of the medieval legitimate order was 
accomplished within theology. Religion was ‗laicised.‘396 
The importance of the doctrine of ‗justification by faith alone‘ cannot be 
underestimated as its socio-political consequences were far-reaching.
397
 Effectively, 
medieval Catholicism had divided the world in a binary manner – yet unified within 
the body of Christ. The Augustinian ‗doctrine of the Two Cities‘ defined two separate 
realms, one spiritual and solely controlled by the Church, and one temporal governed 
by secular ruler under the supervision of the pope. This division of the spheres of 
authority permitted the Church to enjoy a dominant status and to control all 
dimensions of European politics.  
However, Luther refashioned this ‗doctrine of the Two Cities‘ into the 
‗doctrine of the Two Kingdoms.‘ His preaching on the priesthood of all believers 
presupposed the essential belonging of all Christians to the spiritual estate, an estate 
that up until then had been exclusively reserved to the ecclesiastical body. However, 
because all men were not Christians in the true sense, worldly governments were 
needed to enforce the divine will – and were thus brought into God‘s Kingdom. In 
Luther‘s words: ―Let no one think that the world can be ruled without blood; the 
sword of the ruler must be red and bloody; for the world will and must be evil, and the 
sword is God‘s rod and vengeance upon it.‖398  
Luther argued that kings, princes, or magistrates were performing a divine role 
of structuring and ordering an essentially sinful world.
399
 Likewise, he explained the 
necessary nature of the temporal kingdom by the fact that 
The social corpus of Christendom includes secular government as 
one of its component functions. This government … should operate 
freely and unhindered, upon all members of the entire corpus, 
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should punish and compel where guilt deserves or necessity requires, 
in spite of pope, bishops, and priests.
400
 
 
Therefore, he even required true Christians to go by secular law. In his On Secular 
Authority: how far does the Obedience owed to it extend?, Luther explained that 
the Sword is indispensable for the whole world, to preserve peace, 
punish sin, and restrain the wicked. And therefore Christians readily 
submit themselves to be governed by the Sword, they pay taxes, 
honour those in authority, serve and help them, and do what they 
can to uphold their power, so that they may continue their work, and 
that honour and fear of authority may be maintained.
401
 
 
As a consequence, Luther‘s doctrine of the Two Kingdoms required men to follow 
privately a Christian ethics in accordance with the gospel and publicly to go by human 
standards of justice and righteousness even though these may be based upon coercion.  
Such an arrangement reduced the spiritual authority of priests to the domain of 
the believers‘ souls and left their body and property to the coercive authority of the 
princes and kings. As Nelson explains, Luther‘s insistence on the absoluteness of 
individual freedom in matters religious ―was purchased at the sacrifice of a fabric or 
casuistry in the moral or the political sphere.‖402 The Lutheran doctrine only left to the 
Church ―the purely interior government of the souls of its members; their bodies 
[were] handed over to the secular authorities.‖403 Moreover, because the Church was 
an institution of this world, Luther argued that it had to submit itself to the authority 
of secular rulers, except maybe in matters of doctrine.  
This division of labour led him to claim in his letter to Nicholas Amsdorf on 
30 May 1525 that in the case of the peasants‘ war that was raging in Germany:  
it is better that all the peasants be killed than that the princes and 
magistrates perish, because the rustics took the sword without divine 
authority. The only possible consequence of their satanic 
wickedness would be the diabolic devastation of the kingdom of 
God. Even if the princes abuse their power, yet they have it of God, 
and under their rule the kingdom of God at least has a chance to 
exist.
404
 
 
In such a context, it is easy to see how Luther‘s theological approach opened the door 
to the domination of the Church by states, and why it gathered impetus and support 
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from ambitious secular rulers.
405
 As Luther strived to depoliticise the Church and to 
disentangle it from secular works, he re-politicised it through his reliance on secular 
sovereigns. In the words of Cavanaugh, ―[w]hile apparently separating civil and 
ecclesiastical jurisdictions, the effect of Luther‘s arguments was in fact to deny any 
separate jurisdiction to the Church.‖ 406  
The Reformation delegated matters of faith and religion to individual believers 
and handed over the full jurisdiction of the political sphere to earthly rulers. Instead of 
inaugurating a clearly populist legitimate order, Protestantism solely justified the 
power of kings as a divine command and declared the absolute separation of the 
secular realm from matters of faith. It is only in practice, in its individualism, this-
worldliness, and support for secular rulers that Lutheranism worked towards the 
establishment of an ascending order. Even though he had eschewed the notion of 
nature and rejected the Thomist synthesis of Aristotle as an ―unfortunate 
superstructure on an unfortunate foundation,‖ Luther ultimately – though 
unintentionally – enshrined the legitimisation of the ‗secular‘ within theology. 407 
Starting from a different set of premises as it were, the German priest built a 
foundation on which to erect a secular political order independent from the papacy 
and populist at heart. Finally, as a result of this theological justification of secular 
government, the way was paved for the secular usurpation and appropriation of 
religious legitimacy and resources. 
 
 
3) Shift in Attitudes Towards Secular Authority 
 
The proto-territorial states that emerged from the 12
th
 and 13
th
 centuries 
onwards slowly came to replace the feudal order. Until then, civilians had owed 
varying allegiances to several princes and nobles and political dominion was not 
territorially-bounded but rather overlapped and interpenetrated with those of 
neighbouring princes. As was argued in previous sections, the development of states 
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led to a political and legal contest for their legitimacy within the universal jurisdiction 
of the Church.
408
 The resulting establishment of the supremacy of the temporal realm 
over the papal monarchy was profoundly influenced by Protestantism.  
The practical implementation of the ascending thesis of government and the 
corresponding affirmation of the authority and power of kings and princes were not 
legitimised and strengthened by the secular rulers themselves purely out of self-
interest and through the sole use of military or diplomatic means. It did not spring 
from purely practical and means-end calculations by greedy monarchs. On the 
contrary, kings came to dominate European societies principally as a by-product of 
the creation of a new ‗ethic of conviction‘ within Christianity. The rise of a multitude 
of states took place at the same time as the development of the theological arguments 
for the independence of kings from ecclesiastical control. Through its critique of the 
papacy and support for kings, Protestantism opened up a new space in which the 
establishment of a more secular notion of sovereignty was facilitated.  
In On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, Joseph Strayer maintains that 
the strong organisation and power of the emerging states were not sufficient for their 
legitimisation. Rather, as he demonstrates, ―the relatively badly organized states of the 
early sixteenth century were able to break out of a pattern of instability and civil war 
because a shift in attitudes produced greater loyalty to the ruler and to the state.‖409 
This attitudinal shift permitted ―the acquisition by the state of a moral authority to 
back up its institutional structure and its theoretical legal supremacy.‖ 410  To 
paraphrase Herbert Butterfield, in the 16
th
 century a wind was blowing in favour of 
kings.
411
   
The roots of this shift in loyalty towards secular rulers and the corresponding 
empowerment of emerging states is best exemplified by the theological shift in the use 
of the notion of corpus mysticum in the 12
th
 and 13
th
 centuries. So important was the 
rationalisation of the notion that its ―universal bearings and final effects cannot easily 
be overrated.‖412 The notion of corpus mysticum, prior to the 12th century, used to 
refer to the Corpus Christi, the consecrated host in the Eucharist. In fact, in 
Christianity, people were said to be connected to God ―through a system of 
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sacraments which unite them through the body of the Church with the mystical body 
of Christ.‖413 However, the advent of the ‗new theology‘ secularised many agreed 
doctrines and thus ―the notion of corpus mysticum, hitherto used to describe the host, 
was gradually transferred…to the Church as the organized body of Christian society 
united in the Sacrament of the Altar.‖414  The notion of ‗mystical body‘ came to 
designate the Church, not only in its spiritual dimension, but also in its institutional, 
political, and administrative forms. The once liturgical concept took a political 
connotation by being applied to the coercive apparatus of the Church. 
Simultaneously, this change in doctrine came to challenge the hierarchy 
between the Church and secular polities. If the political and legal organs of the 
Church could be ‗sanctified‘ through its membership in the mystical body, so could 
purely earthly governmental bodies. ―In that respect,‖ Kantorowicz argues, ―the new 
ecclesiological designation of corpus mysticum fell in with the more general 
aspirations of that age: to hallow the secular polities as well as their administrative 
institutions.‖415 This change marked the secularisation of the notion as it shifted from 
theological to juridical discourse.
416
 The term became decreasingly transcendental and 
increasingly immanent. Finally, by referring purely to the Church as a political body, 
the notion came to be applied and transferred to any ―body politic of the secular 
world.‖417 Vincent of Beauvais and Baldus respectively described the commonweal 
and ‗the people‘ as mystical bodies.  
By becoming charged with secular connotations within the Church, the 
concept of mystical body allowed ―the secular state itself – starting, as it were, from 
the opposite end – [to strive] for its own exaltation and quasi-religious 
glorification.‖ 418  Through this process of usurpation, the nascent state came to 
appropriate itself in a profound manner a certain theological vocabulary and ―finally 
proceeded to assert itself by placing its own temporariness on a level with the 
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sempiternity of the militant Church.‖419 Ernst Kantorowicz argues that through the 
politicisation and secularisation of the papacy, the Church became ―the perfect 
prototype of an absolute and rational monarchy on a mystical basis,‖ and in a parallel 
fashion the state increasingly showed  
a tendency to become a quasi-Church or a mystical corporation on a 
rational basis…the new monarchies were in many respects 
―churches‖ by transference…late medieval and modern 
commonwealths actually were influenced by the ecclesiastical 
model, especially by the all-encompassing spiritual prototype of 
corporational concepts, the corpus mysticum of the Church.
420
 
 
These processes of usurpation and adaptation led the Speaker of the Commons, before 
the close of Parliament in 1401, to compare the political body made up of King, Lords, 
and Commons to the Holy Trinity and the procedures of Parliament with the 
celebration of masses.
421
 In the following century, these very same processes gained a 
new momentum by being theologically condoned under the influence of Protestantism. 
From the 16
th
 century onward, ―Protestantism intervened in the development 
of the State in the direction of autonomy, and powerfully furthered it.‖422 This change 
marked the end of the papacy‘s supremacy and the death of the descending legitimate 
order supported by St Augustine and Gelasius I. Effectively, Luther argued in his 
Address to the Nobility of the German Nation that 
forasmuch as the temporal power has been ordained by God for the 
punishment of the bad, and the protection of the good, therefore we 
must let it do its duty throughout the whole Christian body, without 
respect of persons: whether its strikes popes, bishops, priests, monks, 
or nuns.
423
 
 
Obstacles to salvation were lifted by giving secular authorities full freedom to conduct 
their affairs. Luther thus laid claim to the superiority of God‘s secular arm over the 
Church: ―the idea of the Pope and Emperor as parallel and universal powers 
disappear[ed], and the independent jurisdictions of the sacerdotium [were] handed 
over to the secular authorities.‖424  
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Luther also held that ―Christ‘s body is not double or twofold, one temporal, 
the other spiritual. He is one head, and he has one body.‖425 Reversing the medieval 
conception of the two administrative competencies within a unitary Christendom and 
under the final authority of the pope, the Reformer developed a conception of a single 
body under the leadership of secular rulers. This appeal in favour of princely political 
control over all the Lutheran communities within their realms meant that the ―direct 
control over the churches was vested in a consistory whose members were appointed 
by the prince.‖426 Accordingly, secular authorities came to be considered as ―fellow 
Christians, fellow priests, similarly religious, and of similar authority in all 
respects.‖427 In practice, this meant that ―[w]hen images of saints were removed from 
the chancel arches of parish churches, they were often replaced by the royal coat of 
arms… [further establishing] a sanctification of secular power.‖428 The legitimisation 
of the ‗secular‘ from within Christianity was now complete and the process of transfer 
of power and resources from the Church to the state was well under way. In particular, 
a very special type of power and resources was transferred: the very sacredness of the 
Church. 
As Sheldon Wolin demonstrates, what Luther did was to elevate ―the status of 
rulers by clothing it with a sacerdotal dignity [and entrusting them] with some of the 
religious prerogatives previously belonging to the pope.‖429 In effect, the German 
theologian argued that any secular government is part of the social corpus of 
Christendom and thus ―is spiritual in status, although it discharges a secular duty.‖430 
As a result, the state came to be regarded as a religious institution and was ―directly 
assigned Church functions.‖431  
For Calvin, ―[c]ivil government and ecclesiastical government did not 
symbolize distinctions of kind, but of objectives. Their natures, therefore, were more 
analogous than antithetical.‖432  According to the French theologian, ―political and 
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religious thought tended to form a continuous realm of discourse.‖ 433  From the 
dichotomy between regnum and sacerdotium, Calvinism preached the essential 
affinities of the two realms. The political realm came to be referred to as regnum 
politicum and the spiritual realm as regnum spirituale. As Wolin explains, ―by 
declaring each of them to be a regnum, Calvin was pointing to the fact that the 
coercive element was common to both governances. The differences between them 
lay in their range of objects or jurisdiction.‖434 Calvinism ―gave the State a direct and 
generous share in the work of spiritual and ethical elevation and the pursuit of the 
ideals of civilisation.‖435 Under the joint impact of Luther and Calvin‘s theologies, 
political society became ―a divinely-ordained agency for man‘s improvement.‖436 But, 
the newly legitimised secular realm, having acquired some autonomy and power of its 
own, began to expand and develop independently from the Church. In the end, ―the 
secular powers, whose assistance [Luther] had invoked in the struggle for religious 
reform, began to assume the form of a sorcerer‘s apprentice threatening religion with 
a new type of institutional control.‖437  
 
 
4) The Protestant Devotion to the Nation 
 
Besides its centrality in the reversal of the Gelasian and Augustinian doctrines, 
Protestantism played a major role by legitimating and supporting some sort of nascent 
―devotion to the idea of the national state (as opposed to other forms of community 
life).‖438  This devotion can without doubts be traced back to the fact that Reformers 
―invested the expanding civil officialdom with the character of God-ordained calling, 
which plays its part in the execution of the Divine will; and it thus gave to the new 
centralised administration a strong ethical reinforcement.‖439 
The idealisation of the state was antecedent to the Reformation since ―[t]here 
had long been a cult devoted to the king … [and in] 1300 there was a cult of the 
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kingdom of France.‖ 440 However, Protestantism was essential and necessary to the 
spread of these beliefs from a handful of royal officials to entire populations and 
communities. As a matter of fact, ―the very notion of the national state emerged into 
public consciousness only after and largely as the result of the Reformation.‖441 
The disintegration of Christendom and the loss of legitimacy of papal 
authority were accompanied by the emergence of the ‗nation‘ ―as a claimant of the 
affective loyalties of peoples to whom simple genetic affiliation and narrow feudal 
obligations seemed insufficient substitutes for lost celestial benefactions.‖ 442  The 
belief that secular governments have a rightful place in God‘s plan helped to foster the 
idea that the nation was ―also a genuinely consecrated community, one which had its 
roots in nature but its goals in some superior, extra-mundane realm.‖443 Hence, with 
the breakdown of Christendom, ―the transcendental loyalties which that community 
had once inspired were in part transferred to the genius of the nation, which took its 
place as an object of devotion similar to that occupied by the totemistic deities in 
primitive tribes.‖444 Knowing that in the Middle Ages the Latin word natio was used 
interchangeably with the words gens or populus (i.e., ‗people‘), this transfer was thus 
to a large extent one from the descending to the ascending theme of government.
445
 
In practice, the birth and spread of nationalist movements in Europe were 
directly related to the politico-religious alliances fostered by the Protestant 
Reformation.
446
 In the case of the Dutch Revolution, the religious reform of the 
Church was inseparable from the national movement of protest against the Habsburg 
dynasty.
447
 Protestantism was so closely linked with the rise of nationalism that Ernest 
Barker argued that the nation ―began its life at the breast of Christianity … [and] was 
craddeled in Christianity.‖448  This redrawing of the boundaries between the secular 
                                                 
440
 Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, p.56. ―France was a holy land … [that] the 
French were a chosen people, deserving and enjoying divine favour [and that] To protect France was to 
serve God.‖ 
441
 McGovern and Sait, From Luther to Hitler, p.21. 
442
 Willson Havelock Coates, Jacob Salwyn Schapiro, and Hayden V. White, The Emergence of Liberal 
Humanism: An Intellectual History of Western Europe, vol. 2 (London: McGraw-Hill 1966), p.92. 
443
 Ibid. 
444
 Ibid. 
445
 Peter Burke, Languages and Communities in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), p.161. 
446
 Turner, Max Weber, p.106. Wolin, Politics and Vision p.175. 
447
 Turner, Max Weber, p.109. 
448
 Ernest Barker, Church, State and Study: Essays (London: Methuen, 1930), p.147, 43. 
Chapter 4: Secularisation, Act I: Medieval Origins 
 - 115 - 
and religious realms marked the disenchantment of theology and the ‗enchantment‘ of 
politics under the impulse of Lutheranism.
449
 
 In England, mirroring and implementing Luther‘s political theology, Henry 
VIII participated in the severance of the English Church from the papal hierarchy. The 
Church of England arose as an independent and territorial ecclesiastical 
organisation.
450
 While the theological doctrine of the newborn Church evolved quite 
radically over time, its call for the supremacy of the national state over the Church in 
all matters remained unabated.
451
 
Anglicanism went beyond Lutheranism in the redrawing of the boundaries 
between the religious and secular realms and emphasised the essentially national and 
political dimensions of worship as opposed to Luther‘s belief in the possibility of a 
universal, though invisible, Church. Contrary to Luther who claimed that secular 
powers should have control over the visible church, Anglicanism assumed that 
―church and state were merely two different aspects of the same thing, that church and 
state were both phases of the national commonwealth.‖452 The fusion of the political 
with the spiritual became total with Henry VIII‘s designation of the church as a 
corpus politicum integral to the state.
453
 As such, the newly created state-church in 
England was at the heart of the ―fusion of Protestantism and nationalism.‖454 
This rejection of the existence of an invisible church in practice and the 
resulting focus on the visible church as a mere dimension of the national 
commonwealth had a direct symbolic impact on members of the Church. In a time 
when the Church corresponded not only to the clergy but to the entire ―congregation 
of men and women of the clergy and of the laity, united in Christ‘s profession,‖455 the 
denial of the invisible church and the transfer of the visible church within the domain 
of government and politics meant that Church members – i.e., every single member of 
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every community – became ad hoc members of the political state.456 As a result, 
―membership of the one involved membership of the other: the good citizen was 
necessarily also the good churchman.‖457 At the symbolic level, visible church and 
state became one: ―L‘Eglise, c‘est l‘Etat: l‘Etat, c‘est l‘Eglise.‖458 
 
 
5) The Divine Right of King 
 
The secularisation of theology and the spiritualisation of politics created a 
space within the political sciences in which theological transformations were 
mimicked through the development of political doctrines. The theological claim for 
the supremacy of the state developed by Lutherans and Anglicans came to be 
translated into a full-fledged political doctrine of the divine right of kings, the 
widespread acceptance of which marked ―the transition from mediaeval to modern 
modes of thought‖ and ―permitted the emergence of the national state of today.‖459   
The doctrine of the divine right of kings originated in the power struggle 
between the papacy and the empire and was developed as a theological doctrine of 
politics antipathetic to the papal doctrine of ecclesiastical power.
460
 Pope Innocent III 
developed a thorough theory of absolute power; and it is in opposition to this doctrine 
of papal ‗sovereignty‘ by Divine Right that thinkers, inspired by the works of Dante 
and Marsiglio of Padua, formulated the doctrine of the divine right of kings.
461
 Indeed, 
in a context in which the Church was – at least in theory – all powerful, any claim for 
the independence of national states ―had to be [based on] something better than the 
right of the stronger; it had to be a divine dispensation.‖462 
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The Protestant rejection of the divine authority of the pope ―had left a void in 
men‘s minds which it was necessary to fill.‖463 In such a context, ―the parallel of 
divine rule for the maintenance of cosmic order with monarchical rule for political 
order was powerfully convincing and engendered passionate and mystical devotion to 
kings.‖464 Because of the widespread belief in the divine role of earthly rulers, the 
legitimate recipients of this divinely ordained authority and power were the kings and 
princes of every European nation.  
Contrary to medieval political theories that were hardly upheld by secular 
powers, the idea of the divine right of king was quickly adopted by rulers themselves. 
Even though the doctrine had existed for some time, the association of psychological 
premiums under the Lutheran influence made it all the more attractive. For example, 
King James VI (later James I of England) endorsed the doctrine and came to equate 
the office of king with that of God. In a speech before the Parliament, he went so far 
as to argue that ―Kings are justly called Gods for they exercise a manner or 
resemblance of divine power upon earth…For Kings are not only GODS Lieutnants 
vpon earth, and sit vpon GODS throne, but euen by GOD himselfe they are called 
Gods.‖465 Kings became ‗Gods Vicegerents,‘ a function that had until then remained 
the sole property of the Pope.
466
 The idea of the Divine Right of King was not solely 
confined to England but was also adopted by French and Italian monarchs.
467
 
Moreover, some sort of political cult was slowly established ―by borrowing a 
good deal of the ritual of the feast of Corpus Christi, annexed to the profit of 
monarchy the most powerful sacred symbol in Christianity.‖468 For example, Charles 
VIII of France was described as the  
Lamb of God, saviour, head of the mystical body of France, 
guardian of the book with seven seals, fountain of life-giving grace 
to a dry people, deified bringer of peace; one worthy to receive, 
without the formality of being slain, blessing and honour, glory and 
power.
469
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Symbolically, the notion of divine right of kings strengthened the transfer of power 
from the Christian Church to the sovereign, from the sacred body of the Church to the 
sacred body of the king. While the Church was once the sole holder of divine 
authority, with the Reformation, the secular and political realm became the legitimate 
repository of God‘s power.  
 
 
6) The Halo of Sanctity 
 
The theologies of Martin Luther and John Calvin proved extremely 
challenging to the European order of the 16
th
 century. Contrary to the theoretical 
nature of Thomist and Marsiglian philosophies, Lutheranism, and Protestantism more 
generally, led to rapid practical transformations and to the establishment of new 
regularities in behaviour.
470
 The Reformation sprang from localised shifts in values 
and ultimately led to fundamental changes in social structures, political organisations, 
trade, technology, and military might.
471
 Luther and Calvin proclaimed the 
independence of the political realm from the religious realm and thus provided a 
theological justification for a perceptible shift towards an ascending form of 
legitimate order. ―The positive and committed attitude towards the secular order so 
characteristic of the Reformation and charged with such importance for the shaping of 
modern western culture rests upon a series of theological assumptions.‖472 
Luther‘s theology participated in a shift in attitudes and attachment away from 
the Church and towards nascent secular political entities. This shift in legitimating 
principles heralded a transfer of power and loyalty from the papacy to the nation and 
its representatives. In turn, secular rulers were made the repository of the sanctity 
once reserved to the sole Church. As John Figgis argues,  
what Luther did in the world of politics was to transfer to the 
temporal sovereign the halo of sanctity that had hitherto been 
mainly the privilege of the ecclesiastical; and to change the 
admiration of men from the saintly to the civic virtues, and their 
ideals from the monastic life to the domestic.
473
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Protestantism thus achieved the transfer of the ‗halo of sanctity‘ and provided 
powerful arguments for the legitimisation of the ascending theme of government at 
the expense of papal sovereignty. Despite his ‗absolutism,‘ Luther‘s individualisation 
of faith and soteriology, challenge to the papacy, and theological support for secular 
rulers and nationalism provided decisive resources for the establishment of Ullmann‘s 
ascending thesis. The secularisation of Europe was marked by the transfer and 
usurpation of the Church‘s halo of sanctity from an institution that took God as the 
supreme authority to an institution that legitimated its authority by reference to other 
bases of power.  
However, the sanctity of the Church – i.e., its sacredness, holiness, saintliness 
or spirituality – was by no means destroyed. The survival and preservation of this 
quality outside the papal framework and within an earthly institution is of great 
importance for our assessment of the nature of modern secularism. As I will 
demonstrate, this very process of transfer calls into question the widely accepted idea 
that secular politics is universal, non-religious, objective, and neutral. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The aim of this chapter was to begin the interpretive study of the secularisation 
of Europe. Based on the definition of the secularisation process and on the theoretical 
framework developed in previous chapters, I looked at the broad changes in sources 
of morality and legitimate orders that took place during the two seminal periods of the 
12
th
 century Renaissance and 16
th
 century Protestant Reformation. In the first part, I 
looked at the rediscovery of Aristotle and explored the shift in moral sources from 
God to the notion of ‗nature.‘ I explained how the constitutional structures 
legitimating the authority of the Church became challenged and were replaced by 
structures legitimating the authority of secular rulers, i.e., the shift from ascending to 
descending theme of government. In the second part, I looked at the impact of the 
Reformation on the secularisation of Europe. I explained how Luther proclaimed the 
independence of the political realm from within theology. Even though Luther did not 
use the notion of ‗nature,‘ I argued that he worked towards the secularisation of 
theology, the critique of the papacy, and the sacralisation of secular political 
entities.
474
 It is with Luther that ―Christianity came to provide a crucial basis of 
legitimacy for emerging nation-states.‖475  
Theological disputes over the source of authority were the means through 
which the process of disenchantment made its way into Christianity. With the 
secularisation of the concept of corpus mysticum and the resulting transfer of its 
mystical characteristic from Christ to the visible Church and to the political realm, the 
state came to enjoy some sort of spiritual glorification. The legitimacy of the civil and 
secular bodies was carved out and emerged from within the ‗sacred‘ core of 
Christianity. The change in attitudes fostered by Lutheranism instilled a sense of 
devotion and loyalty to the state, the king, and the nation. The result was the 
domination of all ecclesiastical institutions by the state; itself a new Church by 
transference. As James Mayall explains, the nationalists ―moved into the building 
which had previously been occupied by dynastic rulers and religious authorities… 
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[but] left the building itself more or less intact‖476 Our diagram on the four levels of 
secularisation can now be further completed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The 4 Levels of Secularisation after the Reformation 
 
 
 
To come back to the wider theme of this thesis, it is important to locate the 
transfer of the Church‘s halo of sanctity within the more general frame of the 
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secularisation of Europe. According to the argument developed in this chapter, it 
seems that the secularisation process took place through different means. First, it 
began with the rationalisation of theology and the legitimisation of secular authorities 
through theological debates. And second, as part of the sacralisation of politics, 
secular rulers usurped ―that which it felt to be the source of the church‘s power, 
namely, the church‘s claim to possess and to dispense a supernatural force.‖477 As I 
argued in the above sections, the first form of secularisation took place through the 
media of Thomist theology and the separation of nature from grace. And the latter 
took place through religio-political arrangements such as those encouraged by 
Lutheranism and Calvinism.  
This redrawing of the boundaries between the secular and religious realms 
marked the disenchantment of theology and the sacralisation of politics. The transfer 
of the halo of sanctity from Church to state, from Church to nation, from Christ to 
king, and from pope to king paved the way for the fusion of ―[t]he spiritual tradition 
of the new and secular nation…with the spiritual tradition of the old and Christian 
society.‖ 478 From a conception of a Church as an absolute and universal sovereign 
authority, the secularisation of theology led to the fusion of Church and state.
479
 In 
turn, the state came to be considered as a ‗consecrated community‘ clothed in 
‗sacerdotal dignity,‘ and became the new source of moral authority and unity for the 
community.
480
 These developments were the proofs, for John Figgis, that ―the religion 
of the State superseded the religion of the Church.‖481 The Love of the Father was 
transmuted into the love of the fatherland. 
Now that the first step of the secularisation process has been outlined, we can 
turn to the second step, i.e., the processes of modelling and translation. In fact, the 
modelling of the state on the Church and the translation of religious dogmas into 
secular terms have already been touched upon in the previous sections (i.e., the 
secularisation of the papal doctrine of absolute sovereignty, the replacement of the 
mystical body of Christ by that of the King, and the development of the doctrine of 
divine right of kings). However, these processes were still taking place within a theo-
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centric framework and were thus more part of the process of appropriation than of 
translation on secular grounds. Because of the importance of that second step for our 
enquiry, I will devote the following chapter to the most well-known process of 
secularisation by translation within the political sciences, namely, Thomas Hobbes‘ 
Leviathan. 
 
 
  
5. Secularisation, Act II: 
Hobbes’ Sacred Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
The politico-theological revolution triggered in the 16
th
 century supported and 
fuelled the secularisation process in two ways. First, it endorsed themes and ideas 
indispensable to the emergence of the ascending theme of government and law. And 
second, it justified the transfer of legitimacy and authority from the Church to the 
nascent state. As a result, the ‗halo of sanctity‘ of the Church was transferred to the 
secular realm of politics. This process of transfer mainly took place within a theo-
centric framework and was advocated by Protestant prelates. But soon, the argument 
in favour of the control of the religious realm by secular rulers came to be transposed 
into the political sphere and couched in purely secular terms. In the 17
th
 century, 
secularisation was no longer fuelled by the rationalisation of theology and the 
legitimisation of secular authorities through theological debates. Rather, political 
processes of modelling and translation marked a second step in the secularisation of 
Europe.
482
  
On the one hand, lay scholars and political philosophers laid the foundation for 
a comprehensive political liturgy modelled on Christianity to replace that of the 
Church. Following their newly-acquired and religiously-sanctioned legitimacy, 
secular polities were modelled on the Church and theological dogmas were slowly 
translated into secular terms to constitute political theories. More and more, religious 
concepts began to pass over into the secular realm. Indeed, in a context in which the 
Church came to be equated with or dominated by the state, in which theological and 
political doctrines supported the spread of nationalism, in which theology was 
secularised, and in which political apparatuses were spiritualised, ―a perfectly secular 
sort of sacred was asking to be created…and its name was sovereignty.‖483 And on the 
other, political thinkers proceeded to redefine the term ‗religion‘ in accordance with 
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the new liturgy developed within the political sciences. After having stripped religion 
of its sacred character, they redefined and emasculated it to secure the supremacy of 
the political realm. Because this process is central to our understanding of the 
implications of secularisation for the foundation of politics, it is the focus of this 
chapter. 
It is often assumed that the sciences and philosophy of the 17
th
 century 
operated a gradual shift away from a theological account of the world to more 
naturalistic interpretations of events. And Thomas Hobbes, the self-proclaimed 
―founder of political philosophy or political science,‖ is commonly thought to be the 
thinker most representative of this process.
484
 For Brian Nelson, Hobbes‘ works 
embodies the ‗intellectual revolution‘ that made ―the religious point of view 
irrelevant‖ in a Europe ―convulsed by religious revolutions.‖485 In Natural Right and 
History, Leo Strauss describes Hobbes‘ Leviathan as the first doctrine to point 
unmistakably to an ‗enlightened‘ and atheistic society as the solution to Europe‘s 
religious strife.
486
 Thus, Hobbes played a central role in the sharp break between the 
downfall of Christianity and the emergence of secular liberalism.
487
 
Until the end of the 17
th
 century, all theories of government were based on 
some sort of divine authority.
488
 And with the exception of Hobbes,  
all the political theorists up to the end of the seventeenth century 
either have religion for the basis of their system, or regard the 
defence or supremacy of some one form of faith as their main object. 
Hardly any political idea of the time but had its origin in theological 
controversy.
489
  
 
In this context, Hobbes acted as ‗the Galileo of political theory‘ in that he developed a 
‗strictly materialist science‘ in order to exclude ―any religious explanations of 
physical reality.‖490  
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Despite the fact that Robert Filmer was much more influential than Hobbes in 
the 17
th
 century, the latter has become the symbol of key socio-cultural 
transformations that were taking place at the time.
491
 This is the reason why I focus on 
Hobbes‘ masterpiece to illustrate the revolution in political philosophy that saw the 
advent of a secular foundation to politics. However, contrary to the common wisdom 
and in support to existing interpretations, I explain that the socio-cultural revolution 
embodied in the work of the English scholar did not so much result in the 
rationalisation and disenchantment of religion as in ―the transformation of politics into 
a secularized theology.‖492 While I agree that Hobbes played a central role in the 
intellectual shift of the 17
th
 century, I contend that this move in a more secular and 
naturalistic direction was achieved by modelling and translating theological dogmas 
into secular terms. Far from disenchanting the world, Hobbes re-enchanted it on a 
secular basis.
493
 I argue that Hobbes‘ Leviathan draws its significance from the role it 
played in this second step of the secularisation process.
494
 
Therefore, this chapter is organised as follows. In the first part, I look at the 
17
th
 century creation of a secular political liturgy to match that of Christianity. 
Following an outline of the historical context - the Wars of Religion and Westphalia - 
I explore the birth of a political and fully secular doctrine of salvation through the 
study of Hobbes‘s Leviathan. I argue that the English thinker, far from being an 
atheist, translated Protestant theological principles into political dogmas and furthered 
the sacralisation of politics as well as its autonomy from Christianity.  
In the second part of the chapter, I look at the implications of this modelling of 
politics on religion. I outline the ways in which religion came to be redefined under 
the pen of the political ‗liturgists‘ in order to justify the legitimacy of the newborn 
secular realm.  Religion was turned into a set of private beliefs and the communal 
element of Christianity was transferred to the state. The result was the creation of a 
realm independent from the Church but sustained by an equivalent form of sacredness. 
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A.  Leviathan, from Theology to Politics 
 
 
 
1) The European Wars of Religion 
 
In the 16
th
 century, the benefits of conversion to Lutheranism were important 
for princes since it allowed them to claim power and control over the property that 
had once been in the hands of the Roman Pontiff. This defiance of the papal order was 
also espoused by Catholic rulers who forced the pope to make concessions during the 
1600s. In turn, the withering away of the once universal authority of the Church led to 
a century of violence, massacres, and wars. The conflicts were, on the one hand, 
religious and involved a struggle between Catholics, Calvinists, and Lutherans and, on 
the other hand, political and involved a struggle between rival kings and princes. The 
most destructive war since the Roman era, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), was to 
mark a turning point in European history. 
The end of the ‗Wars of Religion‘ was sealed with the Peace of Westphalia 
that was concluded, after decades of an exhausting struggle, at Osnabrück for the 
Protestants and Münster for the Catholics. The treaty was the result of years of 
negotiations between all parties involved and marked the redefinition of the role of 
religion in European politics. The roots of the Westphalian Treaty were indisputably 
to be found in Protestantism‘s intrinsic content that pointed to self-determination, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention.
495
 The Protestant revolution 
was essential in the emergence and ―the rise of the modern international society.‖496 
As Daniel Philpott puts it, ―no Reformation, no Westphalia.‖497  
As a result of the Thirty Years War, the concept of Christendom was 
discredited.
498
 The so-called religious atrocities were so appalling that local princes 
did their best to marginalise the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire.
499
 While this 
was done out of self-interest in the acquirement of the Church‘s power and riches, it 
was also the result of the development of a widespread liberal and Protestant 
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presumption that peace and stability could only exist if religion was disciplined by a 
state.
 500
 It extended the Reformist demand that the medieval cosmology of a united 
Christian community be undermined and that religion be ―privatized, marginalized, 
and nationalized.‖501 By marking a movement away from a cohesive and universal 
Christendom, the treaty opened the door ―to a new political theory or even theology of 
international relations.‖502  
The Treaty of Westphalia required all parties to recognize the Peace of 
Augsburg of 1555 by which each prince had acquired the right to determine the 
religion of his own state - the principle of cuius region, eius religio.
503
 It was agreed 
that the citizenries would be subjected first and foremost to the laws of their 
respective government rather than to those of neighbouring powers or to the 
transnational authority of the Catholic Church. By enshrining the concepts of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention in international law and by establishing fixed 
territorial boundaries for many states, Westphalia marked the beginning of the modern 
state-system and was thus considered by some to be the ―majestic portal which [led] 
from the old world into the new world.‖504 While numerous scholars have described 
this view of the treaty as ‗wrong‘ or a ‗myth,‘ they have so far failed to ―dethrone the 
common wisdom.‖ 505  Even though 1648 might not have been the ‗consummate 
fissure‘ described by Leo Gross, ―it was still… as clean as historical faults come.‖506 
As such, despite all the arguments to the contrary, Westphalia is still considered by 
many to be the ―origin of a European system of sovereign states.‖507 
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During the 17
th
 century, the creation of powerful territorial states was 
accompanied by the hope that the newborn political communities would supply 
modern men with their basic material and spiritual needs, marginalising in turn 
religious primordial loyalties.
508
 It was believed that religious legitimacy would 
become supererogatory since the state would be legitimised through the divine status 
of earthly rulers and later through the inherent reasonableness of the ruler‘s 
authority.
509
 In this mission to establish the supremacy and autonomy of the state, the 
Protestant Reformation played an important role by facilitating the creation of a 
political liturgy to replace that of the Church. In particular, it provided Thomas 
Hobbes with essential resources to develop a political theory independent from God. 
To the modern student of politics, Hobbes is the thinker who finally curtailed 
the influence of religion in public life and envisaged how to make peace and stability 
possible in a secular environment free from superstition and supernatural fancies. 
Hobbes‘s methodological materialism, nominalism, and rationalism expounded in the 
first half of Leviathan led most scholars to denounce the book as a piece of atheist 
erudition legitimating the demise of the Church and the use of religion as a tool of the 
state. Likewise, his anti-sacerdotal and anti-papal thinking – yet not anti-clerical - 
made him, in the eyes of many of his contemporaries, an atheist if not the incarnation 
of the Antichrist.
510
  
In the following sections, I explain that Hobbes wrote Leviathan to provide a 
solution to the religious strife of 17
th
 century England. Not only did he 
comprehensively tackle the issue of Church-state relations, but more importantly, he 
did so within a theological and quasi-religious framework influenced by the Reformist 
tradition of the Church of England. His take on religious and political issues clearly 
embodies the transition in political thought that took place under the process of 
secularisation. More specifically, Hobbes‘ philosophy exemplifies to the perfection 
the modelling and translation of religious dogmas into political theory. Unfortunately, 
Hobbes‘ importance in this regard is rarely acknowledged. This omission is 
principally due to ―the fact that the religion of Hobbes has not been the object of 
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serious study but has been commented upon by scholars primarily interested in his 
politics.‖511 This one-sided and incomplete take on Hobbes‘s philosophy is a further 
proof of the secularist bias that pervades modern International Relations Theory.  
 
 
2) Hobbes‘s Religion and the Reformation 
 
The fact that Christianity, and the study of religion in general, occupy more 
than a third of Hobbes‘s writings is rarely mentioned, if ever noticed. His masterpiece, 
Leviathan, is evenly split between an outline of a materialist philosophy and religious 
exegesis. Also, a third of the book is devoted to the sketch of his utopia, the Christian 
Commonwealth.
512
 Even though ―Scriptural and religious questions occupy more 
space in Leviathan than any other topic discussed in the work,‖ the theological and 
religious dimensions of Hobbes‘s thinking remain barely recognised. 513  As David 
Johnston explains,  
The traditional interpretation has been that the theological views 
developed in parts III and IV of Leviathan, however interesting they 
may be in themselves, are of no real significance for his political 
philosophy…[and] appear to be mere appendages to the true 
work…mere trappings, designed to make Hobbes‘s doctrines 
palatable to a nation of Christian believers.
514
 
 
As a result, this allowed many to uphold the erroneous idea that Hobbes‘s aim is 
―nothing less than the total destruction of the religious view of life which, it is 
suggested, he detested.‖ 515  
However, a number of scholars have come to agree that the theology Hobbes 
develops is essential to any proper understanding of his political philosophy.
 516
 As 
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Taylor argues, ―a certain kind of theism is absolutely necessary to make [Hobbes‘s] 
theory work.‖517 And ―[w]e get a wrong impression of the man if we overlook, as is 
now commonly done, his personal piety and religious beliefs.‖ 518 Yet, those scholars 
who emphasise the importance of Hobbes‘s theology struggle to agree on the 
denomination to which the English thinker belonged. It ranges from the religion of the 
Gentile
 
 or of the Socinians, to orthodox Calvinism and Anglicanism.
519
 Nevertheless, 
what comes out of the debate is that Hobbes was neither an atheist nor a disguised 
atheist pretending to be a faithful Christian by fear of the consequences.
520
 ―Despite 
his materialism…Hobbes believed in God‖ and was a pious man. 521  In Herbert 
Schneider‘s words, ―he was clearly an orthodox Christian and, far from being an 
atheist, was devout. He was a sincere Anglican.‖522  
Once Hobbes‘ Anglican background is acknowledged, the Protestant flavour 
of his philosophy becomes indubitable and the ―conflict between Hobbes the pious 
believer and Hobbes the author of a completely naturalistic science of body, man, and 
societies‖ withers away. 523 In effect, it is only through the recognition of his Anglican 
affiliation and Protestant convictions that ―his skeptical assaults on traditional 
religious ideas and doctrines and … his changing interpretations of many of these 
latter matters‖ can be reconciled ―without having recourse to theories about Hobbes‘s 
sincerity or lack of it.‖524  
Among other themes, Hobbes‘s conception of God, human nature, and earthly 
government, his individualism, his elimination of miracles and other supernatural 
fancies, and his vision of human salvation, all start to make sense if one recognises his 
Protestant inclination instead of some sort of illusive atheism.
525
 The Hobbesian 
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challenge to the authority of the Church as a necessary mediator between God and 
men was not fuelled by atheism but by his Protestant allegiance.  
In fact, ―to close students of Reformation theology … what is striking about 
Hobbes‘ formal theology is not its uniqueness or its virtuosity, but its orthodoxy 
within Reformation tradition, especially that articulated during the English 
Reformation.‖526 For Michael Oakeshott, it is evident that ―the immediate background 
of his thought was the political theology of the late middle ages and the Reformation; 
and, of course, scripture was the authoritative source to which he went to collect the 
religious beliefs of his society.‖527 As Eldon Eisenach points out,  
the doctrine of election, the importance of the invisible church and 
the centrality of the millennial promise are not unique to Hobbes, 
but defined the major themes of Reformation theology, and are the 
source of its critique of sacerdotal authority…[Hobbes‘s] scepticism 
was matched and often exceeded first by the Anglican and then by 
the Puritan clergy. And to doubt Hobbes‘ reliance on revelation as 
the ground of this scepticism would be to doubt the sincerity of 
almost the entire body of Reformation churchmen in England from 
the late sixteenth century onward….528 
 
In reality, Hobbes was not the only one to be charged with atheism. Not only was 
Hobbes agnostic where theologians such as Aquinas and Calvin had been agnostic 
too,
529
 but more importantly, ―[m]any of the most respected divines of the English 
Church in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, including an Archbishop of 
Canterbury, … faced the same charges [of atheism].‖530  
 For example, if one considers the statement that ―it is with the mysteries of our 
Religion, as with wholsome pills for the sick, which swallowed whole, have the 
vertue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect,‖ one is 
drawn to conclude, from a modern perspective, that these are the words of a sarcastic 
atheist.
 531
 However, as Paul Johnson reminds us,  
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Our own impressions of the tone of a remark, as well as our 
assessment of its force, must be corrected by familiarity with the 
conventions of its historical origins. Hobbes‘s image of mysteries 
chewed, swallowed, and cast up would have carried little emotive 
impact in his own day.
532
  
 
On the contrary, such a statement was a full-fledged ―part and parcel of a doctrine of 
salvation and a theory of Christianity which formed the mainstream of Anglican 
doctrinal development in the seventeenth century.‖ 533  The irony of Hobbes being 
branded an atheist ―is heightened by the fact that the charge (or credit) of atheism has 
frequently rested on those of his opinions which are closest to important 
developments in the history of Christian thought.‖534 As such, Ian Tregenza concludes 
that ―it may well have been his Christian outlook itself that gave rise to his atheistic 
reputation.‖535 
Even though he was criticised during his lifetime, it is only during the 19
th
 
century that ―Hobbes was completely secularized and then even made a materialist, 
Epicurean atomist, mechanist, in addition to being an atheist.‖ 536  As Aloysius 
Martinich argues, ―Hobbes was never so much an atheist as he was during the first 
half of the twentieth century.‖537 In his own time, Hobbes might have been closer to 
being a Reformation theologian.
538
 Overall, it seems that Hobbes is both a theologian 
and a political philosopher and he must remain so to secure the unity of 
sovereignty.
539
 
The acknowledgment of Hobbes‘s theology opens a whole new field of 
enquiry concerning religion, politics, and the secularisation of political thought. The 
importance of Hobbes‘s scriptural exegesis should not be underestimated. In fact, the 
theological argumentation of the English thinker is essential in that it points toward 
what Richard Sherlock described as the ―refounding of Christianity.‖540 As Johnston 
argues, what Hobbes attempted was to ―turn Christianity into a civil religion, 
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compatible with sovereign authority as [he] conceived it, but leaving man essentially 
what he had been before, a homo religiosus.‖541 Such a claim is echoed by Patricia 
Springborg who argues that Hobbes tried ―to form from Christianity a civic religion 
like that of the great empires on which his Leviathan is modelled; an aspiration that 
also lay at the birth of Anglicanism.‖542 In such a context, the Hobbesian theology 
must be taken seriously, not only in itself, but more importantly as a prominent 
landmark in the secularisation of European thought. Far from solely rationalising 
religion, Leviathan translated Christianity into political doctrines and mystified 
political authority. The result was the creation of politics as ‗a secular theology.‘543  
 
 
3) Leviathan as a Secular Version of Papal Sovereignty 
 
 The political philosophy of Hobbes was thoroughly concerned with the 
English Civil War and the troubles caused by sectarian strife. The religious dimension 
of the conflict did not escape his attention since he ultimately believed that ―the 
dispute between the spiritual and the civil power [had], more than any other thing in 
the world, been the cause of civil wars in all parts of Christendom.‖ 544  As a 
consequence, Hobbes‘s political philosophy was concerned to a large extent with 
settling the age-old conflict between the Church and the state.
545
 His Leviathan was 
designed as ―a solution to the political and theological problems at the heart of the 
Civil War by demonstrating that reason and revelation mandated the rule of the 
sovereign over both church and state as the basis for a lasting peace.‖546 To achieve 
this, Hobbes had to draw extensively on medieval and Reformation literature.  
In Hobbes on Civil Association, Michael Oakeshott argues that ―Leviathan, 
like any masterpiece, is an end and a beginning; it is the flowering of the past and the 
seed-box of the future.‖547 Far from being a completely original piece of work, some 
arguments employed in Leviathan are ‗precisely the same‘ as those developed in the 
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14
th
 century by Marsiglio, Dante, and Ockham.
548
 And it is based on this heritage, 
―especially as it [was] received and transmuted by the Reformation,‖ that Hobbes 
translated Christianity into political theory and proceeded to the transformation of 
politics into a secular theology.
549
 In particular, the English philosopher did so by 
creating his Leviathan as a reversed replica of the medieval doctrines of papal 
sovereignty.
550
 Overall, Hobbes played a major role by facilitating the passage of 
hierocratic doctrines into the political theory of the secular state in the 17
th
 century.
551
 
The development of the notions of papal supremacy and papal sovereignty can 
be traced back to the 6
th
 century when the Church began to develop a theory to 
legitimise its own authority and powers. As the legitimate holder of the ‗keys of the 
kingdom of heaven,‘ the Roman Pontiff enjoyed complete jurisdiction in the care of 
souls.
552
 These biblically expressed claims to power culminated in Innocent III‘s 
claim to absolute papal sovereignty. And even though the papacy was decreasingly 
able to control and command European monarchs, the process was ―counterbalanced 
by the elaboration of a doctrine of power unparalleled since the days of imperial 
Rome.‖553 As a result, arguing that the salvation of all people was entrusted onto the 
papacy, Innocent III requested the means to govern in such a way as to be able to halt 
and combat any hindrance to the salvation of Christian society. By the same token, the 
supremacy of the Church over secular rulers was strengthened and the Church-state 
issue was solved. Having already outlined the substance of the doctrine of papal 
supremacy in the previous chapter, in the following paragraphs, I will only focus on 
its form and structure as developed by Augustinus Triumphus. 
Augustinus Triumphus (1243-1328) developed the theory of papal sovereignty 
in great detail and besides the usual reference to Petrine powers, he provided a 
meticulous outline of the nature and function of papal authority. The medieval scholar 
considered the sovereignty of the pope to be ―the essence of the Ecclesia‖ and to be 
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universal, ―perpetual, and incorruptible, and common to all the society.‖554 Mirroring 
Innocent III‘s doctrine, Augustinus Triumphus thought that human salvation could 
only be achieved through ―an absolute obedience to the ruler‘s will.‖555  And as part 
of this unconditional obedience, all subjects were said to ―act as one man,‖ with the 
resulting ‗artificial‘ or ‗fictitious‘ entity being ―portrayed by the ruler.‖556 The need 
for total obedience that human salvation enjoined meant that ―all Christians [came to] 
form the body of the pope.‖557 This participation in the Juggernaut - i.e., Michael 
Wilks‘ term for the papal government - did not entail the division of papal 
sovereignty.
558
 Rather, ―[t]he inclusion of all in one means the supremacy of one over 
all: unity entails monarchy. The incorporation of all in the head involves no division 
of sovereignty (which would thereupon cease to be sovereignty).‖ 559  This 
indivisibility of sovereignty was dear to Augustinus.  
To the modern scholar of International Relations, this succinct description of 
the form and structure of papal sovereignty as being embodied in an all-powerful and 
artificial body bears resemblance to that developed by Thomas Hobbes.
 560
 It seems 
that in his depiction of papal government, Augustinus is describing the front-cover of 
the original edition of Leviathan. Besides these superficial and structural similarities, 
both Juggernaut and Leviathan share some functional similarities. Mirroring the 
Juggernaut‘s role as the guide of ―the body of the faithful from its transitory and 
earthly existence towards salvation and eternal life,‖ Hobbes‘s Leviathan, ―is an 
artificial man made for the protection and salvation of the natural man.‖561  In fact, 
Hobbes‘s motto is that of ―Salus populi suprema lex,‖ since ―forasmuch as eternal is 
better than temporal good, it is evident, that they who are in sovereign authority, are 
by the law of nature obliged to further the establishing of all such doctrines and rules, 
and the commanding of all such actions‖ necessary to human salvation.562  
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However, what separates them is that the Juggernaut draws its substance from 
God and the descending theme of government while the Leviathan draws its substance 
from nature and the ascending theme.
563
 As Wilks argues, Augustinus Triumphus‘ 
theological theory of the sovereign Juggernaut only embodies ―in an unfamiliar form 
what a modern writer would immediately recognise as a theory of State-
sovereignty.‖564 By unfamiliar, one has to understand ‗theo-centric.‘ 
 
 
4) Hobbesian Theology and the State-Church Issue 
 
The solution Hobbes offered to the issues of Church-State relations and of 
sovereignty is not limited to a simple reversal of the papal doctrine of absolute 
sovereignty based on his engagement with science and nominalism. Rather, Hobbes‘s 
Protestant confession led him, through Biblical exegesis and theological 
‗ratiocination,‘ to transfer and translate religious concepts from the field of theology 
to the newborn field of secular politics. As Willis Glover argues, the switch from the 
Juggernaut to the Leviathan was much more problematic ―than has been realized by 
interpreters who assume too easily that [Hobbes] cut the Gordian knot by assigning an 
absolute and completely arbitrary religious authority to the sovereign.‖565 The picture 
is much more complex. In this section, I explain how the authority of the secular 
sovereign was legitimised along Reformist lines. 
For Hobbes, Leviathan‘s religious authority is by no means absolute or 
completely arbitrary. As a matter of fact, the English thinker argues that the sovereign 
must be obeyed only as long as he does not jeopardise the salvation of his subjects – 
and it is up to the subjects themselves to decide whether the sovereign‘s orders 
contravene to their salvation. Being ―a wholly human contrivance, not in the least an 
outcome of God‘s providence,‖ the state can only legitimise its authority through ―the 
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consent of every one of the Subjects.‖566 These limitations on Leviathan‘s power led 
Patricia Springborg to argue that  
Hobbes‘s doctrine of the union of civil and ecclesiastical power 
does not depart much from Marsilius‘s, or from Luther and 
Hooker‘s formulations of ‗the Godly Prince,‘ more or less canonical 
on the post-Reformation role of the sovereign as God‘s deputy in 
the kingdom of this world.
567
 
 
 For orthodox Calvinists and Lutherans as for Hobbes, an all-powerful and 
coercive state was justified by the violence that followed the Original Fall of Adam 
and Eve. As Paul Dumouchel argues, it is the Fall that led ―to the erection of 
Leviathan, the mortal god, under whose protection men seek security from each 
other.‖568 Such a position was reminiscent of Calvin‘s argument developed in The 
Homily against Disobedience and Wilful Rebellion in which the French theologian 
argued that  
after the fall God ‗did constitute and ordain…governors and 
rulers…for the avoiding of all confusion which else would be in the 
world‘. Without the state ‗there must needs follow all mischiefs and 
utter destruction…of souls, bodies, goods…‘569  
 
Likewise, following earlier Reformists, Hobbes upheld the ‗spiritual statuses‘ of 
rulers and Commonwealth as well as the Anglican fusion of Church and state.
570
 For 
Hobbes, a Church  
is the same thing with a Civil Common-wealth, consisting of 
Christian men; and is called a Civill State, for that the subjects of it 
are Men; and a Church, for that the subjects thereof are Christians. 
Temporall and Spirituall Government, are but two words brought 
into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their Lawfull 
Soveraign…There is therefore no other Government in this life, 
neither of State, nor Religion, but Temporall; nor teaching of any 
doctrine, lawfull to any Subject, which the Governor both of the 
State, and of the Religion, forbiddeth to be taught: And that 
Governor must be one; or else there must needs follow Faction, and 
Civil war in the Common-wealth, between the Church and State; 
between Spiritualists, and Temporalists; between the Sword of 
Justice, and the Shield of Faith; and (which is more) in every 
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Christian mans own brest, between the Christian, and the Man. The 
Doctors of the Church, are called Pastors; so also are Civill 
Soveraigns…Who that one chief pastor is, according to the law of 
Nature, hath been already shewn; namely, that it is the Civill 
Soveraign.
571
 
 
By defining the Church as simply ―A company of men professing Christian Religion, 
united in the person of one Soveraign,‖ Hobbes unified it to the state under the sole 
authority of the secular ruler.
572
 ―As head of the national church, the sovereign 
becomes de jure Vicar of Christ on earth‖ and acquires ―supreme ecclesiastical 
power‖ within his territory.573 The king becomes the ―sole Messenger of God, and 
Interpreter of his Commandements‖ and thus possesses ―ecclesiastical supremacy as 
God‘s lieutenant, after Moses and Christ.‖ 574  Ultimately, ―he which heareth his 
Soveraign, being a Christian, heareth Christ.‖575  
 Hobbes seems to be continuing the transfer of the Church‘s halo of sanctity to 
the state initiated by Luther. By uniting Church and state, Hobbes makes the 
Commonwealth the legitimate successor to the apostolic church. Moreover, because 
the sovereign is the representative of God on earth and ―the soul of an artificial body 
which is both State and Church,‖ he ultimately acquires the status of ―the person of 
God born now the third time.‖576 Consequently, Hobbes‘s Christian sovereign,  
as head of the Christian church, is responsible for the salvation of 
his subjects. Far from making religion or the church a mere tool of 
the state, Hobbes defines the Christian state as a church and ascribes 
to it a religious mission which takes precedence over its legitimate 
worldly concerns.
577
 
 
As a result, it is not too far-fetched to argue, as Hood does, that ―Leviathan represents 
an attempt to support by a new method a traditional doctrine of Divine politics 
adapted to serve the purpose of a national sovereign.‖578 This new method, though 
modelled on Christianity along Protestant lines, is secular. 
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5) Hobbes‘s Doctrine of Salvation 
 
Hobbes‘s theology is of great importance for understanding the role that his 
political philosophy played in the broader secularisation of Europe. To take his 
theology seriously leads one to acknowledge the Reformist dimensions of his work 
and to consider the crucial issue of state-Church relationship. However, the solution 
Hobbes found in the Leviathan brings up the issue of salvation for which the 
Commonwealth is supposed to be responsible. And the Englishman was well aware of 
this. Hence, at the heart of the second half of Leviathan lays some sort of doctrine of 
human salvation or soteriology. Were we to overlook Hobbes‘s Anglicanism and his 
religious beliefs, we would remain blind to the fact that his ―theory of personal 
salvation was an essential part of his philosophy and a major issue in the bitter 
conflicts of his time.‖579 In this section, I look at one more dimension of Hobbes‘ 
secularising influence, his re-evaluation of the traditional Christian soteriology. 
 The Hobbesian doctrine of salvation was by no means controversial or hotly-
debated in the 17
th
 century. In fact, it ―was substantially identical with that held by 
leading Anglican thinkers in the first decades of the century‖ and corresponded to ―the 
essence of the covenant theology that was favoured by some early Stuart 
Calvinists.‖580  As such, Hobbes only asserted ―the Reformed protestant doctrine that 
Biblical Christianity compels us to believe in a doctrine of salvation by faith and 
election, not ‗works.‘‖581 
His soteriology is simply and clearly stated: ―All that is NECESSARY to 
Salvation, is contained in two Vertues, Faith in Christ, and Obedience to Laws;‖ i.e., 
―Laws of Nature, and the Laws of our severall soveraigns.‖ 582  The first part of 
Hobbes‘ soteriology requires men to accept a single precept: ―The (Unum 
Necessarium) Onely Article of Faith, which the Scripture maketh simply Necessary to 
Salvation, is this, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST.‖583 Besides, faith is said to be a 
divine gift, a gift of God that cannot be given, taken away, or imposed by force. As 
for the second part of his soteriology, Hobbes seems to vindicate the Lutheran and 
Calvinist principles of non-resistance to earthly rulers, Vicars of Christ.  
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Hobbes‘s doctrine of salvation enables him to solve the conflict between state 
and Church. Effectively, while he argues, following Luther, that ―Obedience to the 
laws of commonwealth is commanded by Christ,‖ he is careful to add that faith in 
Christ does not require any public or political proclamation or engagement, for ―it is 
internall, and invisible.‖584 As a consequence, there is no more conflict between a 
sovereign‘s command and the essence of Christianity. The Leviathan cannot, by 
definition, jeopardise his subjects‘ salvation.  
 However, Hobbes‘s doctrine of salvation has deep consequences that 
differentiate his work from that of his forerunners. While the papalists and Protestants 
conceived of salvation as other-worldly, Leviathan is made into a source of human 
salvation in ‗this world‘ and for ―men that are yet in the flesh.‖585 For Hobbes, ―at the 
beginning of the world God‘s rule over Adam and Eve was not only natural but also 
by agreement.‖586 This divine covenant granted eternal happiness to both inhabitants 
of the Garden of Eden. However, the breaking of the covenant led to the Fall. From a 
state of grace, humans fell into a natural state of bellum omnis contra omnem.  
In this context, Christianity corresponds to ―God‘s promise to men of a new 
covenant to replace the divine kingdom which was lost through Adam and Eve‘s 
fault.‖ 587  Through the creation of the Commonwealth, the Kingdom of God is 
reinstituted for  
by the Kingdome of God, is properly meant a Common-wealth, 
instituted (by the consent of those which were to be subject thereto) 
for their Civill Government, and the regulating of their behaviour, 
not onely towards God their King, but also towards one another.
588
  
 
For Hobbes, ―the Kingdome of God is a Civill Kingdome‖ and ―Salvation shall be on 
Earth.‖589 By the same token, Hobbes argues that ―the elects shall not ascend‖ for ―the 
promise of eternal life, [is] an eternal life here on earth.‖ 590  
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Hobbes does not ―merely temporalize Christian salvation,‖ he also ―politicizes 
it.‖591 While the responsibility for the salvation of mankind in the other world was 
entrusted to the Church, Hobbes entrusted it to the Leviathan and turned the eternal 
kingdom of God into a this-worldly place. As a result, ―Heaven is radically 
temporalized into a mere extension of the earthly commonwealth.‖ 592  Or as Leo 
Strauss put it, Hobbes replaced ―the state of grace by the state of civil society.‖593  
For Strauss, Hobbes ―asserted that what is needed for remedying the 
deficiencies or the ‗inconveniences‘ of the state of nature is, not divine grace, but the 
right kind of government.‖594 Accordingly, politics is believed to offer, to say the least, 
―something of value to [human] salvation. It offers the removal of some of the 
circumstances that, if they are not removed, must frustrate the enjoyment of 
Felicity.‖ 595  By monopolising ‗the profound feelings‘ and ‗the most impassioned 
ideals sought by men,‘ politics came to ‗dethrone God‘ and take the place of 
religion.
596
  
It is obvious that following the Protestant tradition, Hobbes did shed a this-
worldly light onto Christianity and participated in the secularisation and politicisation 
of theological and biblical precepts.
597
 Hobbes succeeded in handing over ―the keys of 
the kingdom of heaven‖ to the secular ruler and made the political realm, through the 
Commonwealth, the institution responsible for the salvation of its subjects. By turning 
the civil government into a ‗mortal God‘ with quasi-divine powers and a saviour of a 
mankind trapped in the state of nature, Hobbes‘s Leviathan may well be said to be 
―the first great achievement in the long-projected attempt of European thought to re-
embody in a new myth the Augustinian epic of the Fall and Salvation of mankind.‖598  
It is in this sense that Hobbes managed to transform politics into a secular theology. 
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6) Conclusion 
 
I devoted the first part of this chapter to the 17
th
 century creation of a secular 
political liturgy to match that of Christianity. Through the study of Hobbes‘s 
Leviathan, I looked at the second step of the secularisation process which resulted in 
the translation of Protestant theological principles into political dogmas and in the 
sacralisation of politics. Though a layman, Hobbes furthered the project of the 
Reformers through scriptural exegesis. By arguing that the principles of Christian 
politics were to be derived from the Bible ―by wise and learned interpretation, and 
careful ratiocination…without Enthusiasm or supernaturall inspiration,‖ Hobbes 
promoted what he considered to be ―the natural outcome of Christianity in history,‖ 
namely, ―the disenchantment of the world, the decline of magic, the rationalization of 
belief, and the exclusion of spiritual agencies in favour of natural explanations.‖599 
Through scriptural exegesis, Hobbes turned God into ―a natural cause among causes‖ 
and thus played an important role in the secularisation process.
600
  
The secular project developed by Hobbes did not imply the divorce of 
theology and politics.
601
 Rather, it brought about a shift from ‗a Priesthood of Kings‘ 
to ‗a Kingdome of Priests‘ and from a ―Sacerdotall Kingdome‖ to a ―Royall 
Priesthood.‖ 602  Religion, being innate to man, had to be taken into account and 
incorporated. The preservation of the Church‘s ‗halo of sanctity‘ was done through 
the second step of the secularisation process, namely, the modelling of politics on 
religion. It was transferred to the sovereign and justified on a secular and immanent 
foundation. 
As a consequence, Hobbes‘s Leviathan is profoundly metaphysical in that it 
substituted all theological and religious myths with the political myth of the Mortall 
God. In Hobbes‘s scheme Leviathan is the imitation of the Kingdom of God to come 
with the civil sovereign playing the role of ―God‘s personator.‖603 But at the same 
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time, Leviathan ―is also antimetaphysical since the new god it creates is transcendent 
in only a juristic, not a metaphysical, sense.‖ 604  Hobbes‘s political myth is of a 
secular nature since it originates from within the heart of men. As Carl Schmitt argues, 
Leviathan ―is supreme, it possesses divine character. But its omnipotence is not at all 
divinely derived: It is a product of human work and comes about because of a 
‗covenant‘ entered into by man.‖605 The new political myth embodies the very spirit 
of the ascending theme of government.  
 The cultural transformation implicit in Hobbes‘s Leviathan did not simply 
reside in the rationalisation of theology and religious beliefs. Indeed, the corollary of 
Hobbes‘s challenge to ―the supernaturalistic elements of Christianity was the 
mystification of political authority.‖ 606 As Gabriel Negretto explains, 
Hobbes argued that God was absent in this life but only to transform 
the civil sovereign into a ―lieutenant‖ and representative of an 
utterly transcendent God. Fear of powers invisible is then 
transformed into the fear of a visible omnipotent authority that 
resembles the image of an omnipotent God.‖ 607 
 
Negretto concludes that ―the cultural transformation initiated by Hobbes was not 
simply aiming at the rationalization of religion but, essentially, at the transformation 
of politics into a secularized theology.‖608 Through biblical exegesis and philosophical 
‗ratiocination,‘ Hobbes turned ―Christianity into a civil religion and the political 
sovereign into God‘s lieutenant on earth…a current mediator between God and 
man.‖609 Ultimately, Leviathan created politics as a secularised, temporalised, and 
politicised form of theology.
 610
 
 However, even though Hobbes participated in the secularisation of theology, 
he did not equate politics to theology or the State to the Church. While he considered 
the sovereign to be ‗the soul of the commonwealth,‘ ―Hobbes never called the 
sovereign the soul of the Church. The sovereign is the soul of an artificial body which 
is both State and Church; but the commonwealth is no more than an artificial body, 
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and the Church is.‖611 At rock bottom, there remains an ultimate difference between 
the two. But who is to judge what difference there is between religion and politics? If 
both realms are being sacralised, how can religion and politics be separated? This 
issue was dealt with by the very scholars who carried out the modelling and 
translation of Christian dogmas into political theories. The solution was to redefine 
religion in order to establish the supremacy of the secular. Upon its success in 
acquiring the Church‘s role in the salvation of the souls and the ordering of the world, 
the political realm reinvented religion as a private matter to secure its hegemony in 
this world. This exclusion of religion from the public realm went hand in hand with 
the establishment of a political soteriology. These by-products of the second step of 
the secularisation process are the subject of the second part of this chapter.  
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B. The Modern (Re-)Definition of Religion 
 
 
1) The Re-Definition of Religion 
 
The term religio was scarcely employed prior to the Reformation and was only 
used to refer to monastic life and the different orders and congregations that formed 
the medieval religious mosaic. At the beginning of the 14
th
 century, the term came to 
refer to a virtue in the work of Aquinas and it is only during the 17
th
 century that it 
acquired its modern meaning and that its use spread. From a virtue and a community 
of faithful, religio was turned into a set of private beliefs. The 12
th
 century 
Renaissance, and in a subsequent stage the Protestant Reformation, had a great impact 
on the evolution in the use and meaning of the term.  
In fact, emancipation from the ecclesiastical authority in the Middle Ages was 
only achieved by accepting ―that the purpose of society was no longer the 
achievement of salvation but the preservation of security on earth.‖ 612  Because a 
political society could be governed independently from the Church, Marsiglio and 
Dante deduced that the pope‘s authority, and more broadly religion, could ―be 
reduced to matters of faith and doctrine [that could not be] enforced unless the lay 
ruler lends jurisdictional support for this purpose.‖613  
During the Reformation, in his Temporal Authority: to what extent it should be 
obeyed, Luther further developed the Marsiglian theme and argued that all humans are 
subjects to the rules of two realms, the temporal and the spiritual. But because force 
has only been given by God to secular rulers to enforce peace, security, and justice, 
the Church is left with the sole authority over matters of doctrine. Luther‘s central 
concern was that of disentangling the Church from secular works. However ―[w]hile 
apparently separating civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, the effect of Luther‘s 
arguments was in fact to deny any separate jurisdiction to the Church.‖ 614 As a result, 
in accordance with his doctrine of salvation through faith alone and not works, Luther 
denied any public role for religion. 
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 The Wars of Religion that followed the Reformation led to the implementation 
of this new definition of religion. As John Bossy points out, under Lutheran and 
Calvinist impulses, the Reformation led to the evolution of the word ‗Christianity‘ 
from a ―community of believers,‖ that is ―a body of believers,‖ to a ―body of 
beliefs.‖615 The practical, pragmatic, and communal dimensions of religion – i.e., the 
liturgical dimension of religion - were transferred to the nascent state and to the nation. 
In John Figgis‘s words, ―the religion of the State has replaced that of the Church, or, 
to be more correct, that religion is becoming individual while the civil power is 
recognised as having the paramount claims of an organized society upon the 
allegiance of its members.‖616 
From a Church defined by Aquinas as a community composed of all the 
faithful, ‗past, future, and present, actual and potential,‘ we witnessed, on the one 
hand, the redefinition of religion as a set of private beliefs, and on the other, the birth 
of the political community defined as a secular contract among ―the living, the dead 
and those who are yet to be born.‖617 The social functions that had matured within the 
Church for centuries were finally transferred to the state.
 618
 The nation, taking over 
the role religion once played, became ‗a soul, a spiritual principle‘ and ―the fruit of a 
long past spent in toil, sacrifice and devotion.‖619 By the same token, ―the rise of the 
modern concept of religion is associated with the decline of the Church as the 
particular locus of the communal practice of religion.‖620  In this redefinition and 
privatisation of religion, Hobbes played an important role since he demonstrated, 
through theological arguments, that salvation required only private worship and the 
acceptance of the sovereign. The English philosopher rejected all public expressions 
of faith as unnecessary and affirmed the Protestant argument that obedience is due to 
the civil government on religious grounds. 
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2) The Privatisation of Religion in Hobbes 
 
In accordance with his Reformist and Anglican background, Hobbes put 
emphasis not on works but on faith as the key to salvation. In effect, his soteriology 
did not require any outward action but only obedience to law and faith in Christ. 
However, while obedience to law is a public act, faith in Christ does not need to be 
expressed publicly for ―it is internall, and invisible.‖ 621  Furthermore, Hobbes 
developed the distinction between inner faith and outer confession. In matters of 
religion, an individual has the right to believe whatever he wishes to believe. Hobbes 
supported universal freedom of thought as long as it was done privately, however, ―as 
soon as it comes to public confession of faith, private judgment ceases and the 
sovereign decides about the true and the false.‖622 The interiorisation of faith and the 
absolute control of the public sphere by the civil sovereign are Hobbes‘ solutions to 
the Wars of Religion. Faith is privatised and the public expression of religion is 
transferred to the political community.
623
 Hence, it was not through the rejection of 
religion that modern secular politics was produced, but through ―the theological 
demonstration of religion‘s irrelevance for life in this world.‖624 
Besides this process of interiorisation, Hobbes separates religion from 
theology and thus ―sets the stage for the modern understanding of religion as an 
ideology on which men rely to give meaning to their own lives and to the 
communities in which they live.‖625 Hobbes‘s redefinition of religion as a private 
matter subordinated to public politics became so influential that ―[a] brief survey of 
eighteenth – and early nineteenth-century proposals regarding church-state 
relationships highlights the fact that Hobbes codified the framework regarding the 
relationship of liberal politics to religion.‖626 As Mill would later come to argue, 
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liberal politics - and the corresponding redefinition of religion as a private matter - 
―owes its success to this dialectic of leading religious ideas. Earlier liberalism, he 
asserts, was the beneficiary of a shift from ‗Christianity‘ to ‗Protestantism.‘‖627 In fact, 
this definition of religion became paradigmatic and came to constitute a central tenet 
of the ―political mythology of liberalism.‖628 For example, Hobbes‘s redefinition of 
religion was taken over by John Locke in his Letter Concerning Toleration and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau in the last part of his Social Contract.
629
  
Overall, building on the works of Calvin, Luther, and others, Hobbes redefined 
religion from a community of believers to a body of belief and enshrined this change 
in the political sciences. He redefined religion by privatising it, by subordinating it to 
reason, and by boiling it down to a few tenets that required no public action to be 
taken whatsoever on the part of the believer. The second step in the secularisation 
process meant that ―the whole of Christology and ecclesiology were taken over by the 
secular power; they were secularized, but without their ties with the religious world 
being cut.‖630 By passing over into the realm of the profane, religious concepts were 
progressively emptied ―of their religious content while at the same time pretending to 
preserve their religious dynamism. In the end, we see patriotic worship substituted for 
religious worship.‖631 This unacknowledged continuity and lineage means that the 
modern concept of the fatherland, with all its emotional and religious features is but 
one of the most conspicuous inheritor of Europe‘s Christian legacy. Because of its 
importance in our assessment of the nature of the secular foundation of international 
politics, this continuity needs to be further studied. Being broadly accepted in the field 
of International Relations, its Westphalian expression is the subject of the final 
sections of this chapter. 
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3) State Soteriology and Political Liturgy 
 
In Two Worlds of Liberalism, Eldon Eisenach explains that Hobbes outlined 
two forms of prophetic belief. The first form of belief is developed in the first half of 
Leviathan and is described as ‗humane politiques‘ and the second form, outlined in 
the second half of Leviathan, is described as ‗divine politiques.‘632 Because most 
scholars of International Politics have only explored the corollary of the human form 
of prophetic belief, that is, the unconditional obedience due to the Leviathan, they 
have overlooked the divine source and raison d‘être of this obedience contained in the 
second half of Leviathan. In fact, the Hobbesian ―attack on priesthoods, rituals, and 
church establishments‖ contained in Part I deterred many ―from recognising that the 
basis of [Hobbes‘s] critique was often itself religious, and from seeing how the 
theological perspectives of Reformed Protestantism were consciously incorporated 
into‖ his political philosophy. 633  Thus, the Hobbesian translation of Protestant 
doctrines into a secularised form was overlooked and the soteriological dimension of 
his politics implicitly concealed.  
However, this concealment has recently come under criticism from William 
Cavanaugh. In Theopolitical Imagination, Cavanaugh argues that modern political 
theory, like theology, ―is founded on certain stories of nature and human nature, the 
origins of human conflict, and the remedies for such conflict.‖634  He argues that both 
disciplines are engaged in the establishment of ‗foundational stories of human 
cooperation and division‘ based on the enactment of some sort of social body; 
Leviathan/ the state for politics and the body of Christ/ the Juggernaut for theology. 
Cavanaugh thus concludes that political theory and theology should be identified as 
comparable and analogous ―acts of the imagination,‖ that should be put on an ‗equal 
footing.‘635 After all, politics is only believed to be superior to theology from within 
the political soteriology and vice versa.  
In the Holy Scriptures, it is said that Adam and Eve, as symbols of humanity, 
were living in a state of grace and in unity with God. But one day, ―the harmonious 
participation of humanity in God‖ was disrupted by Adam‘s ―attempted usurpation of 
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God‘s position.‖636 Disunity, corruption, and conflict ensued, and ―the earth was filled 
with violence.‖637 The restoration of the primeval unity, so the story goes, would only 
come about through humanity‘s participation in the Body of Christ, i.e., the Church. 
Through Christ‘s crucifixion, the scattered children of God were once again gathered 
‗together in one‘ and all humans and warring factions came to be reunited.638 
Cavanaugh‘s depiction of the Christian story is to be compared to that 
developed by Hobbes. Like the biblical story of the Genesis, the story of the English 
philosopher begins with an original state of peace and unity. For Hobbes, the primeval 
unity and peace were enshrined in God‘s covenant with Adam and Eve.639 However, 
Adam‘s disobedience ushered humanity into this state of nature of bellum omnis 
contra omnem.
640
 For Hobbes, the resulting constraints on, and obstacles to, men‘s 
enjoyment of life, property, security, and freedom required that a solution be found; 
for the harshness of the war of all against all made life in the state of nature 
unbearable. Salvation required the reunification of humanity and this came through 
the enactment of a social contract and the creation of a governing body. As in the 
Christian story, the scattered children of God were reassembled ‗together into one.‘ 
Through the subjects‘ participation in Leviathan, unity was restored. The similarities 
between the Biblical story on the one hand and Hobbes‘ political philosophy on the 
other led Cavanaugh to argue that it is in soteriology ―that the ends of the Christian 
mythos and the state mythos seem to coincide…As in Christian soteriology, salvation 
from violence…comes through the enacting of a social body.‖641  
Besides their joint commitment to some form of soteriology, both religion and 
politics accept some sort of liturgy. Originally, the term leiturga referred to ―an action 
by which a group of people become something corporately which they had not been 
as a mere collection of individuals.‖642 As Cavanaugh puts it, a liturgy ―enacts and 
maintains community by the ritual remembering or re-presentation of foundational 
narratives, thereby helping to construct the perceived reality in which each member of 
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the community lives.‖ 643  For example the acts of authorisation through which 
individuals give up their rights to the Leviathan correspond to liturgical acts. And by 
extension, the idea of social contract, and secular politics in general, embody complex 
forms of liturgy and soteriology.
644
 In the following section, I offer to consider one 
the most explicit form of soteriology to be embodied in much of International 
Relations Theory, the Westphalian soteriology. I focus on this specific soteriology for 
the sake of simplicity and brevity but the broader study of the remaining soteriologies 
established at the heart of IR necessitates further research. 
 
 
4) The Westphalian Soteriology 
 
Within the field of International Relations, the Westphalian enactment of the 
state as the sole solution to the barbarism of the ‗Wars of Religion‘ that were raging 
throughout Europe is a highly liturgical and soteriological act. According to the state 
soteriology, the Reformation broke down the once universal and unified ecclesiastical 
order of the Church and ushered humanity into bitter conflicts about doctrinal issues. 
Religious disputes were the sources of the Fall and the cause of the ensuing state of 
war of all against all. In such a context, the establishment of the modern secular state 
and the curtailment of religion were essential for peace to return and for mankind to 
be saved.
645
 This view of events came to override historical evidence and finally 
managed to establish itself as the common wisdom. 
In fact, the state soteriology is so widely accepted that the ―one-sided portrayal 
of the Thirty Years‘ War as a war of religion … persists to this very day.‖646 However, 
it is increasingly being acknowledged that the Wars of Religion were not so much 
about religion than about politics. While religion certainly played a role, the core issue 
was the quest for independence of the state from the Church. The Wars of Religion 
were wars of state-building that marked the birthpangs of the state.
647
 
                                                 
643
 Ibid. 
644
 These political liturgy and soteriology remain influential in the political sciences and in a way 
Foucault pointed at their limits when he claimed that ―We need to cut off the King‘s head: in political 
theory that has still to be done.‖ Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: The Harvester Press, 1980), p.121. 
645
 Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, pp.20-21. 
646
 Johannes Burkhardt, "The Thirty Years' War," in A Companion to the Reformation World, ed. R. 
Po-chia Hsia, Blackwell Companions to European History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), p.275. 
647
 Ibid., p.273. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, p.22. 
Chapter 5: Secularisation, Act II: Hobbes‟ Sacred Politics 
 - 153 - 
If we go back to the rise of the modern state in Europe, we observe that the 
empowerment of national units across Europe preceded the Wars of Religion and that 
the Wars themselves only correspond to the final challenge of these territorially 
defined entities to the universal order of the Church; it corresponded to the ―definitive 
triumph of secular authority in a struggle with the Church already centuries old.‖648 
The Wars of Religion were about the total domination of the state over religion and 
their promoters were the ―kings and nobles with a stake‖ in the rise of an hegemonic 
state.
649
 The dominance of the state over the Church that was antecedent to the Wars 
of Religion ―allowed temporal rulers to direct doctrinal conflicts to secular ends.‖650 
Indeed, the ―Reformation maintained itself wherever the lay power (prince or 
magistrates) favoured it; it could not survive where authorities decided to suppress 
it.‖651 Ultimately, in terms of motivation, ―doctrinal loyalties were at best secondary 
to their stake in the rise or defeat of the centralized state.‖652   
At the heart of the Wars of Religion lies this attempt to substitute the state for 
the Church. And as states emerged, the role of religion was altered with ―the political 
ideologian [taking] his place alongside and overlapping the man of religion.‖ 653 
Effectively, as David Martin argues, the development of political soteriology and 
liturgy marked the embodiment, within political theory, of ―much the same 
components as those comprising religion.‖ 654  And thus, to legitimise its newly-
acquired authority and to justify its supremacy, the political realm had to displace its 
predecessor and redraw the boundaries of its sphere of influence. Through its attempt 
to differentiate and separate out what pertained to the ‗secular‘ from religion, politics 
redrew the boundaries of the religious sphere.
655
 But also, by painting a bleak picture 
of religion as a threat to the peace and unity of mankind, the secular realm affirmed its 
hegemony at the cost of misrepresenting and twisting the historical record. While the 
secularisation of politics may have been a necessity in the 17
th
 century, the endurance 
of this quasi-theological Westphalian soteriology is no longer warranted. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In the wake of the Protestant Reformation and following the legitimisation of 
the ‗secular‘ from within theology, a second move in the secularisation of Europe was 
accomplished through the translation of religious dogmas into political theories. The 
17
th
 century witnessed the full transfer of many Anglican theological concepts to the 
field of politics. Under the pen of Thomas Hobbes, Reformist theology, liturgy, and 
soteriology were translated into political doctrines. The redrawing of the boundaries 
between the secular and religious realms implicit in the process marked the 
disenchantment of theology and the sacralisation of politics.
656
 The modern civil 
religion of the state was born out of the redefinition of Christianity. Through 
scriptural exegesis and philosophical ratiocination, Hobbes separated religion from 
the Church and turned it into a set of speculative beliefs that could be scrutinised 
through the use of reason. Religion was redefined and privatised. As Cavanaugh notes, 
―what we call ‗religion,‘ a fundamentally interior disposition of the individual toward 
the transcendent, was also an invention of fairly recent origin.‖ 657  
When one looks at the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, one sees 
obvious similarities with Christian liturgy and Biblical stories. Through the enactment 
of the Leviathan the philosopher developed a new and this-worldly soteriology. The 
main difference between his political doctrine and that of the Christian Church being 
their respective foundation, the ascending theme of government and immanence for 
the former, and the descending theme and transcendence for the latter. As a result of 
this modelling, political theory became ―an alternative soteriology to that of the 
Church.‖658 Likewise, the so-called ‗secular‘ realm has invented ―its own liturgies, 
with pretensions every bit as ‗sacred‘ as those of the Christian liturgy…such liturgies 
are not properly called ‗secular.‘‖659  
 Finally, this brings us back to the functionalist tradition and to Emile 
Durkheim‘s claim that ―[t]here is something eternal in religion.‖660 By ‗enveloping‘ 
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itself in the particular symbols of the nation and of the king, religious precepts have 
survived. Knowing that ―religious answers have been privatized, but not the questions 
to which they have been proposed,‖ the human need for religion remains either 
wanting or fulfilled by the political soteriology.
 661
 As a result, what is purported to be 
a secular, rational, and objective age, that is, a ―death-of-God era‖ can also be 
understood as being ―a god-building era.‖662  
 The argument developed in this chapter goes a long way in answering our first 
research question concerning the impact of secularisation on the foundation of 
international politics. However, the process did not end with Hobbes but continued to 
influence politics for centuries. Therefore, the following chapter deals with the third 
step in the process. As we will see, through a second shift in sources of morality, the 
secularisation of Europe took a new turn and led to the emergence of the legitimate 
order that mostly influences our modern outlook. After the separation of religion from 
politics, and following the processes of usurpation, modelling, and translation, 
secularisation took one last form: the autonomous development of a secular 
eschatology.  
Following the demise of the Church and the loss of sacred order, Europe 
blindly embarked ―on an attempt to discover a new illumination, a new happiness, and 
the face of the real God.‖663 Eric Voeglin explained that as God disappeared, ―the 
contents of the world will become new gods; when the symbols of transcendent 
religiosity are banned, new symbols develop from the inner-worldly language of 
science to take their place.‖ 664  This process of disenchantment resulted in 
‗modernity‘s wager‘ to reconstruct the idea of the sacred and sacrality on a rational 
foundation.
665
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6. Secularisation, Act III: 
The Enlightenment 
 
 
 
Whirl is king, having deposed Zeus. 
 
Aristophanes 
 
 
According to Benjamin Nelson, the shift from faith to reason-based structures 
of consciousness resulted in a profound change in sources of knowledge, truth, and 
morality. From the 12
th
 century onwards, the rationalisation of theology led to the 
founding of new moral sources based on the Book of Nature (Chapter 4). Alongside 
the Book of Creation, the Book of Nature became the most authoritative source of 
morality, and accordingly, the idea of God became ―predominantly this-worldly, 
tending towards a fusion with the conception of ‗Nature.‘‖666 However, from the 17th 
century onwards, under the impact of the same process of rationalisation, the notion of 
nature was divested of its divine dimension. Its predominance faded and reality came 
to be mediated and accessed through the process of cogitation and the exercise of 
one‘s thinking faculties, namely, reason. This inward and internal source of truth and 
knowledge emerged as a result of the search for ‗subjective certitude‘ and ‗objective 
certainty‘ that characterised the shift from faith to reason-based structures of 
consciousness.
667
 It relied mainly on sensory perception supplemented by logical 
reasoning in a view to dominate and control the material world.
668
  
At first nature and reason co-existed side by side, but soon the former 
succumbed to the latter. The scientific revolution of the 17
th
 century slowly 
disenchanted nature and gradually turned it into inert matter the mastering of which 
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was no longer impious but was promoted as a human duty.
669
 Eventually, through the 
Enlightenment spiritual ―struggle to impose man‘s rational will on the environment,‖ 
nature became the object of man‘s intellectual abilities and yielded to his reason.670 
The free exercise of one‘s reasoning faculties became the fundamental legitimating 
principle behind authority.  
In the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, this immanentisation of moral sources ultimately 
resulted in the culmination of political orders legitimised by the will of the people. 
Also, following the increasing interest in the rational mastering of both outer and 
inner nature, political communities became the arena for the establishment of 
civilisation through rational progress. The intellectual transformations that were 
taking place at the time thus established two new legitimate orders: ‗the will of the 
people‘ and civility or ‗civilisation.‘ 671  As the ―most dramatic step toward 
secularization and rationalization in Europe‘s history‖ and as the last seminal period 
to profoundly shape the secular foundation to political legitimacy, the Enlightenment 
cannot be neglected.
672
 Also, as ―one of the principle expressions, as well as one of 
the principle vehicles, of the new consciousness,‖ the French Revolution needs to be 
considered.
673
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An important thread that runs through this thesis is that the secularisation of 
Europe was characterised by the ‗transfer‘ of religious power, property, and functions 
from the Church to secular elites. Through the study of the changes in structures of 
consciousness, moral sources, and forms of legitimacy, I have traced this process 
inherent to secularisation but that contradicts secularism‘s self-proclaimed neutrality, 
superiority, and objectivity. So far, I have explained how the secular foundation of 
international politics emerged and was established through the appropriation, 
usurpation, modelling, and translation of religious and theological resources. Yet, 
there remains to outline the last step in the secularisation of Europe: re-sacralisation. 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that a by-product of the above-mentioned shifts in moral 
sources and legitimate orders was the establishment of a new eschatology that resulted 
in the sacralisation of the world on purely immanent and secular grounds. Through the 
use of reason, heaven was created here on earth. 
This chapter expands on the themes developed in previous chapters and 
continues to trace the establishment of the secular foundation of international politics. 
In the first part, I focus on the 17
th
 century scientific revolution and on its impact on 
the disenchantment of the world and the demystification of ‗nature.‘ Drawing on 
existing scholarship and interpretations, I reject the belief that the inherent superiority 
of reason and logic dispelled religious superstitions and I explain that the intellectual 
movement had ―other than purely secular origins.‖ 674  I argue that the scientific 
revolution, like Protestantism, emerged from within Christianity and acted as some 
sort of Trojan horse in its downfall.
675
 However, instead of looking at the 
transformations in the field of theology, the advancement of the secularisation of 
Europe requires us to focus on the impact of discoveries in the natural sciences and 
philosophy.
676
 
Through studies of the thinkers that very much shaped the ‗climate of opinion‘ 
or ‗mental style‘ of their age (i.e., René Descartes, John Locke, etc), I trace the shift in 
moral sources that took place between the mid-17
th
 century and the French 
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Revolution.
677
 Following Charles Taylor, I argue that the radical inwardness and 
immanence of these thinkers strongly influenced the development of the modern form 
of secular legitimacy.
678
 Despite their explicit attempt to safeguard Christianity, 
Descartes and Locke developed ideas that ultimately challenged the Church, 
rationalised theology, and established the omnipotence of man in all realms. Overall, 
the first part of the chapter provides a sketch of the shift in moral sources that led to 
the overthrow of the once uncontested moral sources of Christianity and made man 
the measure of all things.
679
  
In the second part of the chapter, I look at the key ideas that the Enlightenment 
helped to enshrine in new international legitimate orders. Starting with the 
humanitarian dimension of Jean-Jacques Rousseau‘s philosophy, I demonstrate how 
new legitimating principles came to be accepted. Building on the work of Mlada 
Bukovansky, I outline the ways in which the notion of popular sovereignty came to 
replace previous forms of dynastic authority. In fact, under the intellectual impulse of 
the Enlightenment, the ascending thesis of government finally reached maturity and 
―democratic republicanism…[became] the most legitimate form of politics.‖680  As 
Walter Ullmann argues, the American and French Revolutions resulted from the last 
and final ―resistance of the traditional-conservative forces to the attempted translation 
of the ascending theme of government into practice.‖681 
Finally, I demonstrate that with the Enlightenment and the triumph of the 
ascending theme of government, the seeds of a new set of legitimating principles were 
sown. In effect, while enshrining the shift in moral sources from God to Man, the 
Enlightenment paved the way for the development of legitimating principles that 
revolved around the notions of progress and civilisation. As a result of this process, 
the world was sacralised and an immanent eschatology was developed on rational and 
secular terms. This marked the third and last step of the secularisation of Europe.  
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A.  Moral Sources, Man the Measure 
 
Thro‘ Nature up to Nature‘s God 
 
The proper study of mankind is man. 
 
Alexander Pope. 
 
1) The Enlightenment and the Philosophes 
 
The last seminal period to shape the secular foundation of international politics 
is the ‗Enlightenment.‘ It corresponded to an intellectual and cultural movement that 
radiated outward from Paris and spread to most of Europe between the mid-17
th
 and 
the late 18
th
 centuries.
682
 The internal variety and diversity of the movement was 
immense and it is essential to emphasise the existence of a multiplicity of 
Enlightenments. Far from referring to a homogenous, cohesive, and well-defined 
group of thinkers, it revolved around a core of philosophes whose differences could 
be profound and wide-ranging and agreement rare.
683
 
What united them was a shared commitment to criticism in all spheres of life. 
In The Rise of Modern Paganism, Gay argues that ―[t]he principle of the 
Enlightenment was not the omnipotence of reason… [but] a claim for the 
‗omnicompetence of criticism,‘ understood as the assertion that everything is properly 
subject to rational criticism.‖684 Besides this shared critical spirit, Gay demonstrates 
that Enlightenment thinkers agreed on three important points: ―from Edinburgh to 
Vienna, Philadelphia to Milan, [the philosophes] were hostile to what they were 
pleased to call ‗superstition,‘ advocated a comprehensive humanitarianism, and 
deprecated the accepted legitimations of power.‖685 This tension between unity of 
spirit and division over most issues led Peter Gay to compare the philosophes to the 
members of some sort of ‗family;‘ a family ridden with disputes and disagreements, 
                                                 
682
 Knud Haakonssen, "Enlightened Dissent: An Introduction," in Enlightenment and Religion: 
Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p.1. 
683
 To cite but the most famous members of this inner core of philosophes, the Enlightenment was 
mainly driven by Voltaire, Diderot, d‘Alembert, Locke, Hume, Gibbon, Montesquieu, Rousseau. Peter 
Jones, "Introduction," in The Enlightenment World, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick, et al. (London: Routledge, 
2004), p.3. 
684
 Gay, The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom, p.141. 
685
 Peter Gay, "Why Was the Enlightenment?," in Eighteenth Century Studies: Presented to Arthur M. 
Wilson, ed. Peter Gay and Arthur M. Wilson (New York: Russell & Russell, 1975), p.65. 
Chapter 6: Secularisation, Act III: The Enlightenment 
 - 161 - 
but a family nonetheless.
686
 In light of this complexity and diversity, an exhaustive 
study of the intellectual movement is impossible. In this chapter, I will only 
concentrate on the strand of thought that celebrated and established the secular source 
of morality at the heart of our modern form of consciousness. Overall, I believe that 
my account of this facet of the Enlightenment is in tune with the more comprehensive 
accounts of the seminal period developed by Jonathan Israel or Peter Gay. 
Many of the ideas and values the philosophes cherished were neither new nor 
original. In fact, as the final phase of the ‗long Reformation,‘ the Enlightenment drew 
to a very large extent on the works of medieval and Renaissance scholars.
687
 For 
Hegel, the philosophes were carrying out ―the Lutheran Reformation in a different 
form.‖688 Because the issue of the separation of Church and state persisted until the 
18
th
 century, the philosophes unavoidably drew on the Reformation for ―its 
vocabulary, its philosophical method, and much of its program.‖689 Thus, despite their 
use of the scientific method, ―the Philosophes were nearer the Middle Ages, less 
emancipated from the preconceptions of medieval Christian thought, than they quite 
realized or we have commonly supposed.‖690 In a sense, the Reformation was the 
‗prehistory‘ of the Enlightenment.691  
As for all intellectual movements, it has often been argued that the philosophes 
formed an elite whose ideas did not reach much further than the most educated 
members of the aristocracy of Western Europe. And therefore, it is frequently claimed 
that an intellectual history of the Enlightenment cannot be taken to be representative 
of the broader mood or mentality of 18
th 
century Europe. I believe that while this 
argument is important, it does not apply to the philosophes who were influential 
throughout society and ―were deeply embedded in [its] texture.‖692 
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As important cultural intermediaries and members of the ‗mediatorial elite,‘ 
the philosophes were not so much ―interested in communicating a specific body of 
knowledge‖ as in ―effecting a fundamental revolution in the prevailing pattern of 
thought.‖693 And in their will to change and adopt new ideas, ―[t]he world was very 
much with the philosophes.‖694 Far from being isolated thinkers sitting in their ivory 
tower, Voltaire, Turgot, and their colleagues were public figures engaged in social and 
political activities and ―it was precisely these elites which moulded, supervised and 
fixed the contours of popular culture.‖695 As Roy Porter argues, they ―were men of the 
world: journalists, propagandists, activists, seeking not just to understand the world 
but to change it.‖696 Their connection to the wider society was self-evident and they 
were ―the bearers of public opinion.‖697 In light of the above, it seems appropriate to 
grant the philosophes ―their claim that they were speaking, not for a segment of 
society, but for all of it.‖698  
 
 
2) Theology, Science, and the Rationalisation of God 
 
There exists a widely believed ‗heroic mythology‘ that the Enlightenment 
corresponded to the logical triumph of secular and scientific outlooks over religious 
superstitions.
699
 It is often said that in the 18
th
 century people were rationally and 
logically compelled to abandon Christian fancies for the true reality discovered by 
scientific methods and empirical observation. Accordingly, the religious view of the 
world naturally withered away and left barren reality open to objective scrutiny.  
However, this ‗subtractive‘ approach to religion, science, and secularisation is 
erroneous and unhistorical.
700
 As S. J. Barnett argues, this ―characterization of the 
Enlightenment as the Age of Reason, in which reason was diametrically opposed to 
religion, cannot be sustained.‖701 The climate of opinion was such that the function of 
intelligence was exclusively geared towards the demonstration of the truth of revealed 
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knowledge and the reconciliation of empirical observation ―with the rational pattern 
of the world as given in faith.‖702  In such a context, people did not possess the 
adequate analytical toolbox for the development of atheism and religion did not fade 
away under the pressure of science.
703
 
As a matter of fact, rivalries did not begin between theology and science but 
between Christianity and some unintended consequences drawn from scientific 
discoveries. At core, the Church was not opposed to science per se, and many of the 
key discoveries of the 15
th
, 16
th
, and 17
th
 centuries were either made by members of 
the Church or had successfully been incorporated within Christianity. As Geoffrey 
Hawthorn argues, ―nothing in the gradual intellectual evolution from the medieval 
period to the eighteenth century necessarily implied a challenge to religious faith.‖704 
And in particular, the 17
th
 century Scientific Revolution ―marked no break with the 
Christian view of the world.‖705 
Far from working from outside to bring down the Church, scientists worked 
from within. Effectively, ―[u]p to the Enlightenment, and indeed beyond it, nearly all 
the scientists professed to be devout Christians. Many claimed to be motivated chiefly 
by the desire to understand God‘s handiwork in nature.‖706 Ultimately, their principle 
aim was to prove the truth of the Bible through the newly discovered scientific 
method and based on their empirical observation of nature. And therefore, ―rather 
than acting as a secularizing force, [science] more often sustained the idea of a world 
governed by providence.‖707 
All the great scientists believed that they were rendering the highest service to 
both religion and science, for science corresponded to the exploration of the works of 
God, a pursuit almost as pious as the study of his word.
708
 For Nelson,  
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The founders of modern science and philosophy were anything but 
sceptics. They were, instead, committed spokesmen of the new 
truths clearly proclaimed by the Book of Nature which, they 
supposed, revealed secrets to all who earnestly applied themselves 
in good faith and deciphered the signs so lavishly made available by 
the Author of Nature.
 709
  
 
Historically speaking, ―religion and science moved in parallel tracks, supporting 
rather than hindering one another.‖710 But the paradox of the discoveries of the great 
scientists lay in the fact that ―whatever their motives or their values, their work 
contributed to the secularization of the European ‗world.‘‖711  
By working within ―a distinctly religious spirit and with clerical support,‖ 
―seventeenth-century scientists concealed from themselves, as much as from others, 
the revolutionary implications of their work.‖712 And as a result, secularisation took 
place ‗behind the century‘s back,‘ as it were.713  It is not until the 18th century that this 
marriage of Christianity and science was dissolved, and that the scientific method was 
pushed to its logical conclusion: ―Newton‘s physics without Newton‘s God.‖714  
The tensions between science and theology are best exemplified by the case of 
the Copernican scientific discoveries.
715
 In 1543, Copernicus, a Polish priest, 
developed a new theory that displaced the earth from the centre of the universe and 
put the sun in its place. This heliocentrism was developed by a member of the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy and was tolerated for more than seventy years before it began 
‗to pose a significant threat‘ to Christian orthodoxy. In 1616, the theory was 
proscribed and condemned.
716
 For Benjamin Nelson,  
the fundamental issue at stake in the struggle over the Copernican 
hypothesis was not whether the particular theory had or had not 
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been established, but whether in the last analysis the decision 
regarding truth or certitude could be claimed by anyone who was 
not an officially authorized interpreter of revelation.
717
  
 
The hostility of the Church towards Copernicus - and towards Galileo for that matter - 
rested upon ‗the politics of epistemology.‘ By cultivating ―a field of human awareness 
in which ‗religious‘ consciousness was epistemologically irrelevant,‖ the natural 
sciences developed a new foundation for knowledge that was independent not only 
from Christian revelation but also from any type of ecclesiastical or lay hierarchy.
718
 
The Church‘s privileged access to divine knowledge was ―fatally weakened by an 
alternative institution, science, being able to reveal that divine purpose in nature by 
describing nature in what we would now call straightforwardly naturalistic ways.‖ 719  
The new focus on the natural world that accompanied the spread of the natural 
sciences unintentionally removed the need for revelation. The foundation of ultimate 
knowledge and truth in nature was given a solid scientific grounding since its laws 
could now be proven through empirical observation. Besides, this divine truth ―born 
of a faith in the mathematical interpretation of Nature‖ was much more accessible and 
certain than its revealed counterpart.
720
 For men like Galileo, Copernicus, and Newton, 
the Book of Nature 
was written in numbers and never lied, whereas the testaments were 
written in words which were both easy and tempting to misconstrue. 
Men like Galileo and Descartes were vastly more certain about the 
truth revealed to them by number than they were by the 
interpretations placed upon Scriptures in the commentaries of 
theologians.
721
 
 
This process of gradual reliance on nature and exclusion of the supernatural from the 
material world has been vividly described by John Randall. Beginning with the idea 
of a universe sustained by God, the Columbia Professor traces the steady withdrawal 
of the deity from the cosmos in the thought of key scientists and ends up his account 
with Laplace‘s suggestion to Napoleon that a process of cooling and condensation had 
led to the formation of planets. Famously, to the Emperor‘s query about the role of 
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God in his theory, the French scientist replied, ―Sire, I have no need of that 
hypothesis.‖722 
Besides its sources in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century natural sciences, the 
Enlightenment philosophy also drew on medieval advances in the field of theology. 
For example, the anti-clericalism dear to the philosophes had its roots in the 
Reformation and the Protestant critique of the papacy. By accusing each other of 
being the incarnation of the Antichrist and of ―using superstition and pagan forms of 
worship to hoodwink the masses into quiescent obedience to a false religion,‖ 
Protestants and Catholics alike developed the seeds of the Enlightenment critiques of 
both religion and papacy.
723
 It is in such circumstances that the anticlerical polemic of 
the Reformation unintentionally ―provided the core of the anticlerical historical 
critique advanced by the philosophes of the Enlightenment.‖724 
Moreover, atheism was also invented by orthodox theologians as a critical 
philosophy. In an age of religious ebullition, the ‗atheist‘ was conceived as an 
imaginary interlocutor whose role was to question Christianity in order to demonstrate 
its truth and to perfect it.
725
 And the same applied to the atheism of the Enlightenment. 
In fact, most philosophes of the first generation ―were not atheists, never claimed to 
be atheists, and only ‗discussed atheism‘ in order to refute it.‖726 On the contrary, 
since ―almost all philosophes and their supporters continued to believe in one form or 
another,‖ the 17th century ―ended with a confident affirmation of belief in God.‖727  
In light of the above argument, if the secularising impulse of the 
Enlightenment is to be studied, one must trace its origins in the development of the 
scientific outlook and of the more naturalistic, immanent, and rational moral sources it 
entailed. Because ―[t]he philosophical and the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth 
century were one and the same,‖ I study these changes in moral sources through the 
work of two of the most important philosophers of the 17
th
 century, René Descartes 
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and John Locke.
728
 I demonstrate that despite their attempts to support Christianity, 
the two thinkers developed ideas that made religious mediation superfluous, condoned 
the rationalisation of theology, and ultimately established the omnipotence of human 
reason. As such, Descartes‘ secularising influence is found in his attempt to develop a 
mathematical science that could present a true image of reality and prove the 
existence of God. 
 
 
3) René Descartes and the Inward Turn 
 
The origin of the shift in sources of morality is to be found in the writings of 
‗The Father of Modern Philosophy,‘ René Descartes (1596-1650), and more precisely, 
in his ‗epoch-making‘ interiorisation of the moral sources within man. 729  The 
Cartesian ‗inward turn‘ is based on his philosophical demonstration that all 
knowledge is necessarily mediated by the self and that the only source of truth is thus 
to be found in the very process of cogitation: ‗I think therefore I am‘ or ‗cogito ergo 
sum.‘730  
Charles Taylor argues that this Cartesian epistemology leads in turn to the 
disengagement of the subject from the outside world and to the focus on 
representations and images of reality as conceived by the human mind, i.e., cogitare. 
For Descartes, the world is no longer something we can discover ‗out there‘ but 
becomes a mental construction based solely on the workings of the mind. As a result, 
in contradistinction to the Augustinian belief that men could access the Beyond by 
turning inward, Descartes argues that the only truth that could be demonstrated by 
doing so is the reality of the human cogito. Consequently, in place of God, Descartes 
posits the existence of a purely secular and temporal source of morality within the 
vicinity of the self. While the Cartesian philosophical revolution had countless 
consequences and repercussions, for the sake of conciseness, I only focus on its 
implications for the shift in moral sources that characterised the secularisation of the 
European consciousness. 
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This new sense of inwardness had four important implications in the spheres 
of government, religion, and the natural sciences. First of all, the interiorisation of the 
source of morality led to the affirmation of political atomism. In fact, the rational 
disengagement advocated by Descartes begged for the shattering of the cosmic 
hierarchy to which humans belonged. For now that truth was to be found within, the 
order could not be imposed from outside or be revealed by God; it could only be 
inferred. The political consequences of this philosophical affirmation yielded ―a 
picture of the sovereign individual, who is ‗by nature‘ not bound to any authority. The 
condition of being under authority is something which has to be created.‖731 This 
‗declaration of the Independence of Man‘ posed a direct challenge to Christian 
notions of legitimacy and authority and the chasm that was opened in this field called 
forth the creation and institutionalisation of a new set of legitimating principles.
 732
  
The second and more far-reaching consequence took place in the realm of 
religious legitimacy. By affirming that truth was accessible to all those endowed of 
the ability to ‗cogitate,‘ the Cartesian epistemology proved challenging to the Catholic 
orthodoxy. As Jacob argues, ―[g]uided by the Cartesian method of reasoning, anyone 
could arrive at knowledge about nature and society and deduce the simple, basic laws 
at work in the universe.‖ 733  Thus, like the Copernican revolution, the Cartesian 
philosophy was not atheistic in content, but instead, unintentionally ―obviated the 
necessity for organised Christian worship and for the authority of the clergy.‖ 734 As a 
result, it fuelled critics of the mediatorial role of the Catholic priesthood and 
strengthened the Puritan focus on human consciousness and the ‗ordinary life.‘ 
Luther‘s priesthood of all believers was taken a step further and with Descartes, the 
self began to be secularised.
735
 
Thirdly, this ‗inward turn‘ clashed with Christian orthodoxy in the redefinition 
of God it entailed. The validity of the Cartesian epistemology was dependent upon a 
belief in a benevolent God. For ultimately, what could make the human ability to 
cogitate any reliable or true if it were not for God? The human idea of God was the 
way Descartes found out of his solipsism. Because only an infinite and perfect being 
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could have implanted the idea of God in his mind, and because this being could not 
have been deceitful by creating such an elaborate hoax, Descartes established the 
existence of God based on the idea of the deity that dwelled in his mind.
736
 Relegating 
the reality of God to an impossible quest, Descartes inferred his existence from 
human cogitation. And because God was now to be inferred from man‘s ability to 
cogitate and think for himself, human reason became the Archimedean point. 
Descartes took upon himself God‘s power and ―thereby opened up the hope and 
aspiration for human omnipotence.‖737 
Finally, the Cartesian emphasis on ‗this-world‘ provided a propitious 
environment for the development of the natural science and of the 17
th
 century 
scientific revolution.
738
 Indeed, there was a clear elective affinity between Descartes‘ 
religious rationalism and the scientific spirit of the growing middle class. In 
accordance with the new epistemology, many thinkers began to look at reason as a 
potential way out of conflicting interpretations of the Scriptures. Advances in 
geometry, mathematics, and the ensuing mechanical and instrumental approaches to 
the world were taken up by Christian thinkers. As Randall explains  
for every physicist concerned to discover the secrets of nature there 
were a dozen theologians puzzling over vortices and infinite 
extension in the interests of humanizing and rationalizing the 
religious tradition. Thus the Cartesian philosophy became deeply 
involved…in that long theological debate which lasted without 
cessation from the Reformation struggles of the sixteenth century to 
the indifference and secularism of the eighteenth. For a generation it 
seemed to those who prided themselves on being forward-looking 
that a common Christianity might be established on the firm 
foundation of reason.
739
 
 
As such, Descartes provided a context hospitable to the extension and spread of 
rational criticism of the scriptures and of Christian theology.
740
 Furthermore, his 
religious rationalism made a scientific understanding and control of the material world 
mandatory to the understanding of the divine telos. It is in these terms that the French 
philosopher can be taken to have secularised the legacy of the Reformation and to 
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have opened the road to the complete rationalisation of Christian theology.
741
 Brand 
Blanshard summarises the impact of Cartesianism on human consciousness by 
pointing out that ―[b]efore his time, the truths regarded as most certain were those 
accepted from revelation; afterwards these truths were subject to the judgment of 
human reason, thus breaking the hold of authority on the European mind.‖742 
 
 
4) Locke, Empiricism, and the Study of Nature‘s Laws 
 
John Locke (1632-1704) played a central role in the development and 
deepening of the ‗inward turn‘ fostered by Descartes. His great influence in England 
and across all of Europe made him ―the moving spirit of the eighteenth century.‖743 In 
effect, as Cragg argues, Locke not only ―epitomized the outlook of his own age,‖ but 
also ―anticipated the thought of the succeeding period.‖744 My aim in this section is 
not so much to summarise his philosophy as to consider the impact and the 
implications of the Lockean epistemology in the spheres of religion and government. 
In particular, I will consider the importance of his thought for the shift in moral 
sources away from God and towards human reason.  
Like Descartes and Hobbes, John Locke was a firm believer whose faith was 
very significant to his philosophy. Despite widespread charges that his devotion was 
hypocritical, in the 17
th
 century, not even David Hume doubted the sincerity of his 
faith.
745
 Even though his theology was not orthodox, it was by no means heretical. 
Rather, his religious thought was marked by two revolutionary characteristics. On the 
one hand, building on the inwardness of the Cartesian philosophy and its emphasis on 
the cogito, Locke made the principle that ―Reason must be our last Judge and Guide 
in every Thing‖ central to his theology.746 And on the other, inspired by the emerging 
faith in the new Book of Nature, Locke developed his theology in a this-worldly and 
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naturalist direction. It is for these reasons that his new epistemology conflicted with 
the orthodox emphasis on the Holy Scriptures as the sole source of truth. Although 
Locke was not an atheist, his philosophy eventually rationalised religion and 
individualised faith. 
Inspired by the new science, Locke based his political philosophy on an 
empiricist and materialist epistemology. To the English thinker, all knowledge was 
derived from experience. Ideas either came from the sensation of ‗sensible objects 
without‘ or from reflection and ―what we feel within ourselves, from the inward 
workings of our own spirit.‖ 747  Accordingly, Locke strongly believed that the 
existence of God was a most obvious truth that reason could discover with 
mathematical certainty.
748
 Not only did he believe that ―[t]he works of Nature 
everywhere sufficiently evidence a Deity,‖ but more importantly, he claimed that it 
was through reason, the very voice of God in man, that the design of God could be 
deciphered in Nature.
749
 In tune with the new naturalism, Locke came to equate the 
Laws of Nature with the divine will as understood by human reason.
750
 As he put it in 
his Essay Concerning Human Understanding,  
Reason is natural Revelation, whereby the eternal father of Light 
and Fountain of all Knowledge, communicates to Mankind that 
portion of Truth, which he has laid within the reach of their natural 
Faculties 
 
[Revelation is] natural Reason enlarged by a new set of Discoveries 
communicated by GOD immediately, which Reason vouches the 
truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from 
GOD.
751
  
 
Consequently, Locke made the use of reason within the sphere of religion inevitable 
and necessary.
752
 
Far from rejecting the need for revelation, Locke simply argued that truth 
could be attained in clearer and more direct ways and that henceforth revelation was 
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to be subjected to the standards of proof of empirical observation.
753
 He explained that 
―[i]n all things…Reason is the proper judge; and Revelation…cannot…invalidate its 
Decrees. [Faith] can have no Authority against the plain and clear Dictates of 
Reason.‖754 Because it made sense to follow the clear light of reason rather than the 
sallow glow of an ‗invisible‘ star, reason and scientific investigation came to take 
precedence over faith and revelation as sources of knowledge.  
Likewise, the significance and utility of the Book of Creation began to pale 
before the newly-acquired splendour of the Book of Nature and Book of Reason. And 
only a single step remained to be taken before reason could eclipse revelation 
completely. But before I move on to considering this last step taken by the Deists, it is 
necessary to look at the implications of Locke‘s philosophy in the spheres of religion 
and government.
755
  
 What kept Locke from accepting the logical implications of his argument and 
from falling into atheism was his belief in the inherent compatibility of his approach 
with Christian theology. In The Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke argued that all 
rational beings must be Disciples of Christ, for Christianity‘s central doctrines are 
absolutely consonant with reason and experience. Locke‘s emphasis on the human 
reason meant that no reasonable believer could possibly be required to accept the 
religious tenets that contradicted his reason. No irrational leap of faith was deemed 
essential to salvation. And therefore, Locke boiled down Christianity, in the name of 
true and rational religion, to a few dogmas acceptable to all educated persons.
756
 Thus, 
by attempting to merge and combine his rational commitments with the Holy Writ, 
the English thinker redefined the Christian religion. 
The revolutionary implications of such a redefinition of Christianity were 
unmistakably understood in the 18
th
 century. In his Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion Hume considered Locke to be  
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the first Christian who ventured openly to assert that faith was 
nothing but a species of reason, that religion was only a branch of 
philosophy, and that a chain of arguments, similar to that which 
established any truth in morals, politics or physics, was always 
employed in discovering all the principles of theology, natural and 
revealed.
757
 
 
And for Voltaire, ―Mr. Lock‘s reasonableness of Christian relligion [was] really a 
new religion.‖758 In effect, by building on the Cartesian heritage, Locke had built ―an 
entirely new foundation for Western religion.‖ 759  But interestingly enough, this 
impetus to further the theological debate came not from the professed theologians but 
from within the periphery of Christianity. Locke was a layman whose wit and critical 
spirit ―created a new mentality among intelligent people, and instantly affected 
religious thought.‖760 But this influence did not come from within but came from 
without, for religion was no longer a matter reserved to the sole clergymen.
761
  
In the sphere of government, the Lockean epistemology entailed a twofold 
implication. His individualisation of the access to truth and his affirmation of the 
calling of reason posed a direct threat to divinely-sanctioned forms of authority. In 
fact, the immanence and naturalism of both his theology and philosophy proved to be 
radical, not only in their anti-clerical implications, but more broadly in their 
questioning of the foundations of legitimate authority.  
In both religious and political matters, Locke‘s individualism meant that 
because every man had access to the truth of God through nature and reason, 
regardless of social status, class, or religious belief, no one could impose his will or 
opinions on another.
762
 In turn, this paved the way for a relentless critique of all social 
groups that arrogated to themselves the authority to guide and educate mankind in 
both lay and spiritual matters.
763
 Because God had granted humans a direct access to 
His design through the use of their individual ability to reason, the discovery of the 
laws of nature through reasoning became some sort of ‗calling‘ and reasoning was 
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turned into a religious duty.
764
 It followed that industriousness, discipline, and the 
human drive for improvement became spiritual qualities.
765
  
But the inadequacy of existing forms of authority in enabling humans to 
exercise freely their ability to reason begged for the establishment of new institutions. 
And accordingly, the legitimacy of lay and religious authorities had to be reconsidered. 
Locke argued that the new raison d‘être and function of all forms of authority should 
be the creation of a propitious environment that would facilitate men‘s ―struggle to 
discharge the religious assignments for which God created them.‖766 And hence, the 
individual exercise of reason free from alien guidance had to become institutionalised 
in all spheres of life (i.e., religious, political, economic…).  
Locke came to argue that power could only be wielded to assist individuals in 
the execution of their calling. And correspondingly, social institutions were legitimate 
to the extent that ―they facilitated physical ease and purity of motive in men‘s 
performance in their callings.‖ 767  In this context, Locke‘s Two Treatises of 
Government corresponded to a manifesto for the establishment of a new form of 
legitimacy that was considerate of man‘s religious duties and in tune with the 
relocation of the locus of morality from the Church to the individual and his reasoning 
ability. With Locke, the ―necessary individuality of the religious relationship became 
an epistemological axiom and the force with which it was asserted reduced all human 
authority to a purely instrumental status.‖ 768 Because individual faith was sufficient to 
secure one‘s salvation, the Church only played a role in the performance of 
ceremonial functions and the development of a richer religious culture but held no 
authority or right to coerce. 
The new political order enshrined the Lutheran priesthood of all believers as 
―the primary definitional mode of all human duties.‖769 And by setting up adequate 
forms of authority, Locke hoped that man‘s ―material and spiritual regeneration might 
be speedily accomplished.‖770 The Calvinism of Locke‘s childhood had unmistakably 
influenced his approach to government, but his location of the sources of morality in 
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humans qua rational individuals led him away from the Puritan location of morality in 
the Bible and of authority in earthly rulers.
771
 
Locke‘s theory of government was tremendously influential all over Europe 
and provided the immediate context to much Enlightenment thinking. Short of falling 
into atheism, Locke‘s philosophy provided all the tools necessary for the complete 
submission of God to human reason and his epistemology helped to give currency to 
the intellectual movement that confirmed the supremacy of human reason over God, 
namely, Deism.
772
 As the last stage in the rationalisation of Christianity and as the 
bridge to modern atheism, Deism is ―the key to the whole modern development we 
gesture at with the word ‗secularization.‘‖ 773 Because of its connection to the shift in 
moral sources from the Book of Creation to the Book of Reason, the intellectual 
movement deserves to be scrutinised.
 
 
 
 
5) Deism, from Rational Christianity to Atheism 
 
The Deist school of thought was established at the end of the 17
th
 century and 
reached its apex during the middle of the next. Since its worldview became widely 
accepted and its arguments taken for granted, the movement finally disappeared 
before the French Revolution.
774
 However, the concept of Deism has been challenged 
and the importance of the Deists as ―powerful agents of modernity‖ criticised for 
being over-rated and greatly exaggerated.
775
 Like the concept of ‗Enlightenment,‘ the 
notion of ‗Deism‘ needs to be defined and its use qualified.  
In The Dictionary of the History of Ideas, the term refers to ―the belief that by 
rational methods alone men can know all the true propositions of theology which it is 
possible, necessary, or desirable for men to know…[Deists] have ranged widely from 
Christian rationalists or fideists to atheists.‖776 Such a broad definition stretches the 
notion to include all the thinkers who played a major role in the rationalisation and 
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naturalisation of the Christian dogma. As a result, most, if not all of the philosophes, 
were to some extent Deists (Locke, Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau, etc.).
777
 Also, 
thinkers such as Hobbes and Descartes can be said to have had Deist leanings. Even 
though Deism can be traced back to Cicero or the Greeks, I will solely focus on its 
spread between the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries and especially on its Golden Age that began 
at the end of the 1690s with the publication of John Toland‘s Christianity Not 
Mysterious.  
To do justice to Barnett‘s claim that the influence of Deism has been 
exaggerated, I offer to qualify my claim that the Deists played an important role in the 
development of Western consciousness. I do not believe that Deism per se was central 
to or responsible for this great civilisational mutation. Instead, following Peter Gay, I 
argue that Deism only ‗reflected and articulated‘ this important transition in forms of 
consciousness.
778
 As Cragg notes, even though ―the deists were not a large group, and 
never formed a party in any formal sense, it was clear that they appealed to an 
extensive reading public.‖779 And it is in this quality that they hastened the transition 
in mentality.
780
  
Building on the Lockean epistemology, this group of ‗physico-theologians‘ set 
to find out the essential and true propositions of religion by means of reasoning. The 
first influential exponent of Deism was Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648) who 
listed the five tenets fundamental to this new theology, namely, that (1) God exists; (2) 
he must be worshipped; (3) worship takes place through the practice of virtue; (4) 
men should repent for their sin; and finally, (5) rewards or punishments follow 
death.
781
 The boiling down of the true religion to these five tenets turned most 
Christian dogmas into mere superstitions and Jesus Christ into an impostor.
782
 
In 1696, the publication of Christianity Not Mysterious by John Toland (1670-
1722) - a Presbyterian-minded Dissenter but not yet a Deist – led to the spread of 
Deism and marked the beginning of the ―final facet of the crisis of the Church 
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initiated by the Reformation.‖ 783  Drawing upon anti-Catholic and Protestant 
historiography, Toland‘s pamphlet was designed as a theological exercise and critique 
of the Roman Church and its aim was to offer a Presbyterian solution to the decadence 
of Christianity. Luther and Calvin had questioned the historical and theological 
legitimacy of the Church, but in the 17
th
 century, the Dissenters took one last step and 
questioned ―the very fundamentals of Christianity.‖784  
As a student of Locke, Toland only drew out the teachings of his mentor to 
their logical conclusions. In fact, Locke had retained some sort of belief in the truth 
and authenticity of revelation. But in accord with the new inwardness and naturalism, 
Toland held logically that all revelation must be set against ‗common Notions‘ and 
assessed in the light of reason; for ―the true religion must necessarily be reasonable 
and intelligible.‖785 Because reason is that faculty of the soul by which ―we arrive at 
the Certainty of God's own Existence…we cannot otherwise discern his Revelations 
but by their Conformity with our natural Notices of him, which in so many words, to 
agree with our common Notions.‖786 For Toland, reason was the new benchmark in 
matters of religious truth.
787
 But far from being anti-Christian, Toland combined his 
rational approach to Christianity and claimed that all ―these requisite conditions are 
found in Christianity.‖788 
The ground was now clear from all remaining forms of beliefs unsubstantiated 
by some sort of ratiocination. Reason was made foundational to religion and access to 
God was from then onward to be mediated by this human attribute. By drawing out 
the Protestant emphasis on the individual and the ‗ordinary life‘ to its logical 
conclusion, the Deists decisively completed the 16
th
 century revolution of Luther and 
Calvin.
789
   
The rationale behind putting reason on a pedestal was outlined in a book that 
reached the status of Deist Bible. In Christianity as Old as the Creation, Matthew 
Tindal (1657-1733) argued that ―God, at all times, has given mankind sufficient 
means of knowing whatever he requires of them.‖790 And thus, God must have made 
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his message accessible to all humans without need for ecclesiastical mediation. These 
means were to be found in rationality and his message in nature. Tindal came to 
conclude that ―All divines, I think, now agree in owning that there‘s a law of reason, 
antecedent to any external revelation, that God can‘t dispense, either with his 
creatures or himself, for not observing.‖ 791  This new rationalism and focus on 
individual reason provided great support to the ascending theme of government. 
Indeed, it eventually established human reason as the new mediator of divine 
knowledge. As one Deist argued, ―the voice of the people is the voice of God.‖792 
Besides the fact that knowledge of nature was unambiguous, the universality 
and timelessness of reason made it a surer source of truth than the Bible - a book that 
was after all only expressing a ‗local‘ and time-bound version of the eternal truth. For 
the Deists, ―it was not in Holy Writ, but in the great book of nature, open for all 
mankind to read that the laws of God had been recorded.‖793 For centuries religion 
had rested upon revelation, but in the 18
th
 century, it came to rest ―largely upon 
Nature.‖ 794  As Basil Willey sums it up, Nature came to ―furnish the principal 
evidences of religion, while a somewhat embarrassing Revelation [had to] be 
harmonized with it as best might be.‖795 On the one hand, most Deists claimed to 
represent true Christianity and to have eliminated the superstitious accretions and 
primitive misconceptions that had accumulated around the Church. And on the other, 
orthodox Christians felt the need to ground their faith firmly upon nature before 
having recourse to the supernatural. In such a context, the Word of God could only be 
rationalised, from within. 
 
The Deists were without doubt religious men and their ties to Christianity are 
unmistakable; but ―in their natural religion, nature was primary and religion 
evaporated.‖ 796  And in this, Deism embodied the very process of transition and 
change in consciousness that was taking place across Europe. For Peter Gay, the proof 
of the secularising influence of the new natural religion was to be found in the fact 
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that while humans had been religious animals for most of their recorded history, after 
Deism, and partly because of it, they were so no longer.
797
  
The importance of the movement is not so much to be found in its creed which 
had Protestant roots but in the application of the new rational method to religion and 
personal faith.
798
 And this is where the sources of Deism‘s own downfall are to be 
found. In fact, Deism corresponded to one of many levels of rationalisation of 
Christianity. Deism attacked Christianity, only to be attacked in turn by atheism. As 
Jacob argues, many thinkers and philosophers ―started their religious odyssey from 
orthodoxy, slipped over into Deism, and then quickly made their way to pantheism, or 
what most people would have called atheism.‖799 For example, ―Diderot moved from 
Catholicism to theism, from theism to deism, from deism to scepticism, and from 
scepticism to atheism.‖800  
The siècle des Lumières saw the glorious rise of a Deist theology on rational 
and natural foundations but also the beginning of its end under the pen of David 
Hume.
 801
 Hume‘s most significant insight was to point to the limits of reason and to 
criticise the idea of a rational order of nature. Contrary to the Deists, the Scottish 
thinker argued that in light of God‘s silence, man had to find the way by himself. 
Humans lived in a disenchanted world in which neither nature nor the cosmos were 
alive and intelligent. Man had to resign himself to submit everything to criticism, for 
ultimately, he was alone in a meaningless world. And accordingly, Hume made all the 
sciences, ―Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion…dependent on the 
science of MAN,‖ for ultimately, ―the science of man is the only solid foundation for 
the other sciences.‖802  And for Hume, ―Human Nature [was] the only science of 
man.‖803 Paving the way for generations of thinkers, Hume argued that such a science 
had to be discovered in the study of history: ―mankind are so much the same, in all 
times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. 
Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human 
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nature.‖804 History was the key, and it became so important that during ―the latter half 
of the century Philosophers turned historians.‖805 The function of the new historical 
approach was to distinguish between good and evil and to assess the compatibility of 
human custom with human nature. Ultimately, it became the new benchmark for truth 
and morality. 
 
 
6) Conclusion 
 
In the first part of this chapter, the aim was to sketch out the shift in moral 
sources that marked the secularisation of Europe. Because this shift took place as a 
result of the disenchantment of the world and the demystification of nature, I began 
my enquiry with the 17
th
 century scientific revolution. Far from having ―purely 
secular origins,‖ the scientific revolution, like Protestantism, emerged from within 
Christianity and acted as some sort of Trojan horse in its downfall.
806
 Despite their 
explicit attempt to safeguard Christianity, philosophers developed ideas that 
ultimately challenged the Church, rationalised theology, and established the 
omnipotence of reason in all realms.  
Through the study of important implications of the works of Descartes, Locke, 
and the Deists in the spheres of religion and politics, I explained that knowledge came 
to be individualised and philosophical reason became ―the only and exclusive 
criterion of what is true.‖807 The final source of authority came to be vested within 
man. In turn, this implied the necessity of political atomism, of religious 
individualism, and the obligation to look at nature through the lens of reason to 
decipher the laws according to which men were to live. Ultimately, the result was the 
overthrow of the once uncontested moral sources of Christianity and the replacement 
of the primacy of God and the Scriptures with nature – first as God‘s creation and 
subsequently as disenchanted matter with its own indwelling laws - and finally with 
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human nature and reason.
808
 While in the 16
th
 century ―Ascetic Protestantism had 
championed the rationalism of world mastery ‗in the name of God‘; scientific 
rationalism now propagated it ‗in the name of man.‘ Anthropocentrism takes the place 
of theocentrism, anthropodicy that of theodicy.‖809 
But such changes had consequences for the place of man in the cosmic 
hierarchy. The withering of God as the source of morality in favour of nature and 
reason ―seemed to imply the paradoxical thesis that man was at once the creature and 
the creator of society.‖810 This change in moral sources eventually had repercussions 
in the realm of legitimacy. By making man responsible for his own welfare and 
salvation in an essentially disenchanted world, the new philosophy called forth the 
creation of new legitimate orders. Man withdrew himself from nature and recreated 
himself in and through history. At the heart of this shift was the birth of new 
legitimate orders.  
In the second part of this chapter, I show that with the Enlightenment and the 
triumph of the ‗inward turn‘ fostered by Descartes and Locke, the seeds of a new set 
of legitimating principles were sown. In effect, while enshrining the shift in moral 
sources from God to Man, the Enlightenment paved the way for the development of 
legitimating principles that revolved around the notions of ‗the people,‘ progress, and 
‗civilisation.‘811 As a result of this process, the world was sacralised and an immanent 
eschatology was developed on rational and secular terms. This marked the third and 
last step of the secularisation of Europe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
808
 Taylor, Sources of the Self p.314. This shift was not as clear-cut as is here suggested. The 
intermingling of reason, nature, and God in the writings of 17
th
 and 18
th
-centuries philosophers made 
the transformation much more complex and tedious. Yet, when one abstracts and looks at a longer time 
span, the shift from God to man becomes clearly discernable. 
809
 Roth and Schluchter, Max Weber's Vision of History. p.50. 
810
 Hawthorn, Enlightenment and Despair, p.27. 
811
 The connections between the change in moral sources and the emergence of new legitimate orders 
are outlined in the second part of the chapter. But as Bury reminds us in the case of ‗progress,‘ ―[i]t was 
in the atmosphere of the Cartesian spirit that a theory of Progress was to take shape.‖ Bury, The Idea of 
Progress, p.65.  
Chapter 6: Secularisation, Act III: The Enlightenment 
 - 182 - 
B.  Legitimacy After the Enlightenment 
 
 
1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope? 4. What is man? 
Metaphysics answers the first question, ethics the second, religion the third and 
anthropology the fourth. Fundamentally all this could be reckoned as 
anthropology, since the first three questions are related to the last.  
 
Immanuel Kant. 
 
Besides a strong critical spirit, all the philosophes shared a comprehensive 
humanitarianism, some sort of hostility towards ‗superstition,‘ and a strong opposition 
towards the related legitimisation of power.
812
 The inwardness, naturalism, and 
immanence of the new moral sources as expounded and expressed in the rational 
philosophies of Descartes and Locke became widely accepted. And accordingly, the 
establishment of new legitimate orders upon the new moral foundations was called 
forth. In this, the Enlightenment paved the way for the implementation of new forms 
of legitimacy based on humanitarian principles. In the second part of this chapter, I 
deal explicitly with the emergence of the international legitimate orders of popular 
sovereignty and ‗civilisation.‘ These have been central to the secular foundation of 
international politics since the Enlightenment. 
The climate of opinion that surrounded the development and growth of the 
new cultural rationales was characterised by a growing preoccupation with the 
improvement of society and of its political government. The Enlightenment 
epistemology made it conceivable for humans to attempt some sort of spiritual 
regeneration through large-scale social engineering and the creation of an earthly 
order compatible with human reason. The goal was to make life in this world the 
foundation of politics.
813
 In the words of Voltaire, man had been endowed with reason 
―not that he may penetrate the divine essence but that he may live well in this 
world.‖814  
Scientific discoveries and their ‗this-worldly‘ spirit were central to the socio-
cultural transformations that Europe was experiencing. The discovery of the laws of 
nature entailed implications in the spheres of religion and government. As Isaac 
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Barrow argued, the ‗world natural‘ was believed to provide a template for the working 
of the ‗world politick.‘815 And Newton (1642-1727), following his mentor, argued in 
his Optics that his scientific method could be used to enlarge the bounds of the social 
sciences.
816
 As a result, many thinkers attempted to undertake such a quest and 
applied the Newtonian principles to the study of human societies. In Europe, 
economics, politics, and history became some sort of ‗social physics‘ and an 
extension of the natural sciences.
817 
  
In Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe, Peter Burke demonstrates that 
this new approach resulted in a shift in popular attitudes towards ―the ‗politicisation‘ 
of popular culture, or the spread of political consciousness.‖818  It corresponded to a 
‗systematic attempt‘ by the intellectual and social elite to change the values and 
attitudes of the people. This reform was advocated by the clergy and the laity alike 
and it accompanied the ―major shift in religious mentality or sensibility‖ mapped out 
in the first part of this chapter.
819
 The new cultural pattern that was gaining influence 
eroded the religious legitimisation of monarchical rule and made the cult of the king 
obsolete if not repulsive.
820
 And it is in opposition to this traditional notion of 
legitimacy that rested upon divine right and divine power that a rational, republican, 
constitutional, and humanitarian international legitimate order emerged following the 
French Revolution.
821
 The relationship between the Enlightenment and the Revolution 
is complex and many of the philosophes were horrified by the violence and chaos it 
created. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment contributed to the events in France by 
facilitating the emergence of a ‗public opinion‘ as well as alternative forms of 
legitimacy.
822
 
As the ‗intellectual father‘ and ‗master of morality‘ of the French Revolution, 
Rousseau is our entry point for the study of the establishment of new legitimate orders 
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based on the principles of popular sovereignty.
823
 His impact on European 
consciousness was so important that Henri Bergson declared that  
the most powerful of the influences which the human mind has 
experienced since Descartes – however we may assess this – is 
undeniably that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The reform he operated 
in the realm of practical thought was as radical as that of Descartes 
in the realm of pure thought.
824
  
 
Rousseau‘s importance for our subject is twofold. On the one hand, he played a 
central role in the rationalisation and immanentisation of Christianity. In the words of 
Jacques Maritain, ―[i]t was Jean-Jacques who completed that amazing performance, 
which Luther began, of inventing a Christianity separate from the Church of Christ: it 
was he who completed the naturalization of the Gospel.‖ 825  And on the other, 
Rousseau‘s philosophy was essential to the shift in legitimate orders during the 18th 
century. Indeed, despite his distrust of the notion of rational progress, the Genevan 
scholar ―contributed more than any other individual in his century to the progress of 
society‖ and to the project of social regeneration.826  Also, his theory of popular 
sovereignty gave ―the first signal of a universal subversion.‖827 After two centuries, 
his work remains most relevant to the understanding of ―the fundamental political 
ideas of our world.‖828 
 
 
1) Rousseau on Theodicy and Legitimacy 
 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) is a very controversial figure amongst 
students of the Enlightenment. The work of the Swiss thinker proved very significant 
for the French and American revolutionaries, the Romantics, and some would argue, 
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for 20
th
 century authoritarianism.
829
 His status as a member of the enlightened 
philosophes has often been questioned but despite tensions with the ‗Encyclopédistes,‘ 
Rousseau was certainly a man of the Enlightenment.
830
 In this section, two facets of 
his work that are deeply representative of the 18
th
 century changes in legitimacy are 
considered. First of all, I look at the way Rousseau secularised the Christian theodicy 
and thus advanced the project of social regeneration. And secondly, I look at the way 
he laid down the theoretical foundations for a popular legitimate order based on the 
naturalism and inwardness of Descartes and Locke. 
In the famous opening paragraph of his Social Contract, Rousseau pondered 
on the following paradox: ―Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains…How 
has this change come about? I do not know. What can render it legitimate? I believe 
that I can settle this question.‖831 In these introductory sentences, Rousseau expressed 
his determination to tackle the issue of oppression and inequality in the world and 
hinted at a solution based on a reconsideration of the principles of legitimacy behind 
authority. 
Throughout his work, Rousseau developed a notion of the state of nature in 
which humans were free, peaceful, and naturally innocent.
832
 In opposition to the 
Christian doctrine of the original sin, his ‗noble savage‘ was by nature pure and good. 
Largely as a result of ‗accidents of nature‘ humans were drawn to interact with each 
other and it is by passing from the state of nature to the civil state that they came to 
chain themselves.
833
 Through the creation of private property, social life made people 
the prisoners of greed, jealousy, and selfishness. Thus, according to Rousseau, the 
human Fall from the benevolent state of nature took place upon men‘s entering 
society. 
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In Emile, Rousseau claimed that ―[e]verything is good as it leaves the hands of 
the author of things, everything degenerates in the hands of man.‖ 834 And in the 
second part of his Discourse on Inequality he also argued that ―it was iron and wheat 
which first civilized men, and ruined the human race.‖835 Besides drawing a powerful 
interpretation of history as some sort of secular Fall, these two quotes exemplify the 
intellectual process through which Rousseau ―removed the problem of evil from 
religion into politics.‖ 836  Through the location of the source of injustice in the 
corrupting nature of private property, Rousseau solved the problem of theodicy by 
―removing the burden of responsibility from God and putting it on human society.‖837 
And because the Fall had taken place in this world, the solution had to be found here 
on earth. Human salvation could not be achieved through divine intervention and 
instead, man had to ―become his own savior and, in the ethical sense, his own 
creator.‖ 838 In turn, this separation of heaven and earth resulted in the sacralisation of 
―a finite set of temporal arrangements.‖839 Heaven being cut off, transcendence was 
relocated in earthly matters.  
Rousseau‘s solution to the issue of theodicy made up only half of the Social 
Contract for the second half was devoted to the justification of political order and the 
establishment of appropriate principles of legitimacy.
840
 As a matter of fact, now that 
the sources of the Fall had been located, a way out could be sketched. And in 
accordance with the secular nature of the Fall, Rousseau believed that the solution 
was to be found ‗in and through the state.‘841 As Albert Camus explained, since God 
had been denied, the king had to die. 842 
The solution Rousseau offered to the above human dilemma was the creation 
of a community founded on a social contract, a new society to which humans 
surrender themselves completely while preserving their natural freedom. This new 
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community is guided by the combination of the will of all the citizens engaged in 
doing what is good for all, namely, the general will. The general will is inalienable, 
indivisible, ‗absolutely general,‘ and thus ‗absolutely moral.‘843  Morality is no longer 
to be found in God or Nature, but in humans through the general will. As an 
essentially religious concept that has been immanentised, the general will becomes the 
new benchmark for good and evil and is turned into an object of sacred devotion.
 844
 
Through the will of the people, ―[t]he new God is born‖ and the corpus mysticum of 
Christianity is turned into a liberal body politic.
845
 
By making the general will the repository of moral authority, Rousseau finally 
completed the process initiated by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan. While Christendom 
had made the Church both sovereign and holder of moral authority, the English 
thinker had separated the sovereign from the moral sources altogether. And in this 
process, Rousseau finally completed the circle. By arguing that the community 
created moral authority, he thus rejoined ―moral authority and the state, this time in a 
secular setting.‖846 To the secular Fall, Rousseau thus offered a secular solution based 
on a secular moral source. 
But the connection between Hobbes and Rousseau is deeper since the two 
thinkers followed the same unilateral contractarian logic and stressed the absolute 
character of sovereignty.
847
 And the ‗only‘ difference between them was that 
―Leviathan assigned undivided power to an individual sovereign, the absolute prince, 
whereas the Social Contract put it in the hands of the ‗collective sovereign‘, i.e. the 
people.‖848 Rousseau‘s emphasis on the absoluteness of sovereignty led Henry Maine 
to criticise him for establishing a ‗collective despot‘ that corresponded to an ‗inverted 
copy of the King…the French King turned upside down.‘ For ultimately, as Maine put 
it, ―[t]he mass of natural rights absorbed by the sovereign community through the 
Social Compact is, again, nothing more than the old divine right of kings in a new 
dress.‖849 
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This inversion and the location of moral authority in the popular community 
was a major transformation. In effect, legitimacy could now spring directly from the 
people without any reference to outside authority.
850
 Rousseau‘s Social Contract was 
the source from which ―sprang the People (with a capital P), the Sovereign People, the 
People the sole source of all legitimate power.‖851 Camus went further and argued that  
The Social Contract amplifies and dogmatically explains the new 
religion whose god is reason, confused with Nature, and whose 
representative on earth, in place of the king, is the people considered 
as an expression of the general will…with The Social Contract, we 
are witnessing the birth of a new mystique – the will of the people 
being substituted for God Himself.
852
 
 
By arguing that man‘s original goodness had been perverted by society and that 
political association was the only way to salvation, Rousseau secularised and solved 
the issue of theodicy and paved the way for the modern social imaginary of popular 
consent.
853
 With the philosophes and in particular with Rousseau, man was placed at 
the centre of the moral universe and the idea of the superman took the place of the 
representation of kings as God‘s lieutenants.854  
 
 
2) Legitimate Order and Popular Sovereignty 
 
The broad shift in structures of consciousness and the concomitant changes in 
moral sources found their utmost political expression in the late 18
th
 century. Because 
of the widespread socio-political disagreements over the status and power of 
monarchs all over Europe, the sources of political legitimacy came to be scrutinised 
from the beginning of the century onwards. The ideas and philosophical debates of the 
Enlightenment found a ready-made audience since they generally tended to provide a 
suitable discourse through which grievances could be successfully expressed. As a 
result, Enlightenment ideas, by facilitating a transformation in approach towards 
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legitimate authority, provided the template and parameters, delimited the boundaries, 
and set the rules of interaction for emerging forms of political organisation.
855
  
 Many of the ideas of the philosophes had slowly trickled down and spread 
throughout European societies and finally, at the end of the siècle des Lumières, 
Enlightenment principles managed to penetrate and to fundamentally transform 
international affairs. Far from corresponding to localised or individual struggles, the 
revolutions and socio-political transformations of the late 18
th
 century corresponded to 
deep challenges mounted against the ideals of dynasty and divine monarchy and 
corresponded to attempts to achieve systemic change and epochal transformation.
856
 
In Legitimacy and Power Politics, Mlada Bukovansky explores the ways in 
which theocratic-dynastically legitimated forms of sovereignty ceased to be dominant 
and came to be replaced, through the French and American revolutions, by forms of 
national sovereignty legitimated in terms of popular will. She argues that the key 
element behind this shift was the development of the Enlightenment discourse of 
popular will that penetrated and transformed international politics and cradled the 
ascent of a new hegemonic form of legitimate authority. By rejecting and condemning 
kingship by divine right, the French revolution marked a further step in the 
secularisation of Europe.
857
 Because Bukovansky has already provided a detailed 
account of this shift in legitimacy, my aim is not so much to summarise it as to draw 
out the full conclusions concerning the secularisation of European consciousness. In 
particular, I look at the most important and telling dimension of the change in 
legitimate orders, namely, the rise of public opinion as an important source of 
authority in domestic and international politics. 
In 1789, the French Revolution discourse was infused with certain ideas and 
ideals of the Enlightenment. Starting in the 12
th
 century, the ascending theme of 
government finally culminated in a Europe-wide overhauling of the structures of 
legitimacy. Up until the late 18
th
 century, monarchical rule was founded on a notion of 
legitimacy that saw ―the king as a benevolent paternalistic ruler who [stood] at the 
apex of a rigidly hierarchical social order and rules by religious sanction in 
                                                 
855
 Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics, p.3. 
856
 Ibid. p.16. Hall, National Collective Identity. 
857
 ―Up to now God played a part in history through the medium of the kings. But His representative in 
history has been killed, for there is no longer a king. Therefore there is nothing but a semblance of God, 
relegated to the heaven of principles.‖ Camus, The Rebel, p.90. 
Chapter 6: Secularisation, Act III: The Enlightenment 
 - 190 - 
accordance with the law.‖ 858  But in opposition to these widespread standards of 
legitimacy that sanctioned authority in dynastic, territorial, and divine terms, the 
Enlightenment discourse offered a new benchmark based on democratic ideals and the 
broad consent of the governed, i.e., the people.
859
 The notion of ‗the people‘ did not 
refer to a fixed entity and its changing character makes it very difficult to define. Also, 
not all philosophes were democrats and many of them very much feared the 
consequences of empowering and educating the populace.
860
 Nevertheless, some sort 
of socio-cultural movement in this direction took place.
861
  
Because the Enlightenment discourse had to be translated and negotiated in 
accordance with the socio-political situation of the century, the legitimating principles 
that gathered most support were those based on some sort of popular sovereignty. 
Effectively, Enlightenment ideas of freedom, equality, and universal rights did not 
spread thanks to their inherent attractiveness and force, but were rather taken up by 
actors and classes that had elective affinities with them. For example, they were 
supported by the bourgeoisie to further the commercial and political interests of the 
class. Also, the scientific principles of the philosophes were summoned by the king 
whose aim was to centralise, bureaucratise, and rationalise the government of the 
country. As Marsak points out, the idea of reason became under Richelieu ―a source 
or sanction for power, both political and philosophical.‖862  
On a continental scale, the advantages and success of the new political 
organisation soon spread and all sides began to find great interest in adopting the 
Enlightenment ideas. The power of state armies staffed by citizen-soldiers, whose 
allegiance to the nation-state was based on the notions of popular sovereignty and on 
the equality and fraternity of all Frenchmen, forced rivals to adopt a similar form of 
legitimisation.
863
 The power of the mass armies constituted in the wake of the French 
Revolution required the creation of similar armies based on similar sources of 
political legitimacy to stop the spread of French imperialism. 
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The intellectual notion of popular sovereignty found its utmost expression in 
the European-wide ―rise and increasing influence of public opinion as a source of 
political authority.‖ 864  The great transformations of the public sphere in the 18th 
century and the concomitant boost in importance of public opinion had a tremendous 
impact on the structures of legitimacy of the then legitimate order.
865
 In effect, many 
philosophes claimed that ―[i]n order for public opinion to appear as a supreme 
authority, the world had to be swept clean of other, inherited authorities.‖866  
The authority of the kings suddenly came under challenge by the new voice 
from below. And while ―[t]here was no public opinion under Louis XIV, for the 
brilliance of the monarch outshone it… when public opinion had become king, it left 
no place for royal authority.‖867 By the late 18th century, public opinion acquired the 
status of some sort of ‗supreme court‘ that was, as the French statesman Malesherbes 
claimed, ―independent of all powers and respected by all powers…that tribunal of the 
public…the sovereign judge of all the judges of the earth.‖868   
Besides being an expression of the ascending theme of government, the 
emergence of public opinion marked the secularisation of the legitimate order. From 
God and dynastic principles, the new source of legitimacy was now to be found in the 
people. And this far-reaching reversal corresponded to the ―substitution of public 
opinion for divinity.‖869 From then onwards, the people – as opposed to the mob or 
the populace - became the most qualified social strata to interpret the laws of God. 
Through the people, the voice of God was heard, thus making popular sovereignty a 
similarly religious source of legitimacy.
870
  
On the international stage, the French revolution changed the nature and rules 
of interaction between states. By defining the state as the embodiment of popular will, 
―the Revolution presented a challenge to the whole legal and conceptual basis of 
international politics.‖871 As Schroeder argues,   
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Instead of international claims and transactions being argued and 
fought out on the basis of treaties and legal rights, the popular will 
was now to be the decisive factor. This vastly increased the potential 
for international conflict, magnified uncertainties, and elevated 
quarrels over concrete interests into struggle over fundamental 
principles and world views.
872
 
 
The legacy of this epochal transformation is to be found in the great importance 
conferred upon popular sovereignty in our modern political conscience.  As Thomas 
Franck argues, the notion of popular sovereignty has rapidly become, since the end of 
the Second World War, a normative rule of the international system.
873
 The will of the 
people is increasingly being considered as a condition of legitimacy for a 
government.
874
 Now that the first facet of our modern legitimate order has been 
outlined, we can move on to the second facet, the notion of civilisation. 
 
 
3) Rational Progress and Social Regeneration 
 
By enshrining the shift in moral sources from God to Man, the Enlightenment 
not only facilitated the spread of popular sovereignty but also paved the way for the 
development of legitimating principles that revolved around the notions of progress 
and civilisation. Based on the increasing interest in the mastering of both outer and 
inner nature that accompanied the scientific revolution, political communities became 
the arena for the establishment of civilisation through rational progress.
875
 Following 
the withering away of God, man was made responsible for his own welfare and 
salvation in an essentially disenchanted world and became the creator of society.
876
 
Thus, the Enlightenment epistemology made it conceivable for humans to attempt 
some sort of spiritual regeneration through large-scale social engineering and the 
creation of an earthly order compatible with human reason. For Alexis de Tocqueville, 
the French Revolution embodied the ideal of the total ―regeneration of the whole 
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human race.‖877 These socio-cultural changes called forth the institutionalisation of an 
ascending legitimate order but also supported the concept of civilisation. In this 
section, I look at the roots of this civilising order in the Enlightenment shift in the 
notion of ‗Chain of Being.‘878 
For centuries, the idea of ‗Chain of Being‘ had been central to medieval 
consciousness and the descending theme of government. The notion provided a 
definite structure for all things natural and painted the cosmic order as some sort of 
top-down hierarchy that included all beings, both material and invisible. God was 
obviously at the top of the chain and was followed by archangels, angels, and down to 
men, animals, plants, etc. During the Enlightenment, the idea attained its broadest 
diffusion and its implications were accepted in all spheres of life. ―[N]ext to the word 
‗Nature,‘ ‗the Great Chain of Being‘ was the sacred phrase of the eighteenth century, 
playing a part somewhat analogous to that of the blessed word ‗evolution‘ in the late 
nineteenth.‖879 However, in line with the new climate of opinion, the concept was 
reinterpreted and came to be reconciled with the idea of slow historical progress and 
gradual development. As Arthur Lovejoy demonstrated, in accordance with the 
metaphysical principles of natural theology and Deistic thought, ―the once immutable 
Chain of Being‖ was converted ―into the program of an endless Becoming.‖880  
As a result of this tilting process, God was temporalised and came to be 
identified with the very process of historical progress. Creationism was replaced by 
evolutionism and the Christian eschatology was revised accordingly.
881
 In the political 
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realm, this tilting process resulted in the emergence of a horizontal ―conception of the 
destiny of man as an unending progress.‖882 The main challenge sprang from inter-
civilisational encounters with China, a people that was civilised but that, contrary to 
Europe, had none of the superstitious beliefs preached by ecclesiastics. The great 
achievements of this non-Christian empire provided Voltaire and other philosophes 
with the decisive proof that the Christian hopes of salvation could safely be replaced 
with secularised hopes in the indefinite ability of man to improve his lot and to 
become ever more civilised. As Robert Nisbet puts it, Providence-as-Progress was 
gradually replaced by Progress-as-Providence.
883
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: From the Great Chain of Being to Civilisation 
 
 
In Meaning in History, Karl Löwith demonstrates that this new approach to 
human existence marked the secularisation of the Judaeo-Christian belief in the ‗End 
of Time‘ as well as the immanentisation of the eschatological pattern. In particular, 
the Lumières marked a turning point since they began to develop a natural philosophy 
of history by secularising Christian theological principles. Slowly but surely, the 
Christian consciousness came to be replaced by historical consciousness.
884
 For 
example, Voltaire, among others, managed to emancipate ―secular history from sacred 
history, subjecting the history of religion to that of civilization.‖885 And accordingly, 
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the new benchmark for comparison was no longer religion but civilisation, the 
realisation of ―the supremacy of reason, first, over the forces of nature, and, secondly, 
over the dispositions of men.‖886 The main facets of the ideal of civilisation were the 
achievement of progress (including fairness, reciprocity, common decency, and 
compassion), freedom from necessity, the perfecting of the human race, and the 
fulfilment of every individual‘s potential and needs.887 From then on the scheme of 
redemption through Christ was fully temporalised and came to be replaced by a 
historical process of progress and civilisation. Far from corresponding to a monolithic 
expression of a divine plan, the various notions of progress corresponded to 
competing postulates.
888
 In the 19
th
 century, the ―belief in the progress of mankind, 
with Western civilization in the vanguard, [became] virtually a universal religion.‖889 
Even though many Enlightenment thinkers had been suspicious of the idea of progress 
as perfectibility, it became ―the animating and controlling idea of western 
civilisation.‖890 Following the Enlightenment and the spread of the idea of earthly 
progress, a new legitimate order based on civilisation emerged.  
 
 
4) Legitimate Order and Civilisation 
 
Overall, the socio-political upheavals of the 18
th
 century paved the way for the 
rise of new legitimate orders not only based on the notion of popular sovereignty but 
also based on the notion of civilisation. The Enlightenment faith in social regeneration 
and progress facilitated a gradual shift in legitimating principles from the divine 
sanction of earthly authority to a more legalistic sanction according to standards of 
civilisation.
891
 As Ian Clark notes, Europe witnessed ―the emergence of a notion of 
civilization, initially as an adjunct of Christendom, but finally as a displacement of the 
latter as the operative basis of international society.‖892 In fact, Clark argues that ―the 
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shifting basis of legitimacy from a predominantly moral/theological one to one rooted 
in conceptions of legality‖ corresponded to a key phase of the secularisation of the 
notion of international society during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries.
893
  
 From the 17
th
 century onward, the gradual shift from Christendom to the 
notion of civilisation took place as the European state-system began to expand on a 
global scale. Christianity had been fundamental and foundational to the medieval 
conception of the world order. But after Westphalia, and most particularly following 
the Peace of Utrecht in 1713-14, it became obvious ―how problematic a preoccupation 
with Christendom could become for an increasingly diverse and potentially greatly 
expanded international society.‖894 The confessional schism and the religious wars 
had signalled that religion could no longer offer a universally acceptable identity. 
Instead, the main principles of legitimacy were ―gradually transmuted from an 
emphasis upon Christendom and a common religion, to an emphasis upon due regard 
for appropriate standards of civilization.‖895  
At first, the civilising mission went hand in hand with the spread of the good 
news of the Gospel. To be a good Christian meant to be civilised, and vice versa. But 
during the 20
th
 century, the gap between the two widened and the balance shifted in 
favour of the latter.
896
 In the words of Hedley Bull, ―the assumption of a right to 
spread the Christian message and so realize the community of all men in Christ… 
[gradually gave way to the] assumption of a right to spread civilization and so bring 
into being a secular universal community of the civilized.‖897 
The longing of the West to achieve progress and civilisation led it beyond the 
confines of its own borders and the standards of civilisation became embedded in 
colonialism.
898
 Facilitated by the scientific and industrial revolutions, the civilising 
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mission was extended to all continents. Besides the spiritual salvation of the colonised 
through the spread of the Gospel, European powers wanted to remedy the barbarism 
of primitive existence by introducing free trade and commerce.
899
 Like Christianity, 
commerce was seen as a ‗great engine of civilisation‘ and as William Bain explains, 
markets were considered to be  
productive not only of material wealth, but of great social energy, 
and individual improvement…[they] cultivate a sense of 
responsibility, discipline, industry, and all that was required of the 
virtuous citizen; and, consequently, moral refinement and material 
prosperity would naturally arise in human beings...
900
  
 
Accordingly, a body of international law designed to facilitate the progress and 
civilisation of primitive peoples was developed in the aftermath of the French 
revolutionary wars but mostly during the 19
th
 century.
901
  
In the 26 February 1885 General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa 
―the moral and material well-being of native populations‖ was established as an 
international obligation and duty encumbered on the great and civilised powers.
902
 
The conference was based on ―the belief that the nexus of commerce, civilization, and 
peace…would impart knowledge of science, Christian morality, and the virtues 
necessary to bring the light of civilization to the ‗dark heart of Africa.‘‖903 Chapter 1, 
Article VI of the Declaration bound the signatory powers  
to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for 
the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-
being…They shall, without distinction of creed or nation, protect 
and favour all religious, scientific or charitable institutions and 
undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or which 
aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the 
blessings of civilization.
904
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Likewise, Article X called for the maintenance of peace as a means to encourage ―the 
development of civilization.‖905 But besides its legitimisation of Europe‘s civilising 
mission, the Conference remained committed to the spread of Christianity. As a 
matter of fact, the second part of Article VI established most explicitly the protection 
of Christian missionaries, scientists, and explorers as well as the right of foreigners to 
organise religious missions. 
In the wake of the Great War, the ‗sacred trust of civilisation‘ was 
institutionalised in the Covenant of the League of Nations. According to Article 22, 
advanced nations were entrusted with a responsibility for tutoring those territories 
―inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world.‖906 As part of the Mandate system, Christianity no 
longer enjoyed a special status and freedom of conscience and religion was 
established for all. Obstruction and interference with missionary enterprise was still 
forbidden but missions were no longer ‗the objects of special protection.‘907 Finally, 
following the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations 
Trusteeship Council, all references to missionaries had been erased and no special 
arrangements were made to facilitate the spread of Christianity.
908
  
 
 
5) A New Eschatology 
 
This new vision of human history that developed during the Enlightenment 
was connected to the philosophes‟ professed goal of ridding civilisation from the 
tyranny and barbarism of clerical superstitions. However, in the 20
th
 century, it 
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became clearer that their aims had had most unintended consequences. Concerning 
the notions of civilisation and progress, Löwith noted that ―the irreligion of progress 
is still a sort of religion, derived from the Christian faith in a future goal, though 
substituting an indefinite and immanent eschaton for a definite and transcendent 
one.‖909 Likewise, Bury argued that ―the Progress of humanity belongs to the same 
order of ideas as Providence or personal immortality…Belief in it is an act of 
faith.‖ 910  And finally, Becker explained that through their concern with rational 
progress toward a ‗better world,‘ many of the philosophes remained within ―the line 
of prophetic and messianic monotheism.‖911  
A similar point can be made concerning Rousseau‘s philosophical contribution. 
By developing what Cassirer called the ‗one great principle,‘– that man is good, that 
society makes him bad, but that only society, the agent of perdition, can be the agent 
of salvation – Rousseau secularised the issue of theodicy and paved the way for the 
modern social imaginary of popular consent. By tearing the Gospel ―from the 
supernatural order and transposing certain fundamental aspects of Christianity into the 
sphere of simple nature,‖ Rousseau proceeded to a ―naturalization of Christianity.‖912 
However, this naturalisation and immanentisation of Western consciousness as well as 
the concomitant ‗denial of the transcendent‘ led to the divinising of the self, politics, 
and the state.
 913
  For Elshtain, the Christian ideas and religious quest pursued by 
Rousseau in the Social Contract led to the infusion of ―transcendence into politics 
rather than reserving it for the sacred.‖914 Likewise, Daniel Bell concurs that ―[t]his 
transfer of sacrality onto political and social values became a new legitimacy, the cult 
of mankind, and it was this cult that heralded a new era, a new secular religion.‖ 915 
Ultimately, the democratic culture that took hold in Western societies ―culminated in 
the emergence of a new form of sacralised politics‖ and acquired the status of ‗civil or 
political religion.‘916  
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In his Heavenly City, Becker explores these residues of the medieval sacred 
cosmology that paradoxically endured in Enlightenment philosophy. The Cornell 
professor argues that in their rejection of the Church, some philosophes forgot to 
reject the immortality of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being, in their 
rejection of the authority of the revealed word of God, some came to accept blindly 
the authority of reason and nature, and far from having dropped their hope of 
returning to the Garden of Eden, some developed a new historical view of progress 
tending towards peace and civilisation. In place of the City of God, they erected an 
Enlightened City, an earthly city made of secular material and whose gates would be 
guarded by men themselves.
917
 And in so doing, ―they used, along with much new 
material, some of the old Christian bricks.‖918 As Peter Gay argues ―the philosophes 
boasted that they were making all things new, but far from wholly discarding their 
Christian inheritance, they repressed, and retained, more than they knew.‖919 Likewise, 
Roy Porter remarked that ―Enlightened histories claimed to be replacing error with 
truth, but they were in reality trading new myths for old – their own mentalities were 
mythopoeic too.‖920  
The mythopoeic spirit intrinsic to the human condition remained very much 
alive and the 18
th
 century was ‗enlightened‘ only in the sense that it had shifted 
―canons of proof and direction of worship‖ from God to Nature and Man.921  The 
Enlightenment ―view of the world should not be equated with skepticism or 
atheism.‖922 It was only disenchanted to the extent that ―[o]ne type of certainty (divine 
law) was replaced by another (the certainty of our sense, of empirical 
observation).‖ 923  As Bell explains, the language of the French revolution ――was 
political, deriving from the Enlightenment, the fulfillment of Reason, but the 
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revenge the good man and unmask the hypocrite, consoling and certain idea, do not abandon me!‖ For 
the French thinker, ―Posterity is for the Philosopher what the other world is for the religious.‖ Becker, 
The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers, p.150. 
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underlying sentiments were religious.‖924 And drawing on a ‗spiritual energy‘ similar 
to that of Christianity, this new mythology justified a new hierarchy of power based 
on the new standards of civilisation and democratic legitimacy.
925
  
 
 
6) A Shift in Worship 
 
In the 17
th
 and early 18
th
 centuries, Mother Nature came to replace God the 
Holy Father as the ultimate source of legitimacy and truth.
926
 And the most outspoken 
critiques of Christianity could praise nature in a most pious manner without passing 
for believers. The religious character of the new worship of nature resulted from the 
transfer of all divines attributes from God to the material world and was framed using 
very traditional forms of Christian devotion.
927
 Hence, Shaftesbury (1671-1713) could 
pay tributes to the new deity and pray to it: 
O Glorious Nature! supremely Fair, and sovereignly Good! All-
loving and All-lovely, All-divine!...O mighty Nature! Wise 
Substitute of Providence! impower‘d Creatress! Or Thou 
impowering Deity, supreme Creator!
928
 
 
In the same vein Comte d‘Holbach (1723-1789) addressed the new God in terms 
reminiscent of the medieval consciousness: 
Oh Nature! Sovereign of all beings. And you, her adorable 
daughters, Virtue, reason, and truth. Be forever our only divinities; 
it is to you that are due the homage and incense of the earth. Show 
us, then, Oh Nature, what man should do to obtain the happiness 
that you desire for him.
929
 
 
But with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, reason began to take the place 
of nature. And accordingly, the human attribute was incensed and glorified with the 
most religious terms:  
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Divine Reason, pure emanation of the supreme Being, thou who 
governest the destiny of men and empires, pray accept the homage 
which we come to render unto thee today in this august temple! This 
tribute may please thou, since it is inspired by the burning love of 
the Fatherland and by the sentiments of its goodness. Indeed, it is 
thanks to this that we reconquered our holy liberty, too long 
profaned under the abhorred yoke of a shameful servitude.
930
  
 
From theologians and astrologists, educated men turned philosophers, scientists, and 
historians in their quest for a new basis for morality.
931
 The Enlightenment faith in 
nature and in the Author of the Universe was soon rationalised, and with Darwin, 
disappeared altogether. Finally, with the notions of evolution, progress, and 
civilisation ―God, and all the substitutes for that conception, could be ignored since 
nature was conceived not as a finished machine but as an unfinished process, a 
mechanistic process, indeed, but one generating its own power.‖932  
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Conclusion 
  
I am an object of myself and of my representations.  
That there is something outside me is my own product. 
I make myself. 
 
Immanuel Kant 
 
 
In this chapter, I traced the development of the individualism and inwardness 
of the new consciousness from the 17
th
 century onwards. Luther and Calvin had 
shifted the basis of faith from the traditional ecclesiastical hierarchy to the sole 
Scriptures. But Locke took this rationale to its logical conclusion and in a very 
Cartesian fashion rejected this external inspiration or foundation and argued that the 
only source of knowledge was the experience of the human reason. All forms of 
knowledge, both lay and religious, were said to subsist within, and to be mediated by, 
man.
933
 With Rousseau, the Divinity was absorbed and assimilated in ourselves and 
happiness was possible to the extent that ―we withdraw from things and draw closer to 
ourselves: we are then sustained by our own substance, but it is never exhausted.‖ 934 
According to this alternative source of knowledge, new international 
legitimate orders were established. At the vanguard of civilisation, European states 
strove tirelessly towards progress and redemption. The eternal life was promised by 
René Descartes and Auguste Comte with the latter arguing that in a perfect society 
politically governed by industrial administrators and morally guided by natural 
scientists life would become infinite and death a remnant of the past.
935
 Following the 
translation of Christian theology into secular terms, a purely natural and this-worldly 
eschatology was developed and parts of the eschatological hopes of Christianity were 
finally rehabilitated but in a purely secular gaze. Salvation was again possible, here on 
earth. Overall, the Enlightenment sacralised the worldly existence and thus completed 
the third step of the secularisation process. 
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In the 21
st
 century, we clearly remain ―the Enlightenment‘s children.‖936 The 
ideas and values dear to the philosophes are very much present and still provide the 
foundation of much theorising within the Social Sciences. As Nisbet argues, ―[a]ll of 
the social sciences without exception – political economy, sociology, anthropology, 
social psychology, cultural geography, and others – were almost literally founded 
upon the rock of faith in human progress.‖937 And accordingly, we still approach 
social life through this ―purely secular time-understanding‖ which allowed us to move 
―from a hierarchical order of personalized links to an impersonal egalitarian one; from 
a vertical world of mediated access to horizontal, direct-access societies.‖938  
This conclusion has important implications for the legitimacy of the secular 
foundation of international relations. The endurance of a mythopoeic mentality poses 
a fundamental problem regarding the alleged objectivity and neutrality of the secular 
foundation of international politics. If the secularisation of Europe cannot be 
dissociated from the sacralisation of the world and from the development of a secular 
eschatology, the claim to superiority of secular politics over its faith-based 
counterpart is weakened. Besides, the return of religion on a global scale questions the 
universality and adequacy of this very foundation.  
The argument developed in this chapter goes a long way in answering our first 
research question concerning the impact of the secularisation process on the 
foundation of international politics. However, before I summarise the argument and 
the main findings of this thesis, it is essential to consider the most recent 
transformations to have taken place in the secular foundation of international politics. 
Effectively, while the secularisation process reached its peak at the beginning of the 
19
th
 century, it seems that it underwent a reversal in the 20
th
 century. Therefore, the 
following chapter deals with the socio-cultural transformations that followed the third 
step of the secularisation process. In particular, I look at the move away from the 
moral source and legitimate orders established after the Enlightenment and I outline 
the onset of a process of ‗de-secularisation‘ or re-enchantment. Only then will it be 
possible to answer the two research questions set at the beginning of this thesis. 
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Figure 4: The 4 Levels of Secularisation after the Enlightenment 
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7. Globalisation and the 
“Return of the Gods”  
 
 
 
Only a god can save us now. 
 
Martin Heidegger 
 
 
Until the beginning of the 20
th
 century, the ideals of progress and civilisation 
enjoyed widespread authority amongst Western nations. By demonstrating the falsity 
of the teachings of treacherous and perfidious priests, the philosophes had paved the 
way for a civilisation free from dogma and supernatural nonsense. In turn, the saving 
powers of the Enlightenment and its ability to free humans from the barbarism and 
shackles of superstition and religious belief were beyond criticism. However, the 
1900s saw the corrosion and questioning of this Enlightenment monument of Western 
legitimacy. In particular, following the two World Wars and the fall of all colonial 
empires, the cultural rationales inherited from the Lumières came under criticism. 
Having supposedly led to the horrors of the camps, the instrumental rational legacy of 
the philosophes was challenged from all sides of the political spectrum. Likewise, the 
civilising order that had emerged during the 18
th
 century fell into disrepute. By the 
mid-20
th
 century, the Enlightenment project of civilisation and progress had been 
reframed and the authority of reason reconsidered.  
Students of structures of consciousness have depicted this reappraisal as some 
sort of limbo between epochs and different socio-cultural trends.
939
 In Civilizational 
Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters, Benjamin Nelson noted that 
Today we are again at a turning point in the successive civil wars 
and revolutions of the cultures of conscience and consciousness. 
This time it is the Western rationalized consciousness which is on 
trial in all countries of the world. The frightful events of our century 
have convinced great numbers that the civilizations reared on the so-
called ‗myth of the objective consciousness‘ are beyond repair.940 
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Based on this diagnostic of the socio-cultural turmoil, Nelson claimed that what we 
are currently witnessing corresponds to the reversal of the trends that led from the 12
th
 
century onward to the spread of rationalised structures of consciousness. The current 
turning point, Nelson thought, corresponds to a battle that ―ranges between the 
existential structure of ‗faith-consciousness‘ and the more objective ‗rationalized-
structures‘ of consciousness.‖941 Accordingly, the cultural revolutions taking place the 
world over are ―marked by intensive thrusts of collective process…to forge new 
collective identities and new collective forms of experience and expression…they are 
to be found wherever separatist groups pursue the right to collective identity.‖942 
Overall, this reversal means that the individual consciousness fostered by the 
Enlightenment is giving ground to a collective form of consciousness akin to that 
which was prevailing in the Middle Ages.
943
  
Sharing this analysis of the present condition, Sorokin demonstrates in Social 
and Cultural Dynamics that the ‗this-worldly,‘ rational cultural form that emerged 
after the fall of Christendom and reached its zenith in the 18
th
 century is being slowly 
replaced by an ideational and ‗other-worldly‘ culture in which knowledge is accessed 
through faith and intuition. For Sorokin, the self-defeating nature of modern culture 
means that through incessant rationalisation, values have ―become still more relative 
and atomistic until they are ground into dust devoid of any universal recognition and 
binding power.‖944 The Russian-American sociologist concludes that faced with a lack 
of foundation and meaning Westerners are returning to the cultural rationales that 
prevailed in the Middle Ages. To be more precise, instead of reversing completely to 
the medieval arrangements, they seem to be using the material vehicles and 
instrumentalities of modern culture as the mouthpiece of medieval ideational 
meanings and values.
945
  
In The Ever-Present Origin, Jean Gebser develops a similar argument and 
comes to the conclusion that the structure of consciousness that is currently emerging 
is characterised by a greater consciousness of the spiritual.
946
 Likewise, in The 
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Decline of the West, Oswald Spengler had already predicted the return of religion. He 
had argued that  
the seed of a new resigned piety, sprung from tortured conscience 
and spiritual hunger, whose task will be to found a new Hither-side 
that looks for secrets instead of steel-bright concepts and in the end 
will find them in the deeps of the ‗Second Religiousness.‘947  
 
From the highpoint of the rational spirit of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, 
Western culture has now reached its limits and is now returning ―to its spiritual 
home.‖948 
Gebser, Sorokin, Nelson, and Spengler saw the demise of the Book of Reason 
and the ‗return‘ of religion as central to the 20th century.949 Thus, at the turn of the 21st 
century, it is important to explore the reality and nature of this apparent reversal of 
trend. Knowing that the secularisation of Western Europe resulted from the inverse 
shift in consciousness, we could well wonder whether the current shift will lead to the 
‗re-enchantment‘ of Europe or at least to the onset of a process of ‗de-
secularisation.‘950 Moreover, when one considers that a similar reversal seems to be 
taking place in the realm of international legitimacy and that it seems to be connected 
to the revival of religion, an understanding of the implications of this change in 
structures of consciousness becomes critical.
951
 
Therefore, in line with the theoretical framework developed in chapter three, 
this last chapter deals with the most recent transformations in moral sources and 
structures of legitimacy and relates them to the return of religion. In the first part of 
the chapter, I outline the main facets of the driving force behind the current shift. I 
argue that ‗globalisation‘ is challenging the modern source of morality and facilitating 
the emergence of an alternative moral source. Next, I assess the extent to which this 
‗post-modern turn‘ is paving the way for a new sense of identity propitious to 
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communal arrangements and the revival of religion.
952
 I conclude that the changes 
outlined by Nelson and Sorokin do not seem to be taking place and that the return of 
religion has up until now been mostly a by-product and a reaction to globalising 
forces. Far from heralding a return to a notion of the good premised on the divine, 
recent changes have not fundamentally questioned the modern anthropocentric moral 
source. 
In the second part of the chapter, I deal with transformations in the sphere of 
legitimacy. I look at the challenges posed to the civilising order and I map out the 
onset of new forms of international legitimacy after the Second World War.
953
 I argue 
that the current shift in legitimate order is emphasising notions of self-determination 
and human rights and is leading to the weakening of secularism and to the 
accentuation of religious concerns. Ultimately, the return of religion is only connected 
to a process of de-secularisation in a very limited sense but remains nonetheless 
significant to the extent that it highlights the importance of reforming the secular 
foundation of international politics. 
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A.   Moral Sources, De-Centring the Self 
 
 
 
The idea of life having a purpose stands and falls with the religious system. 
 
Sigmund Freud 
 
The death of God is also the death of eternal truth 
 
Max Horkheimer 
 
 
The last historical period I wish to study in this thesis is the 20
th
 century, and 
more particularly, the radical wave of globalisation that spread from the 1960s 
onwards. The importance of the Reformation and the Enlightenment in history is well-
known, but the significance of our own time is often overlooked due to the lack of 
historical hindsight. In this context, Bruce Mazlish has argued that ―present-day 
globalization is the counterpart for our time of that earlier French Revolution‖ and 
that its scope and force are far greater than its predecessor.
954
 Transformations in 
technology, the economy, industry, the information revolution, etc, have profoundly 
transformed historical experience and impacted the social and cultural arrangements 
of societies the world over. Whether the 20
th
 century corresponds to the latest seminal 
period is a question which will have to be answered by historians in the coming 
decades. But the lack of hindsight should not stop us from studying those 
revolutionary trends in belief and attitudes that typify the current transitional 
challenge. While the future is unpredictable, the main contours of the emerging order 
can be derived from the availability of some powerful cultural resources.
955
  
The aim of the following sections is thus to study the impact of this latest 
historical period on moral sources and to connect it to the resurgence of religion. If a 
process of de-secularisation is taking place, we should be able to discern its contours 
by looking at the transformation in the sources of morality brought about under the 
impulse of globalisation. Therefore, in the next section, I outline the main 
characteristics of the globalisation process. Then I look at the impact it has had on 
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moral sources as well as its consequences on the way the self is conceptualised. And 
finally, I connect these changes to the current resurgence of religion. 
 
 
1) Globalisation, a Seminal Period ? 
 
Globalisation has been defined in various ways by different scholars and the 
scale of the process makes an exhaustive study impossible. Over the last two decades, 
the term has been used more and more frequently, and increasingly loosely. But 
simply put, it corresponds to the growing transcendence of borders as well as the 
expansion, acceleration, and deepening of interconnections on a global scale. It 
encompasses all spheres of life and is often associated with notions of ‗global 
village,‘ ‗complex interconnectivity,‘ space/time compression, the butterfly effect, etc. 
Also, it is related to Westernisation, liberalisation, McDonaldization, or neo-
colonialism. Its causes are multiple but broadly speaking it is facilitated by the 
changes in information technology and in the economy as well as by the emergence 
of a global consciousness.
956
 Because I am only interested in the changes 
globalisation has brought about at the levels of consciousness and moral sources, my 
account will be limited to the cultural dimension of the process. In particular, I will 
pay special attention to the challenge posed to the Enlightenment moral source as 
well as to the way people live and experience the world. Even though changes in the 
spheres of trade, finance, economics, and information technology are central to 
globalisation, they have not been included.  
Far from being a recent phenomenon specific to the 20
th
 century, globalisation 
is deeply rooted in a modernity which is ‗inherently globalizing.‘957 Overall, three 
main waves of globalisation have been distinguished: ―The first, after 1500, centred 
on the globalization of regional trade; the second, after 1800, gained impetus from 
industrialization; the third derived from the architecture of a new world order after 
1945.‖958  The roots of the process and the certain continuity between the waves 
should not obscure the fact that the profound systemic and holistic transformations of 
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present-day globalisation are characteristic of a new epoch.
959
 Compared to the first 
two waves, the scope and pace of the last wave denote a radical qualitative 
difference.
960
 
Different dimensions of the associated cultural condition – variously termed 
late, high, reflexive modernity or post-modernity - have been captured in the notions 
of ‗post-industrial‘ or ‗post-Fordist‘ society, the development of the ‗network society‘ 
or the emergence of a ‗risk society.‘ 961  Overall, it seems that the information 
technology revolution, the economic crisis of capitalism and statism, and the 
blooming of cultural social movements have brought about, through their interactions 
and the reactions they triggered, a new social structure, economy, and culture.
962
 This 
transition is characteristic of highly integrated and modernised countries but remains 
uneven and incomplete in many parts of the world. 
Writing in the second half of the 20
th
 century, numerous scholars commented 
on the socio-cultural changes that were taking place as a result of globalising forces. 
They demonstrated that the special character of change in late-modernity had an 
impact on culture and especially on the way identity is conceived. Overall, they found 
that the transformations and the compression of time and space led to the 
disembedding of the social system, to the creation of global interconnections, to the 
challenge of ‗traditional‘ authority, and to the alteration of personal identity. Indeed, 
the pace and scope of change as well as an increased reflexivity meant that social 
practices became ―constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming 
information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character.‖963 
                                                 
959
 Mazlish, The New Global History, p.107. 
960
 Scholte, Globalization  It is likely that over the longue durée, the 20
th
 century will look like a major 
rupture in culture and consciousness. This is what Mazlish argues. Overall, I believe that the debate 
over the gradualness of this rupture is due to the diversity of historical frames of reference adopted by 
scholars. 
961
 Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society : A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: 
Basic Books, 1976). Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, vol. 1, Information Age. 
Economy, Society, and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). Ulrich Beck, Risk Society : Towards a New 
Modernity (London: Sage, 1992). One of the first writers to use the word ‗postmodern‘ was Bernard 
Bell. In the 20s and 30s, Bell argued that the postmodernist is the man who is disillusioned with the 
religions of democracy, science, of the superman, etc, and who is ―seeking once more for a God quite 
beyond the limitations of those lesser deities too popular of late.‖ Bernard Iddings Bell, Religion for 
Living. A Book for Postmodernists. (London: John Gifford, 1939), p.xiii. The postmodern was used to 
refer to this return to God and a deeper form of spirituality. 
962
 Manuel Castells, End of Millennium, vol. 3, Information Age. Economy, Society, and Culture 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), p.356. 
963
 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, pp.37-38. 
Chapter 7: Globalisation and the “Return of the Gods”  
 - 213 - 
This endless process of fragmentation and reconstruction of both societies and 
individualities is what characterises the nature of change at the turn of the 21
st
 century.  
Through its homogenising powers as well as its incessant need for re-
actualisation, globalisation is questioning and thus eroding all forms of identity. The 
source of worry is not so much to find a solid identity but the suspicion that it might 
be torn apart or melt into air.
964
 Effectively, as reality and existence are confronted to 
―the dialectical interplay of the local and the global,‖ individuals are forced to 
reconstitute their identity in reference to the multiplicity of options offered by 
globalisation.
965
 As shared identities are caught up within global flows, they tend to 
become the preeminent organising principle of postmodern societies.
966
 In this way, 
globalisation is connected to the resurgence of religion. 
In turn, this lack of continuity creates a sense of ontological insecurity and 
existential anxiety and individuals become tempted to dissolve their personal worries 
by belonging to a community.
967
 In a fragmented, dislocated, and ever-shifting world, 
women and men look for communities to relieve their uncertainties: ―Identity sprouts 
on the graveyard of communities, but flourishes thanks to its promise to resurrect the 
dead.‖968 As Alain Touraine explains, ―in a post-industrial society…it is the defense 
of the subject, in its personality and in its culture, against the logic of apparatuses 
and markets, that replaces the idea of class struggle.‖969 The new primacy of identity 
is to grow and develop ―as prolongation of communal resistance.‖970 This resistance 
is against globalisation‘s dissolution of local institutions, the individualism and 
blurring of boundaries, and finally, against the crisis in patriarchal ‗personality 
systems‘ and traditional mechanisms of social security.971 This cultural resistance is 
also closely tied to the resentment of Western hegemony and injustice and this is the 
subject of the second part of the chapter. 
The globalising character of our present situation, whether the mark of a 
seminal period or not, is profoundly affecting existence and experience. The 
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transcendence of borders and the increase in interconnections are confronting 
individuals and societies to a growing flow of information. In turn, this leads to the 
fragmentation, hybridisation, and dislocation of worldviews and to a demand for 
greater fluidity and flexibility. However, it is also leading to insecurity and fears 
which are met by resistance and a return to the safety of traditional and communal 
sources of identities. 
In light of the above account of the socio-cultural transformations brought 
about by globalisation, we could well wonder whether the moral sources inherited 
from the Enlightenment have remained unaffected. Indeed, if, ―subjectivity and the 
social order are constituted together‖ and implicate one another, it is important to 
explore the potential repercussion of these changes on the notion that Man is the 
measure of all things.
972
 In the following sections, I argue that globalisation and the 
advent of post-modernity, while increasing human powers technologically, question 
the sovereignty and self-sufficiency of the Enlightenment subject and participate in 
the dismantlement of the associated worldview.
973
 It could be wondered whether this 
transition could open the door, in some cases, to an inflexion or redirection of the 
secularising process and to the emergence of a new religious consciousness.
974
 
 
 
2) The Philosophical Limits of Modernity‘s Moral Sources 
 
In the previous chapters, I argued that under the impulse of the Renaissance, 
the Reformation, and the Enlightenment, the moral sources shared across Europe 
slowly shifted from God to Man. And in the early 19
th
 century, Hegel could exclaim 
that 
never since the sun had stood in the firmament and the planets 
revolved around him had it been perceived that man‘s existence 
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centres in his head, i.e., in Thought, inspired by which he builds up 
the world of reality…This was accordingly a glorious mental 
dawn.
975
 
 
The outcome of this change was the creation of the sovereign, rational, and 
autonomous individual as the ultimate repository of meaning, morality, and political 
legitimacy.
976
 In The Question of Cultural Identity, Stuart Hall defines this 
‗Enlightenment subject‘ as ―a fully centred, unified individual, endowed with the 
capacities of reason, consciousness and action.‖977  The fact ―that man becomes the 
center and measure of all beings…[and] at the bottom of all objectification and 
representation‖ marks the defining trait of modernity.978 
 Of course people were also individuals in pre-modern times, but this 
individuality was felt and experienced in a different manner. As members of a 
divinely ordered hierarchy with specific roles and duties in the Great Chain of Being, 
people were kept from enjoying individual sovereignty by the weight of traditional 
and religious structures. In this context, the emergence of the sovereign individual as a 
result of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment was a major development in the 
history of mankind. Following the shattering of the Christian order, man was 
redefined in a threefold way. First, the existence of the Almighty and of a human soul 
was made unnecessary and their existence was dismissed as being a mere religious 
fancy spread by wicked priests. Second, emotions and the body itself were separated 
from the rational self and their possession became but a nuisance.
979
 Bodies were 
atomised and became separated from one another other. And third, man began to 
control nature and thus separated himself from his environment. The Romantic 
reaction to the disenchantment of the world was characterised by a ―sharp sense that 
human beings had been triply divided by modern reason – within themselves, between 
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themselves, and from the natural world.‖980 By centring the world within man, the ties 
between heaven and earth were cut.  
This threefold separation had major implications. First of all, it made man a 
buffered and individual sovereign. The philosophical changes of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 
centuries marked the arrogation of divinity by the man endowed of reason and thus 
made him his own creator and his own saviour.
981
 But secondly, by becoming ―a kind 
of prosthetic God‖ and acquiring a ‗Godlike character,‘ man was assailed by troubles 
for there was nothing left that could give life the deep and powerful meaning it once 
had.
982
 The individualism, bureaucratic, and instrumentalist nature of modern life 
dissolved traditional communities and superseded the once symbiotic relation that 
man had with nature and his environment. Man became insecure, homeless, ―himself 
a stranger and solitary in the world.‖983 This ultimately led to the destruction of ―the 
matrices in which meaning could formerly flourish.‖984 The Death of God left ―only 
one remaining absolute, which is Nothingness.‖985  
It is in this context that during the 20
th
 century, processes of change associated 
with globalisation and the growing complexity of modern societies led to the 
emergence of a more social conception of man.
986
 The transformation resulted from 
the realisation that identity is shaped through the interaction of the individual with 
his/her society and is transformed through dialogue and exchange with the ‗outside.‘ 
According to this new understanding developed by the like of Talcott Parsons and 
George Herbert Mead, the individual was no longer seen as essentially ―autonomous 
and self-sufficient‖ but as being ―formed in relation to ‗significant others‘, who 
mediated to the subject the values, meanings and symbols – the culture – of the 
worlds he/she inhabited.‖987 The demarcation line between the inside, the ‗self,‘ and 
the outside, society, became permeable and the individual came to be studied in his 
symbiotic relationship with the environment.  
But soon this view of the subject was radicalised and through a series of 
intellectual ruptures and advances in social theory, the Cartesian source of morality 
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was finally ‗de-centred.‘988 In opposition to the ‗anthropologisation‘ of reality that 
made man the measure of all things, ―[t]he second half of the twentieth century has 
been witness to a major shift in Western thinking, a shift that can be summed up in 
terms of the ‗death of the subject‘ or the ‗death of Man.‘‖989 And according to our 
theoretical framework, if a process of de-secularisation is taking place it should be 
visible in this change in moral sources. Stuart Hall outlines five philosophical 
perspectives that facilitated this de-centring: psychoanalysis, Marxism, structural 
linguistic, feminism, post-modernism, and post-structuralism.
990
 In this thesis, I would 
like to add one more such perspective to the list, namely, Existentialism. In the 
following section, through the outline of the philosophical rupture associated with 
Existentialism, i hope to ascertain the existence of a de-secularisation process. 
Despite being neglected in the Anglo-American world, Existentialism deserves 
to be studied because of the role it played in the shift in moral sources.
991
 After all, it 
is the tradition that addresses the sense of disorientation and confusion associated with 
modernity par excellence.
992
 Besides, Existentialism was a powerful cultural trend in 
20
th 
century Europe and its impact on the intellectual scene cannot be ignored. As the 
most explicit statement of the Existentialist philosophy, the work of Sartre is 
considered at greater length.
993
 
 
 
3) The Rationalisation of the Cartesian Self 
 
In the 20
th
 century, numerous authors came to the conclusion that in face of the 
growing complexity of modern societies and as a result of transformations brought 
about by globalisation, industrialisation, and two World Wars, the Enlightenment 
subject was ‗de-centred.‘994 The Cartesian ontology according to which all knowledge 
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is necessarily mediated by the ‗cogito‘ was rationalised, thereby giving birth to a 
‗post-modern‘ form of subjectivity. 995  Many scholars explained that as a result, 
identity became fluid, impermanent, and unstable and the immutable and unified core 
of the Enlightenment ‗self‘ became fragmented and ever-shifting. The subject came to 
be defined historically, ―formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways 
[he/she is] represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround 
[him/her].‖996 Enlightenment reason fell from the status of unique source of truth to 
that of historically and socially constructed human ability.  
Playing an important role as part of this broader process, Existentialist 
philosophers began to question the Cartesian assumption that consciousness faithfully 
mirrors reality. If the mind has not been created by a benevolent God, as Descartes 
assumed, how could one know that the mirror offers a perfect representation of the 
world? How could one know that the mind is not itself a variable in the perception of 
outer reality? Therefore, going beyond the sole focus on cogitation, philosophers 
turned to the study of consciousness itself. A new philosophical current began to 
develop, one that would extend from Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche to Husserl, 
Heidegger, and Sartre. For the sake of brevity, I focus solely on the latter phase of 
this development. 
During the Middle Ages, it was commonly assumed that man was God‘s 
creation, that he was endowed with a soul, and that his purpose was the worship of 
God on earth. This theological conception of man saw ―the human being from the 
point of view of his divine origin. Man is the creature of God and made in His image; 
he is part earthly, part spiritual…Human history is the history of man‘s preparation 
for salvation.‖997 In this scheme, the existence of a specifically human essence is 
beyond doubt and identity is determined by one‘s position in the Great Chain of 
Being. With the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the divine purpose of man‘s 
existence was suppressed but the idea of a human essence remained implicit in the 
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work of Voltaire, Diderot, or Kant. Human nature was still found in every man and 
each man was said to be an expression of that universal nature. The essence of man 
was said to precede his historical existence.  
What existentialists achieved was the reversal of this state of affair. For 
example, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) argued that if God is dead, man‘s essence 
cannot precede his existence.
998
  Instead, the Frenchman demonstrated that ―man first 
of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself 
afterwards. If man…is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will 
not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself.‖999 The 
existential condition of man is thus one of radical freedom in which he is made 
responsible for the creation not only of his environment, but more importantly, of his 
self and its reality. Men must now take the place of the creator by ordering outer 
reality but also by taking responsibility for their inner world. In a soulless world in 
which he does not have an essence, man becomes the heart of his own transcendence.  
This condition of infinite possibility and pure freedom makes man indefinable 
except in terms of what he has not already become. Hence one could say that ―there is 
never any stable structure of being in which he can locate his identity. We are, in 
other words, creatures who can never catch up with ourselves…And there is no 
escaping the nothingness that is wrought into the very core of our humanity.‖1000 
However, as they were moving away from the Enlightenment subject in their quest for 
consciousness, existentialists drew closer to a new source of morality. By taking the 
rationalisation process to its very limits, 20
th
 century philosophers paved the way for 
the complete de-centring of the Cartesian cogito.  
 
 
4) De-Centred Subjectivity: From Nothingness to the Other 
 
The radical subjectivism postulated by Sartre finds its roots in Descartes‘ 
‗cogito ergo sum,‘ but contrary to the cogito that possessed an essence and an 
individuality, the existentialist subjectivity – if there is such a thing – is unbounded 
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and only points beyond itself. The French thinker argued that consciousness does not 
exist independently from its object since to be conscious, one must be conscious of 
something: ―consciousness has no ‗inside,‘ it is nothing but the outside of itself.‖1001 
By rationalising the Cartesian cogito, existentialists made human existence a function 
of one‘s environment.  
Moving away from the individualism and self-enclosed Enlightenment 
subjectivism, Sartre pointed to the fact that ―it is not only one‘s own self that one 
discovers in the cogito, but those of others too.‖1002 Contrary to the philosophy of 
Descartes or Kant, the existentialist emphasis on the cogito goes beyond the 
boundaries of the ‗self.‘ Effectively, in a Hegelian fashion, Sartre noted that 
the man who discovers himself directly in the cogito also discovers 
all the others, and discovers them as the condition of his own 
existence. He recognises that he cannot be anything…unless others 
recognise him as such…the other is indispensable to my existence, 
and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself.
1003
 
 
Martin Buber made a similar move based on his reading of Ludwig Feuerbach‘s 
conception of man. Contrary to the self-enclosed and rational individual that 18
th
 
century philosophers found so laudable, Feuerbach held that  
The individual man for himself does not have man‘s being in 
himself, either as a moral being or a thinking being. Man‘s being is 
contained only in community, in the unity of man with man – a unity 
which rests, however, only on the reality of the difference between I 
and Thou.
1004
 
 
Likewise, Buber demonstrated that the mystery of human existence and 
consciousness cannot be resolved by looking at the individual. Instead, the Jewish 
thinker argued that ―[o]nly when we try to understand the human person in his whole 
situation, in the possibilities of his relation to all that is not himself, do we understand 
man.‖1005 Thus the search for the truth of consciousness took a whole new turn since 
the sources of the self led away from the individual and to the rest of the world. Buber 
transcended the emptiness of man‘s inner realm by demonstrating that the ‗I‘ comes 
to exist ―only through the relation to the Thou.‖1006  
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 In the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries, ideas similar to Sartre and Buber‘s 
have been developed by a variety of scholars. In Modernity and Self-Identity, 
Anthony Giddens argues that confronted to ‗personal meaninglessness‘ and 
‗existential isolation,‘ the self has reached its limits as an ‗internally referential 
system‘ and is leading back to the collective level.1007 Likewise, one can find the 
perfect example of the externalisation of the ‗self‘ by an excess of inwardness in the 
work of Judith Butler. In Giving an Account of Oneself, the American post-
structuralist philosopher comes to the conclusion that ―I am only in the address to you, 
then the ‗I‘ that I am is nothing without this ‗you,‘ and cannot even begin to refer to 
itself outside the relation to the other by which its capacity for self-reference 
emerges.‖1008 Overall, these attempts to go beyond the ‗Enlightenment subject‘ are 
part of the broader shift towards more de-centred accounts of subjectivity. While the 
emerging source of morality is not yet perfectly discernable, a definite move away 
from the Cartesian subject can be distinguished. Also, it should be noted that the de-
centring of the subject is leading away from modernity‘s individualism and to a new 
opening on the social world and collectivism.
1009
 
So far in this chapter, I have tried to sketch the conceptual shift by which the 
Cartesian notion of the individual, rational, and sovereign self was de-centred. I 
argued that this shift in moral sources was the result of globalisation and I sketched 
out its conceptual formation by looking at the rupture in modern knowledge carried 
out by Existentialism. By questioning the inside/outside dichotomy, the post-modern 
subject displaced a key tenet of modern subjectivity, namely, the existence of a 
universal essence of man which is shared by all individuals. In this, the Existentialist 
de-centring of the self can be connected to the other five ‗great de-centrings‘ 
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mentioned previously.
1010
 And in accordance with globalising forces, the 
Existentialist view of the formation of the self through the ‗other‘ is opening the door 
to a more fragmented, ever-shifting, and contextually constructed conception of 
identity and hence to a multiplicity of moral sources.
1011
 However, the transformation 
of moral sources is not heralding a return to the medieval focus on God as the 
ultimate source of good but remains within an essentially anthropocentric frame of 
reference. Thus, it does not seem that a straight-forward process of de-secularisation 
is under way at the level of moral sources. Nevertheless, the simultaneity of 
globalisation, the de-centring of the subject, and the resurgence of religion seems to 
point the existence of an indirect connection. Now that the contemporary changes in 
moral sources have been outlined, I shall explore the nature of this connection. 
 
 
5) Globalisation and the Return of the Sacred 
 
In the first section, I outlined the main facets of globalisation. I argued that the 
compression of both space and time led to an increase in interconnections and to the 
dissolution and endless fragmentation of shared identities. As a result of ―the 
dialectical interplay of the local and the global,‖ societies and individuals are asked to 
reconstruct and re-actualise their identities in line with the various options offered by 
globalisation.
1012
 While this heralds the spread of insecurity and anxiety, it also 
facilitates various forms of communal resistance. It seems that at the level of 
subjectivity, a similar movement is taking place. The de-centring of the sovereign 
individual is being met by a renewed attraction to communalism. At the risk of 
generalising, Bauman notes that as the age of self-conscious contingency, post-
modernity thus becomes ―the age of community: of the lust for community, search for 
community, invention of community, imagining community.‖ 1013  The ontological 
dislocation that accompanies globalisation thus calls for the reconstruction of 
individual and collective identities on the basis of communal resistance and in 
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relation to selected traumas and glories.
1014
 It is in this context that the resurgence of 
ethnicity, nationalism, or religion should be understood.  
The connection between globalisation and the contemporary religious revival 
is thus non-coincidental. And despite the fact that most religious movements differ in 
their beliefs and aspirations, their common growth and worldwide appeal largely 
coincide with the third wave of globalisation and the post-modern turn.
1015
 Numerous 
authors have related millenarianism, religious terrorism, and fundamentalism to the 
fragmentation, socio-economic marginalisation, and insecurity that accompany 
globalisation.
1016
 It is widely agreed that to escape this condition, people ―search for 
those threads which can give a person a set of ties that place him in the continuity of 
the dead and the living and those still to be born.‖1017 In particular, these post-modern 
fears that are assailing all individuals are breeding religious movements that strive on 
the idea that ―[t]he individual is to be liberated from this individualism to the 
solidarity of either old or new collective structures.‖ 1018  If modernisation is the 
spreading of the condition of homelessness, then religion ―can be understood as the 
promise of a new home.‖1019  
At the heart of this ‗Return of the Sacred,‘ fundamentalism is a form of 
religion adapted to the loss of foundations and the instability of post-modern life.
1020
 
As a child of the internal contradictions of late modernity,
1021
 religious 
fundamentalism is attempting to build a new foundation for truth and knowledge 
according to an alternative ―substantive vision for the world.‖1022 On the one hand, 
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some argue that it is modern in its acceptance of modern technologies, sophisticated 
means of communication, and in its reliance on ‗identity counsellors‘ and 
specialists.
1023
 Islamic fundamentalism is anti-traditionalist, a-cultural, and often de-
embedded.
1024
 And on the other, Bauman and Lechner hold that fundamentalism 
escapes ―the agony of the individual condemned to self-sufficiency, self-reliance and 
the life of never fully satisfying and trustworthy choice‖ by relying on an alternative 
form of rationality and by adhering to messages of insufficiency of the individual and 
of complete submission to the Will of God.
1025
 As a result, fundamentalists are no 
longer besieged by the modern existential anxiety: ―They have found the Truth. All 
they seek is a society solidly based on the Truth.‖1026  
Within the field of International Relations, fundamentalism, religious 
terrorism, and the clash of civilisations have attracted most of the scholarly attention 
associated with religion. However, it is important to note that fundamentalism is only 
the tip of an iceberg that is far broader than a simple resistance to modernity or a 
minor anomaly. By focusing solely on radical religious groups, scholars have 
overlooked the fact that besides the fundamentalist minority, a large majority of 
religious women and men are aspiring to create a new space within global modernity. 
The above depiction of the return of religion as a reaction and an act of resistance has 
the unfortunate consequence of turning religion into a coping mechanism, an opiate, 
or a reactive placebo. However, this is only part of the story since religion is also 
resurging as a consequence of ―a profound dissatisfaction with a life encased entirely 
in the immanent order. The sense is that life is empty, flat, devoid of higher 
purpose.‖1027 Anthony Giddens is right to note that fundamentalism is not just an 
antithesis or a side effect of globalised modernity but that it carries with it the 
important message that one cannot live in a disenchanted world where no traces of the 
sacred remain.
1028
 For many, the goal is not to reverse or to reject globalised 
modernity but to make religion more determinative in the shaping of the 21
st
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century.
1029
 Besides fundamentalism, the return of religion is taking place through the 
spread of progressive religious movements. 
Finally, before concluding, I would like to point to one last connection 
between the emergence of the new moral source and religion. The impact of 
globalisation on identity and community formation is largely visible and has now 
been studied for a decade. However, less attention has been paid to the fact that the 
de-centred subjectivity that is emerging possesses strong ‗spiritual traits‘ which 
facilitate the experience of interconnectedness and unity, and opens the door to a 
more mystical experience of reality.
1030
 In I and Thou, Martin Buber argues that when 
man transcends his buffered self and enters into a relation with the ‗other,‘ he enters a 
spiritual form of association.
1031
 Henceforth, by moving away from the sovereign and 
independent individual, the new source of morality opens up a space propitious to the 
formation of spiritual associations and thus to the strengthening of ‗religion.‘ 
Influenced by Buber, Emmanuel Levinas expressly developed this point and argued 
that the ‗other‘ opens up the way to God. Commenting on Levinas‘ philosophy, 
Andrius Valevicius notes that ―it is by way of alterity the the [sic] realm of the divine 
is revealed. The relation with God begins in the relation with other men. Over and 
over, Levinas emphasises the social origin of the human encounter with God.‖1032 
Considering that etymologically, ‗religion‘ is derived from the Latin religare - 
meaning to bind again, to (re-)connect humans in a community and with God, it could 
well be that the emerging source of morality will play a role in the return of religion. 
 
 
6) Conclusion 
 
So far in this chapter, I have outlined the globalising forces at the heart of the 
20
th
 century and I have explained their impact on moral sources, subjectivity, and 
identity. In the first part, I looked at the global dynamics that are leading to a 
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worldwide increase in existential anxiety and ontological insecurity. I argued that 
these socio-cultural trends are generating a backlash and a return towards communal 
arrangements. Second, I looked at the impact of globalisation on moral sources. I 
traced the philosophical shift that led away from the ‗buffered‘ and sovereign ‗self‘ of 
the Enlightenment to a more de-embedded and de-centred conception of identity. The 
process led to the recognition that the ‗self‘ can only exist in relation to the ‗Other.‘ 
The internalisation of the sources of morality went full circle and ended up in their 
‗externalisation.‘ As such, from the modern buffered self, it seems that we could be 
returning to the ‗porous‘ self of the pre-modern and enchanted world.1033 In fact, 
Bauman holds that post-modernity ―brings ‗re-enchantment‘ of the world after the 
protracted and earnest, though in the end inconclusive, modern struggle to dis-enchant 
it.‖1034 Legitimacy has been returned to the mysterious and the inexplicable. Finally, I 
argued that globalisation and the associated societal changes are linked to the 
resurgence of religion and the spread of fundamentalism. 
Steve Bruce recently argued that ―unless we can imagine a reversal of the 
increasing cultural autonomy of the individual, secularization must be seen as 
irreversible.‖1035 In light of the above argument, it does not seem that the cultural 
autonomy of the individual is being fundamentally overturned. Rather, over the last 
decades, the ‗de-secularisation‘ or religious resurgence has corresponded to a by-
product, to a backlash against the corrosive forces of globalisation. Thus, 
globalisation has not shown so far to be a de-secularising force.  
However, the present situation could prove to be the first stage of a more 
complex process. Indeed, fundamentalist movements have reconstructed meaning by 
breaking away ―from the institutions of society, and promis[ing] to rebuild from the 
bottom up, while retrenching themselves in a communal heaven.‖1036 But in a second 
stage, they can potentially move away from resistance and emerge as collective agents 
of social transformation. In face of the crisis of the state, the development of a 
theologically-informed social project is a powerful source of change. Recent attempts 
by governments such as Malaysia to achieve the Islamisation of modernity could be 
the precursor to a more profound cultural movement or at least part of ―a story of 
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continual development and formation, constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity 
of cultural programs of modernity and of distinctively modern institutional patterns, 
of multiple modernities.‖ 1037  The resurgence of religion could be seen as a 
comprehensive attempt to develop non-secular forms of modernity.
1038
 
Now that the most recent transformations in moral sources have been outlined 
and that connections have been drawn with the return of religion, we can focus on the 
second level at which the process of de-secularisation can be observed, namely, in the 
sphere of legitimacy. Therefore, in the second part of the chapter, I deal with the 
contemporary changes in legitimate orders and I sketch the current shift away from 
the ideal of civilisation and the onset of new forms of international legitimacy after 
the Second World War. I explain that the shift is leading to the weakening of 
secularism and to the accentuation of religious concerns. However, I conclude that the 
religious revival is only a by-product of globalisation. 
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B.   Legitimacy After the Two World Wars 
 
 
We no longer believe…like the Greeks, in happiness of life on earth; 
we no longer believe, like the Christians, in happiness in an otherworldly life; 
we no longer believe, like the optimistic philosophers of the last century,  
in a happy future for the human race. 
 
Benedetto Croce 
 
 
In Nationalism and International Society, James Mayall explains that over the 
last centuries the Enlightenment notion of the self played a central role in the 
establishment of the concepts of nationalism and self-determination in the foundation 
of international politics. The ‗discovery‘ of the sovereign subject seized ―the 
imagination of society at large‖ and then influenced the organisation of international 
society.
1039
 Mayall concludes his monograph by stating that at the turn of the 21
st
 
century ―[i]t is difficult to see the lineaments of some more satisfactory principle of 
state legitimisation emerging in the future.‖1040 We should not ―look for our salvation 
to some miraculous or mechanical supersession of the national idea‖ but should 
instead accept the fact that the national principle is likely to remain deeply entrenched 
in the workings of the international society for the foreseeable future.
 1041
 
In light of my account of the transformations of the ‗Enlightenment subject‘ in 
the late 20
th
 century, it seems legitimate to question this conclusion. Thus, we could 
well wonder whether globalising forces and the emergence of the ‗post-modern 
subject‘ are connected to the emergence of a ‗post-national‘ or ‗de-centred‘ legitimate 
order.
 1042
 Since our condition of post-modernity is one in which transformations in 
self-identity and globalisation are inter-related, we could expect to see a decentring of 
power at the international level similar to that which characterises the post-modern 
subject, i.e., interdependence, shift in loyalty towards transnational organisations and 
associations, global institutions, minority nations etc.
1043
 Indeed, it seems that the 
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recent ―emphasis on the decentred subject has had a corrosive influence…on the 
imagined sovereign will of the nation…and the effectiveness of the national state.‖1044 
Knowing that the advent of the state and nationalism was central to the secularisation 
of Europe, its questioning might be connected to the process of de-secularisation.
1045
 
Hence, the second part of this chapter is devoted to the study of the principles 
of legitimacy that are emerging in connection to the post-modern turn and 
globalisation. In the following sections, I address this issue of changes in legitimacy 
by looking at the reconsideration of the civilising international order that had spread 
globally in the wake of the Enlightenment. In particular, I look at the challenges 
mounted against its colonial expression through the ‗revolt against Western 
dominance.‘ This is justified by the fact that the anti-colonial struggle marked ―a sea 
change in international legitimacy.‖1046 As Robert Jackson argues ―[t]here is no better 
place to look for changing norms and assumptions about sovereign statehood, 
therefore, than in the sphere of decolonization.‖ 1047 I argue that the challenge to the 
civilising mission and the revolt against the West heralded a shift in the international 
legal and moral climate that saw the challenge to the secular foundation of the state 
and the resurgence of ethno-religious forms of identities.
1048
 For Scott Thomas, the 
roots of the resurgence of religion, at least in the Third World, are also found in the 
colonial era and the dissolution of colonial empires during the 20
th
 century.
1049
 
 
 
1) The Decline of Civilisation 
 
In the 19
th
 century, the Enlightenment project of civilisation faced a growing 
front of critiques. In opposition to the then new faith in historical progress, many 
thinkers began to cast a shadow of doubt over the West‘s ability to transcend itself 
and to solve its problems through the use of reason, technology, and science. Both 
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Romantic and non-Romantic thinkers began to question the foundation of modernity. 
In their diagnostic of its failures these thinkers came to delineate the coming decline 
of civilisation in Europe.
1050
 Despite the great technological, industrial, and scientific 
discoveries, the creation of incredible wealth, and the increasing freedom from 
material necessity, the ideal of civilisation lost much of its aura of sanctity.
1051
 The 
outbreak of ―The Great War for Civilization‖ exposed the inability of the civilising 
project to tame the predispositions of men and in the 20
th
 century, the ideal of 
progress was ―finally revealed to be a hollow one.‖1052 
The change of mood in Europe and the ‗crisis of modernity‘ were mirrored by 
a sharp fall in the prestige Westerners enjoyed among colonised people. The war had 
destroyed all ideals of moral, spiritual, and racial superiority. And as Freud argued, it 
had become obvious that the Europeans had ―never really rose as high as [they] had 
believed.‖1053 The horror of the trenches and the massacres of millions  
made a mockery of the European conceit that discovery and 
invention were necessarily progressive and beneficial to 
humanity…Years of carnage in the very heartlands of European 
civilization demonstrated that Europeans were at least as susceptible 
to instinctual, irrational responses and primeval drives as the 
peoples they colonized.
1054
 
 
At home and abroad, thinkers concluded that reason and hopes in scientific progress 
were the direct sources of the war. The mechanised slaughter of Europe‘s youth was a 
reminder of how far astray the West had moved away from the spiritual and moral 
ideals of the Enlightenment. The material facet of ‗civilisation‘ had completely 
overwhelmed and replaced the spiritual quest it was meant to foster.
1055
 
The idea quickly spread among Western and Western-educated intellectuals 
that a civilisation guilty of such atrocities could not claim to govern and control the 
fate of the rest of humanity. As a matter of fact, ―[t]he crisis of the West and the 
appalling flaws in Western civilization that it revealed did much to break the 
psychological bondage of the colonized elite…World War I provided myriad 
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openings for the reassertion of colonized cultures.‖1056 In the following decades, the 
anti-colonial discourse unfolded and came to contribute to the revolt against the 
imperialist order. The Great Depression of 1929 and the Second World War only 
strengthened the colonies in their struggle for self-determination. The colonisation of 
numerous countries in the name of racial, moral, and spiritual superiority came to a 
halt and the process was slowly reversed. The crumbling of the civilising mission and 
the downfall of ‗civilisation‘ as the operational basis of the international order marked 
a major revolution in sovereignty comparable to the one that had followed the 
Protestant Reformation.
1057
 
 
 
2) Decolonisation and the Revolt Against the West 
 
With the loss of confidence in the ideal of ‗civilisation‘ and with the growing 
discontent of colonised people, the civilising international legitimate order came 
under increasing challenge. As Hedley Bull argues, ―[a]fter the Second World War a 
revolt against Western dominance – a revolt which had been growing in strength 
earlier in the century, and whose roots lay late in the last century – became powerful 
enough to shake the system.‖ 1058  The revolt was reformist in essence and never 
challenged international society itself. It was mostly directed to those rules that had 
been made by, but also for, the European states and that had come to apply to all units 
of the expanded international society.
1059
 Amongst the demands of colonised people, 
five themes were predominant: equal sovereignty, formal political independence, 
racial equality, economic justice, and cultural liberation.
1060
 
Three ‗waves of revolt‘ can be identified at the heart of this revolt against 
Western dominance.
1061
 First, the anti-colonial struggle for independence and equal 
sovereignty from the 1930s until the 1960s; second, the struggle against neo-colonial 
and indirect domination in the form of economic injustice from the 1960s to the 1980s; 
and third, the ―protest against the intellectual and cultural ascendency of the West‖ 
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and for liberation ―in matters of the spirit of the mind.‖ 1062  By the end of the 
decolonisation process, Third World countries had accomplished most of their 
objectives including independence and sovereign equality.
1063
  
During their colonial struggle, speaking as ―suppliants in a world in which the 
Western powers were still in a dominant position,‖ Third World countries had taken 
―Western moral premises as their point of departure.‖ 1064  In turn, they were 
encouraged to justify their demands ―in terms of constitutions, charters of rights and 
international conventions of which the Western powers were the principal authors; the 
moral appeal had to be cast in the terms that would have most resonance in Western 
societies.‖1065 Paradoxically enough, by adopting European ideas of nationhood and 
self-determination, ex-colonies were brought ―into the orthodox system of diplomacy 
and statehood.‖1066 However,  
as Asian, African and other non-Western peoples have become 
stronger relative to the Western powers, as they have come to 
depend less on demonstrating conformity with the ideas of their 
former masters, and as the Westernized leaders of the early years of 
independence have been replaced in many countries by new leaders 
more representative of local or indigenous forces, Third World 
spokesmen have become freer to adopt a different rhetoric that sets 
Western values aside, or at least places different interpretations 
upon them.
1067
  
 
Strengthened by the failure of secular ideologies such as Marxism or nationalism as 
well as by the disappointments of economic development, this psychological and 
spiritual awakening of non-Western countries has led an increasing number of Third 
World states to replace their project to modernise with attempts to ‗indigenise‘ 
modernity.
1068
  
Leaders have begun to look at their past to find the right guidelines for the 
recovery of the lost autonomy and success. They have tried to re-affirm, amongst 
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other things, ―traditional religious beliefs as ultimate norm-setting principles of 
identity and culture.‖1069 In the case of the Middle East, ―since the glory of the past is 
forever associated with Islam, it is the road back to the Koran that is being fervently 
sought not only in the Near East but throughout the commonwealth of c. 600million 
believers.‖1070  
Nowadays, the idea of cultural liberation from ―the intellectual or spiritual 
suzerainty of the West‖ is closely connected to globalisation and to the resurgence of 
religion.
1071
 Unlike the previous revolts of the mid-20
th
 century, this third wave does 
not so much draw on Enlightenment and Western ideas of self-determination, 
sovereignty, and international law as on traditional values which are not necessarily 
compatible with the moral ideals of the West.
1072
 As Bassam Tibi argues in the case of 
Islamic fundamentalism, this new revolt is ―directed against Western norms and 
values.‖ 1073  By ―drawing upon homegrown values to ward off the West… 
[fundamentalism] is nothing short of an effort to de-center the West; it mobilizes anti-
Western attitudes and prejudices while developing alternative worldviews.‖ 1074  In 
opposition to the anti-colonial revolt, Islamic fundamentalism advocates a major 
change in forms of legitimacy and pushes for the acceptance of a new ‗ideology of 
order‘ based on a theo-centric universalism as opposed to secular national 
sovereignty.
1075
 Of course, this fundamentalist challenge remains the work of a 
minority and overall the rules and norms of the Western international system remain 
widely accepted. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that various 
international actors have recently attempted to re-direct and reshape the international 
society and that their demands need to be addressed.
1076
 Now that the challenge to the 
civilising order and the psychological and spiritual awakening of non-Western 
countries have been outlined, I turn to the ensuing shift in legitimate order post-1945. 
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This will allow me to assess the reality of the de-secularisation process in the realm of 
international legitimacy. 
 
 
3) Beyond Civilisation, Human Rights and Self-Determination 
 
During the 20
th
 century, and as a result of the decolonisation process, there 
occurred a profound transformation of the international normative atmosphere marked 
by the reconsideration of the civilising legitimate order and its adaptation to the post-
colonial reality. According to the orthodox positivist view, the ideal of civilisation 
was replaced by that of self-determination and equal sovereignty. Effectively, changes 
in legitimacy meant that a ―contemporary global system of ‗sovereign‘ states has 
emerged out of an earlier Eurocentric system of ‗civilized‘ and before that ‗Christian‘ 
states.‖ 1077  This transformation being fundamental for the architecture of the 
international order, it deserves to be further scrutinised.  
In The Moral Purpose of the State, Christian Reus-Smit explains that ―[u]nless 
embedded within a wider complex of higher-order values, the principle of sovereignty 
cannot alone provide the state with a coherent social identity.‖1078 For sovereignty to 
have any substance, it must necessarily embody deeper meta-values, i.e., the moral 
purpose of the state.
1079
 As such, while positivists are essentially right in their 
emphasis on the continuity of the states-system and on the transformation of the 
Christian system into a civilising order, I believe that their focus on sovereignty is 
incomplete since it fails to embody any such meta-values and to fully grasp the 
substantive nature of the emerging normative context.  
In turn, some scholars have claimed that civilising ideals remain very much 
alive underneath the superficial adherence to the ‗sovereign‘ order. As Jackson 
explains, ―[e]ven though ‗sovereign state‘ has replaced ‗civilized state‘ the idea of 
‗civilization‘ has not been and cannot be abandoned...The old ‗standard of 
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civilization‘ still exists, but is expressed differently today.‖1080 For example, Gerrit 
Gong, David Fidler, Edward Keene, and Jack Donelly argue that the standard remains 
present in the notions of human rights, non-discrimination, development, 
liberalisation of markets, or good governance.
1081
 However, this interpretation of the 
return to the standard of civilisation in the guise of a ‗standard of human rights,‘ a 
‗standard of non-discrimination,‘ or a ‗standard of democracy,‘ though essentially 
correct, over-emphasises the necessary continuity between legitimate orders.  
Instead, it seems that out of the rethinking of the ‗standard of civilisation‘ have 
(re-)emerged two sets of legitimating principles: ideas of national self-determination 
and cosmopolitan ideas of humanity and human rights. As Roland Robertson noted  
The standard of ‗civilization‘ reached its zenith during the 1920s as 
an essentially regulative principle concerning inter-state relations. 
Two things need to be said immediately about its demise. First, the 
standard appears to have been modified into the principle of national 
self-determination…Second, the emergence of the relatively 
autonomous principles of humanity, human rights and so on can be 
traced to the period when the standard of civilization was in its most 
explicit phase in the early years of this century.
1082
 
 
Ian Clark concurs that these ideals of (democratic) self-determination and human 
rights have been ―important bedrocks of post-1945 international society as a 
whole.‖1083 
As mentioned in the previous section, the idea of national self-determination 
was enthusiastically embraced by newly-independent countries and corresponds to a 
large extent to the shift from civilised to sovereign statehood mapped out by orthodox 
positivists. However, Bull remarked that  
the norms proclaimed by the political organs of the United Nations 
represent a profound change that has taken place in our legal and 
moral thinking about matters of international relations, in great 
contrast to the orthodoxies that were accepted on these matters only 
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a few decades ago, and strengthening the assault on the old 
order.
1084
 
 
Besides self-determination, a ―Kantian image of a cosmopolitan world society…has 
made considerable headway in recent decades.‖ 1085  In a dramatic break with the 
civilised order, ―the post-World War II order was explicitly built upon the normative 
foundation of human dignity and human rights.‖1086 Cosmopolitan ideals and liberal 
values gained greater recognition with an ―emerging sense of a world common good‖ 
and ―the growth of a cosmopolitan moral awareness.‖1087 As Andrew Hurrell rightly 
noted, this transformation has seen the increase in concern with issues of human 
suffering and the consolidation of a stable normative structure based on a shared 
culture, language, and vocabulary of human rights.
1088
  
While the institution of a cosmopolitan order is clearly not on the agenda or 
even close to being realised, the normative movement must be taken seriously to the 
extent that it seems to be part of broader socio-cultural transformations.
1089
 It is true 
that the ‗community of mankind‘ is only a moral vision and ―that we are still living in 
a political world in which states continue to be the primary normative units and 
referents.‖1090 But this does not mean that the aims and values that inform the system 
remain immobile. The lasting presence of states worldwide should not keep us from 
considering the socio-cultural trends at play nowadays and the ‗real change‘ that has 
―taken place in the normative structure of international society.‖1091  
This transformation at the level of legitimacy is very much connected to what 
Richard Falk calls the ‗Grotian Moment.‘ According to Falk, we are witnessing ―a 
reversal of the shift completed in the middle of the seventeenth century, by which 
time Medieval Europe had given way to the modern state system.‖1092 The current 
‗Grotian Moment,‘ he explains, corresponds to this gradual transition in world order 
systems away from statist arrangements and back towards non-territorial central 
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guidance and supranationalism.
1093
 The Princeton professor notes that there is a 
normative tension between: (1) a long-standing and waning state-centred form of 
politics premised on sovereign consent (Westphalian conception) and (2) an emerging 
and still vague form of politics centred on the community and premised on the 
existence of a unified mankind (UN Charter conception). Or in other words, the 
current situation is characterised by the emergence of ‗community-oriented‘ forms of 
authority at the expense of ‗sovereignty-oriented‘ ones.1094  
The reality of this Grotian Moment has been criticised by many scholars but 
what is certain is that the contemporary transformations in the sphere of legitimacy do 
not point to the unfolding of a de-secularisation process and it is now possible to 
conclude that a reversal of legitimate order in a religious direction is unlikely. To the 
extent that the onset of a neo-medieval ‗system of overlapping sovereignties and 
multiple loyalties‘ is taking place, it is modern and secular.1095  These changes in 
international legitimacy are not challenging the secular foundation of international 
politics since principles of human rights and self-determination remain mostly within 
a liberal political framework. In this context, it is more likely that the renewed vigour 
of religious movements also corresponds to a by-product of these changes that have 
taken place in the realm of legitimacy. In the following section, I return to the process 
of globalisation and to its implications regarding the legitimacy of state sovereignty. 
Because the state has been a major secularising force in history, the study of its 
questioning in recent decades may yield important insights concerning the current 
religio-cultural trends. It is only in the final section of this chapter that I will connect 
the above changes in legitimate order to the resurgence of religion. There has been a 
tendency to assume that secular ideologies such as nationalism would flourish as part 
of the Grotian Moment but most unexpectedly religious transnational movements 
have also spread. 
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4) Globalisation, the State, and Secularism 
 
The impact of globalisation on the international order has been widely debated 
from the 1990s onwards. In particular, the fate of the state has been a matter of 
concern for students of international relations. Numerous commentators have argued 
that as space and time are contracting, the territorial dimension of states is being 
challenged, thereby giving way to supra-territoriality. Sovereignty defined as the 
exercise of ultimate, absolute, and singular control over a country and its territory is 
no longer dominant both in practice and ideationally.
1096
 On the one hand, economic, 
financial, and commercial fluxes are transcending the boundaries of all states and thus 
profoundly questioning their sovereignty – at least commercially and economically. 
And on the other, the spread of shared identities through transnational networks is 
loosening the affective loyalty required for the exercise of sovereignty and hence 
facilitating claims to self-determination by sub-national and supra-national groups.
1097
 
Likewise, global issues such as ecological crises or genocides are increasingly holding 
greater value than state sovereignty in the eyes of many.
1098
 Overall, the pervasiveness 
of globalisation means that the ‗essential nature of the state itself‘ is being 
transformed.
1099
  
 Numerous scholars have explained the ways in which the revolution in 
information technology and the changes in consciousness are undermining the 
sovereign statehood inherited from Westphalia. In The End of Sovereignty? Joseph 
Camilleri and Jim Falk have demonstrated that the new post-modern perspectives, 
along with the rapid structural changes brought about by globalisation, have resulted 
in a major shift that has had ―significant implications for the enduring legitimacy 
of…the sovereign nation-state.‖ 1100  Indeed, as the result of cultural changes the 
political space is being redefined and civil society is being reconceptualised. Central 
to this gradual transition towards a new polity are two tendencies: ―the reassertion of 
cultural identity and acceptance of cultural pluralism as an organizing principle of 
national and international life…Particularism and globalism are likely to flourish side 
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by side in uneasy coexistence.‖1101 On the one hand, there is a movement towards the 
self-determination of nations which strengthens the state-system but also facilitates 
the formation of local communities based on tradition, religion, and indigenous 
identities.
1102
 And on the other hand, one can see signs of the emergence of a ‗thicker‘ 
international society based on a universal and democratic community of mankind and 
on a global consciousness that looks at ―the world as a whole.‖1103  
The issue is hotly contested but most authors agree that states are gradually 
being consigned to an intermediate role in the midst of increasingly powerful local, 
regional, transnational, and global actors. While claims of the retreat, expropriation, 
or extinction of the state are clearly over-stated, it is true that governance is becoming 
less territorial, more multi-layered, and that sovereignty is acquiring different 
dynamics and underpinnings.
1104
 States remain central, but their role is evolving and 
sovereignty is transforming.
1105
 Andrew Linklater has demonstrated that as a result of 
globalisation and cultural liberation, amongst other factors, political communities are 
undergoing transformations in a post-Westphalian direction.
1106
 Likewise, Georg 
Sørensen outlines the emergence of a postmodern state ‗sandwiched‘ in a system of 
multi-level governance in which collective identities and loyalties are increasingly 
projected beyond the state - onto local, transnational, international, trans-
governmental, or supranational actors.
1107
  
Whether a post-Westphalian order is emerging is a matter of debate but what 
seems definite is that under conditions of globalisation, loyalty and legitimacy are 
shifting away from nation-states in two directions, ―toward the center of the globe and 
toward the local realities of community and sentiment.‖ 1108  In such a context, 
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knowing that the state has been the repository and cornerstone of international 
secularism since the Treaty of Westphalia, it is important to look at the impact the 
current dynamics may have had on the secular foundation of international politics. 
Indeed, the religious resurgence seems to be directly connected to the ―exhaustion of 
the creative capacity of the secular sensibility, especially as it is embodied in the 
political domain.‖1109  
In Religion and Humane Global Governance Falk explains that the rise to 
prominence of secular forms of polities was directly connected to the birth of the state 
and to the shattering of the central guidance of the papal Church and that ever since, 
the ‗secular‘ has remained closely tied to the state. Therefore, in an age in which ―the 
secular imagination is dependent upon the problem-solving capacities of the state,‖ he 
concludes that the questioning of the state is facilitating the return of religion.
1110
 For 
example, the secular tradition at the heart of the French state is coming under 
increasing challenge from a variety of international organisations. As state 
sovereignty is devolved or delegated, French laïcité is being questioned by the 
European Union, transnational groups, minorities, various states, etc.
1111
 While France 
clearly remains sovereign in this respect, it is undeniable that pressure is mounting as 
can be witnessed in the recent issue of the headscarf, the establishment of the Conseil 
Français du Culte Musulman, the call of its president for a moratorium on the 1905 
law on the separation of church and state, Nicolas Sarkozy‘s numerous speeches on 
religion in Rome, Ryad, and Paris, or the recognition of the degrees delivered by the 
Vatican. 
Secularism can also be weakened by the erosion of state loyalty in favour of 
various transnational allegiances. To accommodate migrant populations, secular 
countries are growing increasingly sensitive to religion and are sometimes adapting 
their secularism as is attested by the establishment of Sharia tribunals in Great Britain. 
State-based secularism is also challenged by the growing legitimacy of supra-national 
institutions. For example, the policies pursued by Turkey‘s secularist elites and the 
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restrictions they have imposed on Islamist movements are considered by many to be 
even greater impediments to the country‘s membership to the European Union than 
Islamism.
1112
  
Finally, besides these indirect connections between globalisation, the loss of 
influence of state-based secularism, and the resurgence of religion, the changes in 
legitimate orders underway are paving the way for the return of faith on two 
additional counts. In the last section of this chapter, I look at the connection between 
globalisation, decolonisation, and the return to traditional collective identities. I argue 
that by displacing legitimacy to various supra-national and local groups, globalisation 
is participating in the religious revival by creating spaces for alternative forms of 
modernities. 
 
 
5) Globalisation and the Return of the Sacred 
 
In the political sphere, it is widely accepted that the religious revival came as a 
reaction to the failures of the civilising order imposed by colonial powers and of the 
secular states in Third World countries – i.e., one phase of the revolt against the 
West.
1113
 The erosive and corrosive nature of modernity ―generates feelings of 
alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and leads to 
crises of identity to which religion provides an answer.‖1114 As ―a global myth capable 
of providing a foundation for the construction of an identity,‖ religion can assume 
―the cultural form of resistance to the instrumental rationality of the apparatus of 
domination.‖1115 It has become usual to argue that religion offers powerful solutions 
to the challenges of modernity and to the concomitant destructions of communities 
and traditional meaning systems. In our globalising world, one can see pervasive 
efforts to retrieve indigenous identities and ―to reach back in cultural history past the 
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experiences of modernity and forward beyond the constraints of nationalism, statism, 
and a Western conception of progress and fulfilment.‖1116  
But besides this view of the revival as a reaction to modernity and to the 
compression of the inter-societal system, it seems that the resurgence is also fostered 
by the rise of supra-territoriality.
1117
 In The Declining World Order, Falk argues that 
under the impulse of globalisation the international sphere is the theatre of a twofold 
movement  
a nostalgic return to small local communities premised on high 
degrees of integration, perhaps epitomized by premodern images of 
self-determination and social cohesion affirmed by many 
representatives of indigenous or traditional peoples; and an 
evolution toward encompassing functional communities that were 
premised on low degrees of integration, but looked toward the 
emergence of a planetary polity in some form that sustained peace 
and stability.
1118
 
 
And I believe that the sources of the religious revival are also to be found in the 
second part of this movement. Besides resistance to modernity, the religious 
revivalism seems to be encouraged by ―expectation of identity declaration‖ built into 
globalised and cosmopolitan forms of organisation.
1119
  
As Robertson and Chirico argue, universalistic tendencies and the realisation 
of the global-human condition through new forms of supra-nationalism seem to 
―accentuate or at least open-up religious or quasi-religious concerns.‖ 1120  The 
implications of globalisation for both ―the legitimacy of the world order of societies 
and the meaning of what mankind ‗really is,‘‖ raise questions and issues of a religious 
nature at the global level.
1121
 As a result, ―religious movements arise in reference to 
the issue of defining societies in relationship to the rest of the world.‖1122 The net 
effects of the global integration and of the return to cultural memory, Tibi argues, 
―underlie the rise of religious fundamentalisms worldwide.‖1123  
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Ultimately, the combination of resistance to secular modernity and this 
opening of telic concerns paves the way for the development of multiple modernities. 
For Eisenstadt, the increased global interconnectedness and the restructuration of the 
nation-state model are ―allowing for new interpretations of the cultural programme of 
modernity as it has developed in Western Europe‖ and are thus facilitating the 
emergence of fundamentalist and communal-religious movements.
1124
As Willfried 
Spohn argues, ―the contemporary global rise of nationalism and religion…[is] a 
reaction to the previous authoritarian imposition of the Western European model of 
state secularism.‖1125 And through this global attempt to refashion the secular and 
redraw its boundaries, religion is resurging.
1126
 
Overall, the globalisation is facilitating the return of religion in various ways. 
But besides the reaction to modernity, the response to colonial imperialism, and the 
challenge to state-based secularism, it does not seem that the emerging order 
possesses an inherently religious dimension. The religious revival corresponds to a 
by-product of global and local circumstances rather than the result of a comprehensive 
shift towards faith-based structures of consciousness. Nevertheless, despite the 
absence of a fundamental and profound process of de-secularisation, globalisation and 
the revolt against the West are questioning the very nature of the international order. 
The current wave of cultural liberation is highlighting the limits of the secular 
international architecture, thereby calling forth the transformation of international 
relations in a post-secular direction. 
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Conclusion: 
 
Man‘s extremity is God‘s opportunity 
 
 
During the 20
th
 century, scholars of structures of consciousness predicted the 
onset of a major period of socio-cultural upheaval and the return of religion. The aim 
of this chapter was thus to assess the possibility of a process of ‗de-secularisation‘ in 
the 21
st
 century and to consider its potential implications for the secular foundation of 
international politics. I proceeded in accordance with the theoretical framework 
developed in chapter three and focused my attention on the most recent 
transformations in moral sources and structures of legitimacy.  
In the first part of the chapter, I argued that processes of globalisation are 
challenging the modern moral sources and facilitating the emergence of a new sense 
of identity propitious to the return of religion. In the late 20
th
 century, Sartre, Buber, 
and others moved beyond the Book of Reason by demonstrating that man can only 
exist in relation to his environment. In opposition to the conception of the self as a 
sovereign and buffered individual endowed of reason, social theorists from diverse 
traditions de-centred the subject and demonstrated the fluidity and instability of 
subjectivity. In the international sphere, I explained that the existential anxiety and 
ontological insecurity associated with this post-modern turn are related to a renewed 
interest in communal resistance and more specifically to the religious revival.
1127
 I 
concluded that the changes outlined by Nelson and Sorokin are not taking place and 
that the return of religion has only been, up until now, a by-product and a reaction to 
globalising forces. However, the situation could change in the near future with 
religion playing a greater role in the development of alternative forms of modernity.  
In the second part of the chapter, I focused on the second level at which the 
process of de-secularisation should be observed if it were to take place, namely, the 
level of legitimacy. I dealt with the contemporary changes in legitimate orders and I 
sketched out the shift away from civilisation and towards notions of self-
determination and human rights after the Second World War. I explained that the 
emerging legitimate order is not inherently religious and that under the impulse of 
globalising forces, the religious resurgence springs from the shift in loyalty and 
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legitimacy away from nation-states up towards supra-national institutions and down 
toward local communities and traditional bonds. I argued that the shift is leading to 
the weakening of state secularism, to the accentuation of religious concerns, and to the 
emergence of multiple modernities.  
Already at the beginning of the century, Max Weber was wondering whether 
―entirely new prophets or a mighty rebirth of ancient ideas‖ would come out of the 
iron cage of modern civilisation; or whether it would ultimately decline and disappear 
when ―the last ton of fossil fuel has burnt to ashes.‖1128 In this new century, the 
prophetic words with which Weber concluded the Protestant Ethic could not be more 
relevant. In light of the argument developed in this chapter, the issue remains 
essentially undecided. Identities and groups based on religion are resisting global 
forces all around the planet. But if the resurgence of religion is to become a defining 
trait in the 21
st
 century, the key issue becomes the development of comprehensive 
ethics of conviction to achieve the transformation of social structures. And so far this 
has only taken place to a very limited extent through localised attempts to re-
Christianise or re-Islamise selected sectors of societies. Nevertheless, even though a 
process of de-secularisation is only happening in a restricted sense, it is important to 
note that the revolt against Western dominance is calling for the reform of 
international arrangements in a post-secular direction. 
Now that the processes of secularisation and de-secularisation have been 
explored up until the 21
st
 century, it is possible to conclude the thesis by answering 
the two research questions set in the introduction. In the following chapter, I begin by 
summarising the argument developed throughout the thesis regarding the impact of 
secularisation on the secular foundation of international politics (first research 
question). Then, in light of the theological roots and nature of contemporary politics 
and because of the renewed influence of religion in world politics, I argue that the 
secular foundation of international relations cannot be sustained post 9/11 (second 
research question). Since secularism is neither objective nor neutral, the international 
order it legitimises is no longer warranted. Instead, if International Politics is to 
account for the continued existence of religion within modernity, it must reconsider its 
secularism. For the sake of pluralism, International Relations must open itself to a 
post-secular dialogue with religion. 
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8. Conclusion: Towards 
Post-Secular Pluralism 
 
 
 
 
‗Occidental Rationalism‘ now appears to be the actual deviation. 
 
Jürgen Habermas 
 
 
During the 20
th
 century, the global resurgence of religion came as a great 
surprise because of the widespread acceptance, amongst Western elites, of the 
secularisation and modernisation theses. In particular, this return flew in the face of a 
Westphalian system which upheld secular politics as the most peaceful, stable, and 
universal foundation for international relations. The aim of this thesis has thus been to 
interrogate the secular dimension of the contemporary foundation of international 
politics as well as the avowed secularism of the field. It has been about reconsidering, 
in light of the return of religion, the beliefs and assumptions that shape IR‘s historical 
foresight so that the discipline may transcend its ‗own theoretical captivities‘ and 
develop more adequate ‗horizons of expectations.‘1129  
The thesis was framed by the following two research questions: (1) What has 
been the impact of the secularisation process on the foundation of international 
politics? (2) Is the contemporary foundation sustainable in the 21
st
 century? In the 
previous chapters, I answered the first question by exposing the theological origins 
and character of the ideas, beliefs, and assumptions that have lain at the foundation of 
the so-called ‗secular‘ project. In turn, the argument has highlighted the fact that 
secularism‘s overconfidence in its own neutrality and objectivity may be a threat to 
the preservation of peace and security.  
Therefore, the aim of this last chapter is to answer the second research 
question and to assess the adequacy and sustainability of the secular order in the 21
st
 
century. In the first section, I summarise the findings of the previous chapters and I 
argue that, broadly speaking, the project to bring about peace and security by 
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excluding religion from international relations is oblivious to its own theological 
character and indifferent to the current cultural trends.  
In the second section, I consider the implications of this conclusion for the 
secularist heritage at the core of the current pluralist international order. Debates over 
the nature and historical development of the world order have been central to the field 
of International Relations and in particular to the English School. And nowadays, it is 
broadly accepted that we live in a mostly pluralist society of states in which the 
minimalist arrangements in place allow states to pursue freely and independently their 
chosen goals without fear for their territorial integrity or sovereignty.
1130
 As the most 
representative and explicit outline of the secularist assumptions at the heart of 
pluralism and of much theorising in IR, Robert Jackson‘s Global Covenant is the 
starting point for our discussion. While the Boston professor remains convinced of 
their contemporary relevance, I explain that the secularist postulates embedded within 
the global covenant are compromising the pluralist attempt to serve as ―a bridge 
between the diverse cultures and civilizations of the contemporary world.‖ 1131 
Therefore, what is required is to reconsider the way IR, and more specifically 
pluralism, relates to religion with a view to strengthening political independence and 
international freedom and to forestalling value conflicts.  
Finally, in the last section of this conclusion, I explain that in the interest of 
peace and security pluralism should exchange its secularism for a ‗post-secular‘ 
dialogue with religion.
1132
 After all, secularism is not essential to the international 
pluralist architecture and it is unlikely that the ‗rehabilitation‘ of religion would 
jeopardise the international order as proponents of the Westphalian mythology have it. 
On the contrary, I argue that a post-secular dialogue with religion can be integrated 
within the current ethics of statecraft to facilitate peaceful coexistence. Ultimately, the 
consequences of this transformation depend on the outcome of the post-secular 
dialogue.  
 
* * * * * 
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Throughout this thesis, I demonstrated that the process of secularisation and 
the rationalising forces of modernity resulted in (1) the decline of faith as a structuring 
mode of thought in favour of reason-based structures of consciousness, to (2) the shift 
in moral sources from God to Man, to (3) the shift in the legitimating principle of 
authority from supernatural to immanent and rational belief systems, to (4) the 
differentiation and separation of Church and State and the transfer of property and 
functions from the former to the latter. And more precisely, I argued that 
secularisation and the corresponding shifts in structures of consciousness, moral 
sources, and legitimate orders took place in three steps during the seminal periods of 
the 12
th
 century Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment.  
First of all, the medieval attempt to secure access to God and His design led to 
the rationalisation of theology and to the separation of grace and nature from the 12
th
 
century onwards. As a result, the differentiation of the sphere of politics from 
Christianity was established and the secular realm came to enjoy mounting prestige 
and influence in earthly affairs, at least intellectually. The socio-cultural context 
remained predominantly religious but gradually came to legitimise a more secular 
foundation for authority. 
 In turn, the ‗moral field‘ or ‗immanent frame‘ that emerged provided secular 
rulers with the means and tools for the usurpation of the Church‘s monopoly over the 
supernatural realm.
1133
 The pope‘s Petrine powers and role as God‘s vicegerent on 
earth were transferred to secular rulers and both state and nation became the new 
rocks on which God‘s kingdom was to be built. With the 12th century Renaissance, 
but especially with the Protestant Reformation, the principles legitimating the 
authority of the Church came under challenge and were slowly replaced by new 
principles favourable to the empowerment of secular rulers. In this, Lutheranism 
played a significant role by lending legitimacy to kings and princes from within the 
‗sacred‘ core of Christianity. As such, ―it is a mistake to imagine that modernity is in 
its origins and at its core atheistic, antireligious, or even agnostic…from the very 
beginning modernity sought not to eliminate religion but to support and develop a 
new view of religion and its place in human life.‖1134 Indeed, the emergence of the 
contemporary secular foundation of politics was initially a religious project that was 
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inspired, legitimised, and sacralised by religion, and was overall enabled by religious 
actors.  
Secondly, secular forces began a process of modelling and translation of the 
Christian liturgy, eschatology, soteriology, and theology into political and immanent 
discourses and doctrines. As Leo Strauss puts it, the ‗secularization‘ of theological 
concepts corresponded to ―an adaptation of traditional theology to the intellectual 
climate produced by modern philosophy or science both natural and political.‖1135 
Whether one looks at the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, or 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one sees obvious similarities between their secular liturgies 
and the various Biblical myths and stories. This second step in the secularisation of 
Europe was marked by the development of a political liturgy and soteriology to 
replace that of the Church. The religious character of the new worship resulted from 
the transfer of all divine attributes from God to the secular world and was framed 
using very traditional forms of Christian devotion. The main difference was in their 
respective foundation, the ascending theme of government and immanence for the 
former, and the descending theme and transcendence for the latter. Also, it is as a 
consequence of this process of modelling and translation that the boundaries of the 
religious sphere were redrawn. Following the sacralisation of the political realm, 
religion was redefined, privatised, and rationalised.  
Thirdly, unable to free themselves from their mythopoeic urge humans 
engaged in a ‗god-building‘ enterprise and re-enchanted the world on a secular basis 
(i.e., Weber‘s notion of disenchantment). 1136  In the 17th and 18th centuries, the 
immanentisation of the Christian eschatology was radicalised. The material world 
became the arena in which redemption could be achieved and reason became the 
faculty through which justification could be realised. By striving tirelessly towards 
progress and civilisation, rational men could transcend all boundaries set by traditions, 
religion, and nature – including death – and achieve a state of eternal peace and 
harmony here on earth. The newly translated secular dogmas were ultimately emptied 
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of their original sacred content, resulting in the establishment of a hollowed secular 
project. Being ―composed out of rearranged fragments of religious discourse,‖ 
modern politics thus corresponds to ―a chapter in the history of religion.‖1137 Contrary 
to the common wisdom, secularisation did not put an end to superstitions but enacted 
a ―theological discourse in its own right.‖1138 Overall, this means that the ―supposedly 
‗secular‘ political theory is really theology in disguise,‖ though of a secular type.1139 
Generations of thinkers have argued that the function of religion has 
traditionally been to reconcile men with their fate and the unpredictable forces of 
nature. And thus, it is generally understood that religion is an illusion or an opiate 
which claims to fulfil human wishes and hopes according to revelation ―while 
disregarding its relations to reality.‖1140 However, these scholars were well aware that 
were religion to be rejected or displaced, a new system of meaning and teachings 
would soon emerge to fulfil the same psychological function. Hence, in light of the 
argument developed in this thesis, it could well be that following the collapse of the 
Christian order, secularism developed as a substitute to religion. And like its 
predecessor, secularism seems to be motivated by some form of wish-fulfilment at 
odds with the empirical evidence. In particular, the secularist attempt to bring about 
peace and security by excluding religion from international relations is essentially 
blind to its own religious nature and ignores the residual character of religion. 
Now that the theological origins and character of the ideas, beliefs, and 
assumptions that have lain at the foundation of the so-called ‗secular‘ project have 
been ascertained, it is necessary to consider the implications of the argument for the 
pluralist foundation of the international order. In the remainder of the conclusion, I 
answer the second research question and assess the adequacy and sustainability of the 
secularism of the current pluralist order. First of all, I outline the main secularist 
postulates as embedded in Jackson‘s account of pluralism and then I argue that they 
contradict the essence of the pluralist project. I argue that what is required is to 
reconsider the way IR relates to religion with a view to strengthening political 
independence and international freedom. Again, my focus on Jackson is solely 
motivated by the fact that his pluralist project embodies most explicitly and 
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emblematically that set of secularist assumptions that has been taken for granted by 
most IR scholars. The specifics of his political project are not under discussion here. 
In the final section of this conclusion, I explain that in the interest of peace and 
security pluralism should exchange its secularism for the establishment of a ‗post-
secular‘ dialogue with religion. In particular, what is needed is the development of a 
post-secular ‗common language‘ that could put an end to ―the disastrously speechless 
collision of worlds‖ that characterised events such as 9/11.1141 While this could be 
integrated to the current pluralist order, we should leave the door open to more 
fundamental transformations. The terms of the dialogue should not foreclose the 
outcome of the debate. Ultimately, the implications of this transformation for 
pluralism depend on the outcome of the post-secular dialogue. 
 
* * * * * 
 
In The Global Covenant, Jackson explains that following the Thirty Years War, 
a secular pluralist order was established ―to forestall hostilities and collisions between 
different political groups over issues of values.‖1142 Because international relations 
could not ―be constructed on muddle or confusion or misunderstanding or deep 
mistrust,‖ statespeople were asked ―to rise above their own particular civilizations or 
cultures.‖1143 Accordingly, values that ‗properly belonged‘ to the domestic jurisdiction 
of states were nationalised, privatised, and tamed and international arrangements were 
set up to allow states to pursue freely and independently their chosen goals without 
threatening the sovereignty or integrity of their neighbours. Because they had ―no 
place in international society,‖ political religions, political ideologies, and religious 
creeds were excluded from these international arrangements. In this regard, and 
despite the fact that sovereigns retained their religious commitments, Westphalia 
marked the secularisation of the international society of states.
1144
  
In the 21
st
 century, Jackson explains that ‗however inadequate it may be‘ the 
secular pluralist political framework currently in place ―is the one political-legal 
framework that can transcend all the manifold differences between the countries of 
the world, can accommodate their various belief systems and domestic ways of life, 
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and can serve as a normative basis for their coexistence and co-operation.‖1145 By 
teaching virtues of tolerance and self-restraint in opposition to religion‘s history of 
persecution and struggles for moral superiority, state-based secular politics provides 
the only sustainable and viable source of order.
1146
  
However, with the return of religion, a growing number of voices are rejecting 
this claim. In opposition to IR‘s assumptions, they denounce its secular character as a 
specifically Christian achievement and its imposition on the non-Western world as 
―an explicitly religious action as narrowly sectarian as anything attempted by its 
nonsecular opponents.‖1147 Unaware of their own theoretical captivities, proponents of 
secularism defend an order whose historical foresight and nature are questionable. Far 
from having risen above civilisational parochialism, the contemporary foundation of 
international relations has a theological character and is creating frictions and tensions 
across boundaries (the European Union and Turkey, the USA and Iran, political Islam, 
the US attempt to impose a secular constitution to Iraq…).1148 For a legal-political 
framework that prides itself with being able to ―transcend all the manifold differences 
between the countries of the world‖ and that ―can serve as a normative basis for their 
coexistence and co-operation‖ this is rather inopportune and most ironical.1149  
The pluralist project is thus compromised by its own secularist heritage. But 
this does not have to be so. Despite their historical connections, pluralism and 
secularism are essentially separate and different. Effectively, the global covenant is 
not about secularism: ―It is about freedom; it is about political independence. Freedom 
is not the same as [secularism].‖1150 While secularism may have been a source of 
freedom and independence against an all powerful Church in the 16
th
 century, it has 
become a source of misunderstandings, inequalities, and disputes in the present 
context.
1151
 Conversely, while religion has been a source of oppression in the past, it 
                                                 
1145
 Ibid., p.366.  
1146
 Ibid., p.182, 366, 67. 
1147
 Johnston, "Religion and Culture: Human Dimensions of Globalization," p.669. Lewis, What Went 
Wrong? , p.116. Euben, Enemy in the Mirror. 
1148
 In particular, the theological roots and character of the contemporary order turn the conflict 
between the secular West‘s and different religions into Wars of Religion. Andrew Sullivan, "This Is a 
Religious War," The New York Times, October 7 2001. 
1149
 Jackson, The Global Covenant p.366. 
1150
 Ibid., p.410. 
1151
 Alessandro Ferrara, "The Separation of Religion and Politics in a Post-Secular Society," 
Philosophy and Social Criticism 35, no. 1-2 (2009). 
Chapter 8: Conclusion, Towards Post-Secular Pluralism 
 - 253 - 
is not necessarily opposed to freedom.
1152
 And in the 21
st
 century, ―[i]t would be 
dangerously myopic to focus one‘s attention on the danger that religion poses to the 
polity while ignoring the equal or greater danger posed by secular causes.‖1153 As a 
consequence, if pluralism is to genuinely recognise the variety of moral universes and 
to foster unity in diversity, it must distance itself from its secularist history. In the 
name of pluralism, secularism is to be subordinated to international freedom. 
Moreover, like all fundamentalism, secular fundamentalism ―is to be avoided and 
shunned in the conduct of foreign policy.‖ 1154 
Therefore, what is required is to reconsider the way IR relates to religion as 
well as to secularism with a view to strengthening political independence and 
international freedom and to forestalling value conflicts. If pluralism wants to 
‗acknowledge‘ and ‗accommodate‘ civilisational and cultural diversity around the 
world, it must renounce excluding religion from international dealings.
1155
 After all, 
secularism is not essential to the international pluralist architecture. Rather, in light of 
secularism‘s theological character and for the sake of international freedom, a 
potential solution would be for pluralism to re-open itself to religion. Indeed, the 
failure of the modern attempt to exorcise religion from politics induces us to embrace 
consciously that feature of modernity that had been until then repressed and dismissed.  
I believe that the ‗rehabilitation‘ of religion is all the more justified by the fact 
that the current movement beyond secularism is opening the door to ―an appreciation 
for the polymorphic quality of human experience from which religion can no longer 
be excluded.‖1156 Because of the ―rules and regulations imposed by the ‗plausibility 
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structures‘ of secular modernity,‖ the religious modality of experience was discarded 
– but not refuted.1157 But in light of secularism‘s limits, we are led to go beyond the 
―illusion that there can be only one valid system of truth‖ and to establish a more 
integral approach to knowledge - thereby opening the door to the re-enchantment of 
the world and to a deeper level of experience.
1158
  
As such, a possible solution would be to substitute the secular Westphalian 
language at the heart of pluralism with a post-secular normative dialogue between 
representatives of the competing worldviews. The institutional state-based framework 
within which norms are negotiated is not being questioned here. Rather, it is the 
secular common language in which claims and values are expressed and debated that 
is at stake. And I believe that it could be replaced by a post-secular dialogic search for 
truth that should be self-reflexive as well as cognitively and morally ‗multi-lingual,‘ 
i.e., it should uphold the cohabitation of both secular and religious languages.
1159
 This 
multi-lingual dialogue is beneficial to all since it truly shares the ‗cognitive burden‘ 
associated with the communication and exchange of beliefs and values between 
diverse religious and non-religious groups. Based on a deep sensitivity to the 
complexity of religion and on a profound self-critical assessment of the limits of 
secular reason, post-secularism opens an epistemic universe in which all sources of 
knowledge can cohabit without jeopardising the commitments of any one believer, 
whether secularist or religious. Such a dialogue could be established at the diplomatic 
level and institutionalised within international organisations. After all, the European 
Union and the United Nations are already engaged in cooperation with religious 
groups and faith communities. 
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Post-secularism should not be seen as a return to the religious intolerance of 
the Middle Ages. On the contrary, it frames interaction between believers and non-
believers as a ‗complementary learning process.‘ It requires all participants ―to learn 
and understand the moral languages being used by others, and they themselves would 
need to communicate in moral languages other than their own.‖1160 On the one hand, 
it requires non-believers to engage in ―a self-critical assessment of the limits of 
secular reason‖ and ―a self-reflexive overcoming of a rigid and exclusive secularist 
self-understanding of modernity.‖1161 On the other, it requires believers to reflexively 
relate their beliefs to those of other groups and to accept the authority of the 
constitutional state.
1162
 Ultimately, this does not necessarily threaten the prudential 
and procedural norms of the global covenant (non-intervention, state sovereignty, 
etc).
1163
 Malaysia‘s attempt to integrate Islam to the modern nation-state shows that 
pluralism and religion can cohabit. 
This call for the ‗rehabilitation‘ of religion is bound to raise many academic 
eyebrows and to revive deep-seated fears. After all religion and faith have long been 
denigrated and criticised as pre-modern superstitions and dangerous fancies. Some 
will argue that this post-secular project marks the death of pluralism since it fails to 
divorce the ―normative dialogue of world politics…from the values of particular 
civilizations.‖1164 By bringing religion into the political arena, it legitimises all forms 
of parochialism and thus endangers the peace. However, my point is that secularism is 
itself a threat to pluralism and that one must agree to move towards post-secularism to 
restore political independence. Being commensurable with freedom and inextricably 
connected to modernity, religion must be rehabilitated in the society of states as part 
                                                 
1160
 Ibid.: p.364. 
1161
 Jürgen Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere," European Journal of Philosophy 14, no. 1 
(2006): p.15. Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, p.138. 
1162
 Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere," p.14. ———, "Notes on Post-Secular Society," p.27. 
For all its virtues, I believe that Habermas‘s proposal fails to provide a solution to the issues it claims to 
address. His notion of complementary learning process remains biased in favour of secularism and I 
believe that it can only fulfil its professed goal by becoming ‗multi-lingual.‘ Cristina Lafont, "Religion 
in the Public Sphere: Remarks on Habermas's Conception of Public Deliberation in Postsecular 
Societies," Constellations 14, no. 2 (2007); Maeve Cooke, "Salvaging and Secularizing the Semantic 
Contents of Religion: The Limitations of Habermas's Postmetaphysical Proposal," International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 60, no. 1-3 (2006); Austin Harrington, "Habermas and the 'Post-
Secular Society'," European Journal of Social Theory 10, no. 4 (2007). 
1163
 Scott Thomas argues that ―the resurgence of religion poses no inherent threat to order in 
international society. What threatens international order are regimes that deny political participation 
and global inequality.‖ Thomas, "Religion and International Society," p.41. 
1164
 Jackson, The Global Covenant p.1. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion, Towards Post-Secular Pluralism 
 - 256 - 
of a ‗deeper pluralism.‘1165 Moreover, the reinstatement of faith at the heart of the 
international society of states is likely to strengthen a pluralist ethics through the 
humility and prudence it requires on the part of secularism. Indeed, the acceptance of 
the theological nature of the secular foundation of international politics requires 
secularists to realise that ―they never really rose as high‖ above civilisational 
parochialism as they quite believed.
1166
  
It is true that in most religious traditions there exist believers who reject the 
state as a satanic idol and earthly sovereignty as a sin against God and who consider it 
their duty ―to wage a continual crusade by one means or another against the infidel 
states…The institutions of the infidels, being godless and illegitimate, have no right to 
respect. Their states are not entitled to independent existence.‖1167 However, this over-
publicised and mediatised fundamentalist vision of the world should not prevent the 
onset of dialogue with the large majority of believers. Indeed, believers the world over 
accept the pluralist architecture of the world. For example, writing before the revival 
of religion, Majid Khadduri noted that ―[t]wentieth-century Islam found itself 
completely reconciled to the Western secular system.‖1168 While fundamentalist views 
need to be expressed, they should only be heard to the extent that their proponents 
adopt a non-authoritarian approach and accept the rules of the game.
1169
 At the end of 
the day, because they are only held by a small – though vocal – minority, these 
extremist views would influence the debates only marginally.
1170
 
In the world of the 21
st
 century, the recovery of the ‗spiritual energy‘ that 
dwells at the heart of secularism is necessary since ―[u]nless and until we understand 
the metaphysical, theological core of modernity, we will remain unable to understand 
religiously motivated antimodernism [sic] and our response to it.‖1171 To avoid being 
―perceived as crusaders of a competing religion or as salespeople of instrumental 
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reason and destructive secularization,‖ the legitimacy of faith must be accepted.1172 
The much disputed boundaries between faith and reason, secular politics and religion, 
―should therefore be seen as a cooperative task which requires both sides to take on 
the perspective of the other one.‖1173 On the road towards peace and concord amongst 
nations and between civilisations, the rehabilitation of religion within a post-secular 
pluralist framework is one of the most important steps to be taken.  
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